Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Material Dynamic Risk Management by Kreis, Steven Douglas
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Civil Engineering Civil Engineering 
2016 
Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Material Dynamic Risk 
Management 
Steven Douglas Kreis 
University of Kentucky, dougkreis@uky.edu 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.399 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Kreis, Steven Douglas, "Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Material Dynamic Risk Management" (2016). 
Theses and Dissertations--Civil Engineering. 47. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/ce_etds/47 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Civil Engineering at UKnowledge. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Civil Engineering by an authorized administrator of 
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Steven Douglas Kreis, Student 
Dr. Tim Taylor, Major Professor 
Dr. Y.T. Wang, Director of Graduate Studies 
TIER 1 HIGHWAY SECURITY SENSITIVE MATERIAL DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT 
DISSERTATION 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Engineering at the University of Kentucky 
By 
Steven Douglas Kreis 
Lexington, Kentucky 
Director: Dr. Tim Taylor, Professor of Civil Engineering 
Lexington, KY 
2016 
Copyright © Steven Douglas Kreis 2016 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
TIER 1 HIGHWAY SECURITY SENSITIVE MATERIAL DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT 
Each year, over 2 billion tons of hazardous materials are shipped in the United States, 
with over half of that being moved on commercial vehicles. Given their relatively poor 
or nonexistent defenses and inconspicuousness, commercial vehicles transporting 
hazardous materials are an easy target for terrorists. Before carriers or security agencies 
recognize that something is amiss, their contents could be detonated or released. From 
2006 to 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) recorded 144,643 incidents involving a release 
of hazardous materials. Although there were no known instances of terrorism being the 
cause, accidental releases involving trucks carrying hazardous materials are not an 
uncommon occurrence. At this time, no systems have been developed and 
operationalized to monitor the movement of vehicles transporting hazardous materials. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to propose a comprehensive risk management system 
for monitoring Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs) which are shipped 
aboard commercial vehicles in the U.S. 
Chapter 2 examines the history and current state of hazardous materials transportation. 
Since the late 19th century, the federal government often introduced new regulations in 
response to hazardous materials incidents. However, over the past 15 years few binding 
policies or legislation have been enacted. This demonstrates that government agencies 
and the U.S. Congress are not inclined to introduce new laws and rules that could 
hamper business. In 2003, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and 
other agencies led efforts to develop a prototype hazardous materials tracking system 
(PHTS) that mapped the location of hazardous materials shipments and quantified the 
level of risk associated with each one. The second half of this chapter uses an in-depth 
gap analysis to identify deficiencies and demonstrate in what areas the prototype 
system does not comply with government specifications. 
Chapter 3 addresses the lack of customized risk equations for Tier 1 HSSMs and 
develops a new set of risk equations that can be used to dynamically evaluate the level 
of risk associated with individual hazardous materials shipments. This chapter also 
discusses the results of a survey that was administered to public and private industry 
stakeholders. Its purpose was to understand the current state of hazardous materials 
regulations, the likelihood of hazardous materials release scenarios, what precautionary 
measures can be used, and what influence social variables may have on the aggregate 
consequences of a hazardous materials release. The risk equation developed in this 
paper takes into account the survey responses as well as those risk structures already in 
place. The overriding goal is to preserve analytical tractability, implement a form that is 
usable by federal agencies, and provide stakeholders with accurate information about 
the risk profiles of different vehicles. Due to congressional inaction on hazardous 
materials transportation issues, securing support from carriers and other industry 
stakeholders is the most viable solution to bolstering hazardous materials security.  
Chapter 4 presents the system architecture for The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk 
Assessment Framework (DHMRA), a GIS-based environment in which hazardous 
materials shipments can be monitored in real time. A case study is used to demonstrate 
the proposed risk equation; it simulates a hazardous materials shipment traveling from 
Ashland, Kentucky to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The DHMRA maps risk data, affording 
security personnel and other stakeholders the opportunity to evaluate how and why risk 
profiles vary across time and space. DHRMA’s geo-fencing capabilities also trigger 
automatic warnings. This framework, once fully implemented, can inform more targeted 
policies to enhance the security of hazardous materials. It will contribute to maintaining 
secure and efficient supply chains while protecting the communities that live nearest to 
the most heavily trafficked routes. Continuously monitoring hazardous materials 
provides a viable way to understand the risks presented by a shipment at a given 
moment and enables better, more coordinated responses in the event of a release.  
Implementation of DHRMA will be challenging because it requires material and 
procedural changes that could disrupt agency operations or business practices — at 
least temporarily. Nevertheless, DHRMA stands ready for implementation, and to make 
the shipment of hazardous materials a more secure, safe, and certain process.  Although 
DHMRA was designed primarily with terrorism in mind, it is also useful for examining the 
impacts of accidental hazardous materials releases. Future iterations of DHMRA could 
expand on its capabilities by incorporating modeling data on the release and dispersion 
of toxic gases, liquids, and other substances.  
KEYWORDS:  Hazardous Materials Transportation, Commercial Vehicles, 
Risk Management, Tier 1 HSSMs, GIS-based Architecture 
Steven Doug Kreis 
October 3, 2016 
TIER 1 HIGHWAY SECURITY SENSITIVE MATERIAL DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT 
By 
Steven Douglas Kreis 
Dr. Tim Taylor 
Director of Dissertation  
Y.T. Wang 
Director of Graduate Studies 
October 3, 2016 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my committee: Dr. Tim Taylor (Chair), Dr. Gabriel Dadi, Dr. William 
Maloney, Dr. Dwight Denison, and Dr. Ram Pakath. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, my family, and a few select friends for 
their unfailing support of this endeavor. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION ................................................................................................i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................iii 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. ..vi
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................vii  
Chapter 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Transportation Security ............................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Risk Management of Hazardous Materials Shipments ............................................. 3 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation ............................................................................... 6 
Chapter 2 The Current State of Hazardous Materials Shipping in the United States .... 15 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 15 
2.2 Background on Transportation of Hazardous Materials Regulations .................... 19 
2.3 Prototype Hazmat Tracking System (PHTS) — Background, Description, and 
Accomplishments .......................................................................................................... 29 
2.4 Operational Testing Results and Gap Analysis ........................................................ 34 
2.4.1 Methodology .................................................................................................... 34 
2.4.2 Findings and Gap Analysis ................................................................................ 38 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 3 Quantitative Risk Assessment ........................................................................ 48 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 48 
3.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 51 
3.3 Methodology and Methodological Justification ..................................................... 60 
3.4 Survey Results and Discussion ................................................................................ 65 
3.5 An Equation for Assessing the Risk of Tier 1 HSSMs ............................................... 72 
3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 80 
Chapter 4 The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment Framework—DHMRA 82 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 82 
4.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 87 
4.3 Methodology — Spatially Explicit Modeling of Tier 1 HSSM Shipment Risks ........ 93 
4.3.1 Calculating Risk ................................................................................................ 93 
v 
4.3.2 Conceptual Architecture of the Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment 
Framework ................................................................................................................ 96 
4.4 Case Study: Calculating and Visualizing the Risk of Simulated Hazardous Materials 
Shipments ................................................................................................................... 101 
4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 107 
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Recommendations ................................................. 109 
APPENDIX A Survey Results Tables................................................................................ 115 
APPENDIX B IRB Review and Approval .......................................................................... 168 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 226 
VITA ................................................................................................................................. 236 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 Tier 1 HSSMs...................................................................................................... 18 
Table 2.2 SAI Categories and Provisions ........................................................................... 26 
Table 2.3 Events Recognized in the PHTS ......................................................................... 31 
Table 2.4 Key Gaps Identified in the PHTS ........................................................................ 39 
Table 2.5 Quantitative Summary of Problems Identified in PHTS .................................... 42 
Table 3.1 Application of the Kent Scale by THRTA ........................................................... 57 
Table 3.2 Summary of Definitions for Threats, Vulnerability, and Consequences by Risk 
Assessment System ........................................................................................................... 59 
Table 3.3 Attack Modes Used to Populate Risk Equation................................................. 73 
Table 3.4 Kent Scale for Vno failure (tech) ................................................................................ 77 
Table 3.5 Sample Consequence Equivalence Table……………………………………………………… 79 
Table 4.1 Summary of Injuries, Death, and Financial Damages Attributable to Hazardous 
Materials Incidents in 2016 .............................................................................................. 83 
Table 4.2 Shipping Profiles for Simulated Case Study .................................................... 102 
Table 4.3 Sample Risk Scores for Chlorine Shipments in Rural, Urban, and High-Threat 
Urban Areas .................................................................................................................... 106 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Screenshot of TEAMS Interface ....................................................................... 33 
Figure 3.1 Meyer and Booker's Presentation of the Kent Scale. ...................................... 63 
Figure 4.1 Screen Capture of the SSD’s Situational Awareness Screen ............................ 98 
Figure 4.2 Screen Capture of the SSD’s Research Screen ................................................. 99 
Figure 4.3 Screen Capture of SSD’s Action Screen.......................................................... 101 
Figure 4.4 Risk Score Trend Lines for Simulated Trip ..................................................... 103 
Figure 4.5 Sample Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Score for a Shipment of 
Chlorine Gas .................................................................................................................... 104 
Figure 4.6  Spatial Distribution of Risk for a Chlorine Shipment .................................... 105 
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Transportation Security 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that terrorism produces lethal 
consequences. Unsettling and disturbing, the events of 9/11 revealed that terrorist acts 
could be aimed effectively at domestic targets on a large scale — something that most 
people would have found unthinkable before that day. Although the attacks were not 
the first instance of commercial airliners being involved in terrorist attacks (e.g., Pan Am 
Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988; Air India Flight 182 was 
downed by a bomb while flying over the Atlantic Ocean in June 1985), they are 
especially notable because terrorists seized control of four aircraft, transforming them 
into missile-like weapons to immolate high-value assets. The attacks showed vehicles 
(airplanes, ships, commercial vehicles) could readily be weaponized by determined 
terrorists to inflict significant damage. Understandably, in the immediate aftermath of 
these attacks, Congress, the president, and other government stakeholders immediately 
sought to introduce new laws, regulations, and oversight designed to prevent future 
terrorist acts. Much of the initial focus was on improving the safety of air transportation. 
In November of 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was signed into law, 
which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA was given 
responsibility for overseeing aviation security, as well as the security of highways, 
railroads, mass transit, pipelines, and ports — although it was and continues to be most 
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closely identified with aviation. While aviation was the government’s primary concern, 
there were some initial efforts to improve the security of commercial vehicles that 
transported hazardous materials. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Administration 
scrutinized the operations of over 36,000 motor carriers deemed vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks. Early attempts to pass new legislation, such as a law to impose stricter 
regulations on individuals attempting to earn commercial vehicle licenses to transport 
hazardous materials, were unsuccessful. The preoccupation with aviation left the 
potential risks associated with other modes of transportation underappreciated and 
unaddressed, especially those posed by vehicles carrying hazardous materials.  
Each year, over 2 billion tons of hazardous materials are shipped in the United 
States, with over half of that being moved on commercial vehicles. The total value of 
hazardous materials shipped on trucks exceeded $800 billion in 2007 (FHWA, 2013). The 
manufacture and shipping of hazardous materials is expected to rise steadily over the 
next 30 years because they are essential to many of the products and services that 
underpin modern life. But hazardous materials are routinely left unsecured and are not 
tracked closely from the time they are loaded into containers and trailers until they 
arrive at their destination. Given that they are both unsecured and highly dangerous, 
they present an attractive target to terrorists because they can be readily seized and 
weaponized. Jones et al. (2010) discussed the potential of terrorists using chlorine gas as 
an unconventional but deadly weapon to cause significant numbers of injuries and 
fatalities. Because it is used in numerous processes, ranging from the manufacture of 
paper, plastics, and chemical products, to the municipal treatment of sewage and 
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drinking water supplies, large quantities are shipped every day throughout the U.S. 
Gussow (2007) reported on simulations which demonstrated that releasing chlorine gas 
in densely populated urban areas could produce fatalities in excess of 15,000 and over 
100,000 injuries. In 2007, a train collision resulted in the release of 90 tons of chlorine 
gas new Graniteville, South Carolina. Nine people died and 5,400 of the town’s 7,000 
residents were evacuated (Jones et al., 2010; see also Van Sickle et al., 2009). Other 
incidents in 2007, in Tacoma, Washington and Las Vegas, vented much smaller 
quantities of chlorine gas, resulting in a small number of minor injuries. While these 
releases were accidental, they illustrate the danger posed by a single hazardous 
material.  
1.2 Risk Management of Hazardous Materials Shipments 
Incidents involving trucks carrying hazardous materials are not an uncommon 
occurrence. From 2006 to 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) recorded 144,643 incidents 
(PHMSA defines incident as the unintentional release of hazardous materials), which 
were responsible for 1,519 injuries, 99 fatalities, and over $600 million in economic 
damages. While PHMSA does not specify the cause of releases in its summary statistics, 
there are no known instances of terrorism being the cause of domestic incidents. 
Rather, accidental releases during transit, loading, unloading, and storage are the 
primary culprit. Nevertheless, these statistics underscore that the safety and security of 
hazardous materials are major concerns, and that even in the absence of deliberate 
efforts to intentionally release these substances, tracking and monitoring their location 
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and movement could produce valuable benefits. While the incidents that have occurred 
since 2006 have exacted considerable economic damage and inflicted numerous 
injuries, these numbers pale in comparison to what might unfold if attackers were to 
detonate a highly flammable material or vent extremely toxic gases in urban areas. As 
the recent events in Nice, France remind us, a determined terrorist can easily 
weaponized a single vehicle to injure or kill many defenseless individuals. Although this 
attack did not involve the use of hazardous materials, it is easy to imagine the 
consequences of a rogue terrorist commandeering a commercial vehicle with these 
substances onboard.  
Closely monitoring and tracking the location and movement of hazardous 
materials transported by commercial vehicles cannot eliminate the possibility of future 
releases (intentional or accidental). However, this knowledge can reduce the likelihood 
or mitigate the effects of potential attacks directed at commercial vehicles with onboard 
hazardous materials. Knowledge of pickup and drop-off points, as well as planned 
routing, can assist stakeholders with identifying anomalous driver behaviors, potential 
and emerging threats, and ongoing incidents. In the case of hazardous materials 
incidents, this information can assist officials in coordinating emergency responses and 
mitigating their worst effects. Yet no systems have been developed and operationalized 
to monitor the movement of vehicles transporting hazardous materials in the U.S.    
The purpose of this dissertation is to propose a comprehensive risk management 
system for monitoring Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs) which are 
shipped aboard commercial vehicles in the U.S. The need for such a system is clear. 
5 
Although the federal government and researchers have made previous attempts to 
develop systems to improve the risk management of hazardous materials, none have 
been entirely successful. The creation of new systems has principally been undertaken 
by the federal government, whereas academic researchers have tended to focus on 
micro-scale problems, such as developing equations to quantify the risk posed by 
individual shipments or the level of exposure for particular road segments or population 
centers (see Chapters 3 and 4).  
This dissertation contributes to ongoing discussions among both researchers and 
public and private stakeholders by 1) mapping out the architecture of a hazardous 
materials tracking system that will provide instantaneous and continuously updated 
spatial data on the location, movement, and logistical facets of Tier 1 HSSM shipments; 
and 2) parameterizing a set of risk equations which can be used to quantify the amount 
of risk (i.e., the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences; see Chapter 3) associated 
with individual shipments, and which are compatible with existing methodologies used 
by the federal government to analyze risk. These equations underpin the proposed risk 
management system. As such, this dissertation addresses the micro-scale problems 
academic researchers have long grappled with — how to parsimoniously calculate a 
shipment’s risk profile and its spatial variability — as well as the broader problem of 
integrating all of the data collected on individual shipments into a single risk 
management framework and system that stakeholders can use to understand the 
dynamic nature of risk, so they can then devise appropriate plans to prevent, mitigate, 
or respond to a deliberate or accidental release of hazardous materials. While the 
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system’s development was motivated to address issues related to terrorism, it serves as 
a valuable tool to coordinate responses to accidental hazardous materials releases (see 
below for more on academic and applied contributions). Certainly, by including only Tier 
1 HSSMs the system’s focus is narrow. However, Tier 1 HSSMs are the most dangerous 
materials shipped on U.S. highways, the gases and substances which, if released, are 
most likely to inflict massive damage and cause widespread injuries and fatalities. 
Improving our risk management of these materials is critical for securing the hazardous 
materials supply chain. The risk equations and system architecture can potentially serve 
as the foundation for an expansive risk management framework that applies to all 
hazardous materials.     
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of three interrelated chapters, each of which is a 
standalone paper. While each paper can be read individually, they build upon one 
another. Taken as a group, they offer a cohesive narrative of the risk management 
system’s conceptualization and development. The following paragraphs briefly describe 
the aims and findings of each chapter.        
Chapter 2 begins with a historical overview of hazardous materials 
transportation industry regulations in the U.S. Since the late 19th century, the federal 
government has expanded its regulatory efforts. Often, new regulations have been 
introduced in response to hazardous materials incidents, which illuminated regulatory 
failings. The last major piece of legislation signed into law which dealt explicitly with 
hazardous materials transportation was the 1990 Hazardous Materials Transportation 
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Uniform Safety Act (later amended and revised in 1994). Although the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks prompted the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to conduct 
rapid inspections of motor carriers whose operations were deemed vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks — including many hazardous materials transporters — they did not lead 
to new, extensive regulations. Instead, minor legislation was passed in 2003 requiring 
carriers that transport hazardous materials to establish and implement security plans. 
The FMCSA also introduced a new program that instructed hazardous materials carriers 
to obtain safety permits when transporting certain high-risk materials (see 69 FR 39350). 
Despite these incremental changes, 9/11 changed little with respect to hazardous 
materials regulation, with the federal government opting for piecemeal reforms. This 
has left most security measures in the hands of individual carriers. In 2008, TSA issued 
voluntary Security Action Items for carriers that transport highway security sensitive 
materials; however, no binding legislation based on these items has been passed, and it 
is unclear whether any will be forthcoming. Nevertheless, in 2003, FMCSA and other 
agencies began to explore methods to monitor and track vehicles that were carrying 
hazardous materials. Eventually, these efforts led to the development of a prototype 
hazardous materials tracking system (PHTS) that imported locational data derived from 
truck telematics systems into a GIS-based software platform to map the location of 
hazardous materials shipments and to quantify the level of risk associated with each 
one.  
The second half of Chapter 2 uses an in-depth gap analysis to identify the 
system’s methodological and technical deficiencies. The purpose of the gap analysis is to 
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demonstrate in what areas the prototype system does not comply with government 
specifications. While development of the PHTS demonstrated the feasibility of a 
sophisticated monitoring and tracking system, it was not customized for Tier 1 HSSMs; 
omitted equations that could accurately evaluate the risk posed by individual 
shipments; had a geo-fencing solution which performed inconsistently; and could not 
facilitate communication between government agencies, carriers, and emergency 
responders. In examining both the hazardous materials transportation regulatory 
landscape and the PHTS, the paper contributes to ongoing discussions about how to 
improve the safety and security of hazardous materials. Despite its flaws, the PHTS 
offers a foundation on which to build future efforts. Given congressional reluctance to 
impose new laws or regulations, developing a robust monitoring and tracking program 
with the assistance of carriers and other industry stakeholders is potentially the most 
viable solution to bolster hazardous materials security. A suitable tracking program will 
also provide valuable data to carriers and facilitate more efficient supply chain 
management. Chapter 2 recommends developing a monitoring and tracking system for 
Tier 1 HSSMs and developing refined risk assessment and management tools — based 
on feedback from public and private stakeholders.  
Chapter 3 addresses one of the PHTS’s key failings — the lack of customized risk 
equations for Tier 1 HSSMs — by developing a new set of risk equations that can be 
used to dynamically evaluate the level of risk associated with individual hazardous 
materials shipments. After reviewing risk management systems currently used at federal 
and state transportation agencies, this chapter discusses the results of a comprehensive 
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survey that was administered to public and private industry stakeholders. The purpose 
of the survey was to understand the current state of hazardous materials regulations, 
the likelihood of various accidental and intentional hazardous materials release 
scenarios, what precautionary measures can be used to eliminate or mitigate the 
consequences of particular release scenarios, and what influence a number of social 
variables (e.g., population, economic impact) have on the aggregate consequences of a 
hazardous materials release. Respondents answered questions using a modified version 
of the Kent Scale (Meyer & Booker, 1991). Adopting the Kent Scale opened up the 
possibility of converting qualitative responses to quantitative scores, which established 
the necessary foundation to craft new risk equations. Survey participants viewed the 
majority of attack scenarios as more likely than not to occur at some point in the future. 
Under a majority of the scenarios, respondents felt there is between a 20 and 50 
percent chance of attackers failing due to preventative security measures or technical 
incompetence. Twenty-three survey questions dealt with proposed TSA Security Action 
Items. Overwhelmingly, respondents claimed it was somewhat important, very 
important, or extremely important for stakeholders to implement these items. 
Respondents said that population density, critical infrastructure, economic activity, and 
public fear are the most important contributors to the aggregate impacts of a hazardous 
materials release. Based on these findings, a straightforward risk equation is developed 
that can be used to estimate the level of risk posed by individual shipments1. The 
1 While the risk equation is a single equation (Risk = Threats x Vulnerabilities x Consequences), it combines 
values derived from discrete equations, which are used to calculate threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences, respectively. 
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equation leverages definitions of risk used by the Department of Homeland Security, 
TSA, and other federal agencies, all of which conceptualize risk as the product of 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. The proposed equation may be calculated 
iteratively and at specified intervals to quantify the spatial and temporal variability of 
risk. Employing a spatially explicit approach to risk (further elaborated on in Chapter 4) 
ensures that carriers and government agencies have real-time knowledge of its 
variability. It underscores the fact that risk is most elevated in densely populated urban 
areas with a large number of critical assets and vibrant economic activity. The overriding 
goal in creating the risk equation was to preserve analytical tractability, implement a 
form that is usable by federal agencies, and provide stakeholders with accurate 
information about the risk profiles of different vehicles. 
Taking the PHTS and risk equation as points of departure, Chapter 4 presents the 
system architecture for a GIS-based environment in which hazardous materials 
shipments can be monitored in real time. It also includes a case study to demonstrate 
the application of the risk equation. The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment 
Framework (DHMRA) combines a GIS-based desktop application with an underlying risk 
engine, which iteratively calculates the risk levels of various shipments, to assess vehicle 
risk dynamically. Although the risk scores generated by the risk equation provide 
valuable information, without a corresponding means to locate and visualize individual 
shipments’ risk profile, the data would be unusable. The DHMRA maps risk data, 
affording security personnel and other stakeholders the opportunity to evaluate how 
and why risk profiles vary across time and space. The DHRMA desktop environment 
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contains three situational screens that let security personnel zero in on different 
attributes of hazardous materials shipments. It lets users quickly access shipment data, 
including its contents, planned departure and arrival times, and a detailed analysis of 
risk status. Users have the ability to flag shipments for additional investigation if they 
feel it is warranted, however, DHRMA’s geo-fencing capabilities also trigger automatic 
warnings. Warnings are precipitated by a shipment deviating from its route plan, 
transgressing a geo-fence, or receiving elevated risk scores. The chapter’s case study 
simulates a hazardous materials shipment traveling from Ashland, Kentucky to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; providing detailed analysis of the risk posed by a shipment 
of chlorine gas. There is a positive correlation among threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence scores. These scores peak when the shipment moves into major urban 
areas, such as Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Taken together with 
Chapter 3, the material in Chapter 4 demonstrates the importance of having a risk 
management system which is attuned to the contingency of risk. A shipment’s risk 
profile is a direct consequence of its location. For example, hazardous materials 
shipments traveling on rural highway networks pose significantly less risk than those 
situated near densely populated urban areas. If an intentional or accidental release 
were to occur in urban locations, the human, economic, and environmental costs would 
be staggering. The system’s mapping environment, by placing all shipments on one 
screen, lets security analysts identify areas in which a large number of vehicles with 
hazardous materials onboard are traveling. This information could potentially be used to 
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inform routing decisions, and in the event of an incident, orchestrate an appropriate 
response.    
This dissertation makes several important contributions to the academic 
literature on hazardous materials transportation. In its historical analysis, the 
dissertation illuminates a little-noticed, scarcely commented upon trend in hazardous 
materials regulation — that while regulations expanded throughout the 20th century, 
over the past 15 years few binding policies or legislation have been enacted. This is 
interesting for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that government agencies and the 
U.S. Congress are not inclined to introduce new laws and rules that could hamper 
business. This is consistent with the push toward deregulation that has prevailed within 
the U.S. economy over the last 30-40 years (e.g., Marten, 1981; Belzer, 1994; Berger & 
Mester, 2003; Johnston & Nath, 2004; Calomiris, 2006). Second, this suggests that 
despite increased concerns that terrorists will target commercial vehicles transporting 
extremely volatile and dangerous substances, government stakeholders are unwilling to 
establish mandatory procedures that shippers, carriers, and other stakeholders must 
abide by. This raises a crucial question: under what circumstances would the political 
incentives exist to tighten regulations on hazardous materials shipments? The TSA’s 
2008 voluntary Security Action Items have been endorsed by numerous stakeholders, 
including the majority of those surveyed as part of this research. Lacking some 
cataclysmic event, it is unlikely that TSA or government agencies will press the case to 
enforce these rules.  
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Moving beyond the historical analysis in Chapter 2, this dissertation’s second 
major contribution is the development of new methods to assess and monitor the risk 
posed by commercial vehicles shipping hazardous materials. Knowing that it is unlikely 
new laws will require stakeholders to monitor and track shipments, the purpose of the 
risk management system is to improve public safety while incentivizing private 
industries to submit to a tracking and monitoring program. The risk equations and 
software described in Chapters 3 and 4 give public agencies the tools they need to 
quantify risk and plan for and manage responses to intentional or accidental releases of 
hazardous materials while offering industry stakeholders critical information that can be 
used to manage supply chains and optimize the routing of individual shipments. Because 
the risk equations are consistent with methodologies currently used by various 
government agencies, implementation can be seamless. In devising these equations, 
ensuring that they took on a form compatible with existing definitions and methods of 
calculation was a critical emphasis. Otherwise, the resulting system would be 
functionally useless because agencies would be disinclined to use it. Thus, the risk 
assessment methodologies draw from and complement academic literature while at the 
same time provide a practical application. 
Generally, the overall success of a dissertation is measured in terms of how 
successfully it intervenes into ongoing discussions among research practitioners. 
Although the risk management concepts and methodologies proposed here certainly 
accomplish this, perhaps this dissertation’s most important contribution lies in the 
potential contributions it could make to overhauling the day-to-day execution of risk 
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analysis and management. Because the ideas advanced in this document are based on 
the input of private and public stakeholders, it stands to reason that they are relatively 
uncontroversial. But even when stakeholders endorse an idea in the abstract, 
implementation remains a challenge precisely because it would entail material and 
procedural changes that could disrupt agency operations or business practices — at 
least temporarily. Nevertheless, DHRMA stands ready for implementation, and to make 
the shipment of hazardous materials a more secure, safe, and certain process.   
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Chapter 2 The Current State of Hazardous Materials Shipping in the United States 
2.1 Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated how quickly an 
airplane could be weaponized and transformed into a machine capable of producing 
enormous damage to infrastructure and loss of human life. Policymakers mobilized in 
the days and months following 9/11 to establish new regulations intended to enhance 
the safety and security of air travel and public and governmental facilities. Although 
most early policies and rulemaking did not focus on surface transportation, there were 
some exceptions. For instance, Senator Orin Hatch introduced legislation in October of 
2001 that would impose new regulations on issuing licenses to vehicle operators who 
transport hazardous materials. The bill would have prevented states from issuing 
licenses to these individuals “unless the Secretary of Transportation has first 
determined, upon receipt of notification…that the individual does not pose a security 
risk warranting denial of the license” (107th Congress, S. 1569). Ultimately, this bill did 
not pass. However, the bill revealed that members of Congress recognized the potential 
for highway motor carrier vehicles carrying hazardous materials to be weaponized and 
used to carry out terrorist attacks. 
Over the next few years, new regulations and programs trickled out of the 
federal government.  These regulations and policies were designed to protect the 
United States’ hazardous materials supply chain, with an emphasis on highway motor 
carriers. Along with the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration and 
Department of Homeland Security, new regulations were introduced to strengthen the 
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federal government’s authority to monitor hazardous materials shipments. However, 
there have been no new sweeping regulations since 9/11 that apply strictly to 
hazardous materials transported on surface transportation networks. Despite the lack of 
new regulations, there has been sporadic yet severely lacking progress on this front. In 
2003, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration performed a study to evaluate 
the appropriateness of using smart truck technologies to enhance the monitoring of 
hazardous cargoes loaded on trucks. As a follow-up study in 2005, the federal 
government outsourced development and testing of a prototype truck-tracking system. 
This test appraised the feasibility of comprehensively monitoring hazardous materials 
shipments, in real time, from a centralized truck-tracking center.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the security of hazardous materials 
transportation by situating today’s regulatory policies within their proper historical 
context and demonstrating that fulfilling current regulatory mandates will demand 
increasingly sophisticated technologies to monitor the location and movement of 
hazardous goods. Using a gap analysis, this research demonstrates that a prototype 
system developed on behalf of the U.S. government to track hazardous materials 
shipments is inadequate and operationally deficient — it fails to meet the specifications 
required by the government. Identifying the gap between the current system 
performance and U.S. government expectations is used as a starting point to determine 
what changes would be necessary for a system to conduct real-time monitoring of all 
Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs). This gap analysis is essential for 
developing a new system architecture because it illuminates what changes should be 
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incorporated into the system’s design and architecture to ensure it achieves optimal 
performance and meets regulatory standards (e.g., Akerman & Tyree, 2006; Blanchard, 
2008). This task is critical, given that each year there are over two million shipments of 
Tier 1 HSSMs traveling across the country’s highways. Some of the most dangerous, 
poisonous, and toxic gases, explosives, and chemicals have been designated as Tier 1 
HSSMs. Table 2.1 summarizes what materials have been classified as Tier 1 HSSMs, with 
examples from each hazard class provided. 
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Table 2.1 Tier 1 HSSMs 
DOT Hazard Class Description of Hazard Example Materials 
Division 1.1 Explosives Substances that have the 
potential to catalyze a mass 
explosion 
Blasting caps 
Blasting explosives 
Trinitrobenzene 
Division 1.2 Explosives Substances that have a projection 
hazard but will not trigger a mass 
explosion 
Some fireworks 
Grenades 
Weapons cartridges 
Division 1.3 Explosives Substances vulnerable to fire 
hazards, minor blast hazards, or 
minor projection hazards 
Photo-flash bomb 
Display fireworks 
Some ammunition 
Division 2.2 Non-Flammable 
Gas 
Non-toxic, non-flammable gases  Corrosive aerosols 
Insecticide gases 
Refrigerated neon 
Division 2.3 Poisonous Gas* Gases that are poisonous when 
inhaled by humans; in the form of 
gas at 20° C or less and a pressure 
of 101.3 kPa 
Chlorine 
Dinitrogen tetroxide 
Hydrogen sulfide 
Class 3: Flammable Liquids Any liquid that has a flash point 
that is not above 60.5° C 
Gasoline 
Heating oil 
Hexanes 
Division 6.1 Poisonous 
Materials* 
Materials other than gas which 
are toxic to humans 
Arsenic 
Carbon tetrachloride 
Chloroform 
Class 7 Radioactive Materials Materials that emit radiation Uranium hexafluoride 
Radioactive materials 
Class 8 Corrosive Materials A liquid or solid that destroys 
human skin within a specified 
period of time; it also produces a 
severe corrosion rate in aluminum 
or steel 
Copper chloride 
Fire extinguisher charges 
Hydrochloric acid 
Other Materials Any quantity of chemicals listed 
by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention — Schedules 1, 2 and 
3  
Phosgene 
Mustard gas 
Ricin 
* The TSA Highway & Motor Carrier Program sets variable threshold amounts for different materials in 
these divisions based on the Hazard Zone a material falls under. For both Divisions, the thresholds are as 
follows: Hazard Zone A and B, ≥ 2.3 kg in a single package; Hazard Zone C and D, ≥ 3000 L or 3000 kg in a 
single bulk package. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. It begins with a 
historical narrative of the federal government’s approach to hazardous materials 
regulation, dating to the late 19th century. This is necessary to properly contextualize 
regulatory trends since 9/11. The next section describes the prototype truck-tracking 
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system and the testing that was conducted to evaluate its performance, with the 
primary emphasis being on what this assessment proved about the feasibility of 
implementing a sophisticated monitoring system. While this system was generally 
successful and served a proof of concept, the ensuing gap analysis clarifies deficiencies 
and identifies obstacles to implementing it on a wider scale. The concluding section 
recaps the analysis and discusses the future of hazardous materials tracking for surface 
transportation networks. The discussion ends with an explanation on how a fully 
functioning monitoring system would be designed and operated. 
2.2 Background on Transportation of Hazardous Materials Regulations 
Although a significant amount of research has historically situated the evolution 
of hazardous materials regulation and waste management in the United States (e.g., 
Colten, 1988; Jenkins et al., 2008; LaGrega et al., 2010), comparatively little work has 
examined the evolution in policies related to hazardous materials being transported on 
surface transportation networks (Field, 2004). Although there is no clear explanation for 
why this is the case, it is likely related to scholars tending to focus more on sited 
materials (i.e., those which occupy a single location and are not moved) and the 
implications they have for local populations, environments, and the uneven patterns of 
exposure that have resulted from hazardous waste disposal (e.g., Russell et al., 1992;  
Mohai & Saha, 2007; Elliott & Frickel, 2013; Taylor, 2014). Although this is 
understandable, it overlooks the enormous amounts of hazardous materials that have 
and will continue to move on United States highways — over 800,000 shipments per 
day. Horton et al. (2003) demonstrated that thousands of incidents involving vehicles 
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carrying hazardous materials resulted in injuries or fatalities. While the threat posed by 
fixed materials is undeniable and severe, the ubiquity of hazardous materials transport 
raises critical issues about how its regulatory landscape has evolved, what aspects of 
transport policies and rulemaking have been targeted, and whether new regulations 
have increased the vulnerability of some populations (e.g., Schweitzer, 2006). In 
general, new regulations have been introduced in response to crises that either involved 
large-scale materials releases or events that exposed key vulnerabilities in 
transportation security laws and practices.   
Until 1866, there were no federal laws in the United States regulating the 
transportation of hazardous materials. Although explosives and other materials were 
moved via railways and other modes prior to this, oversight was established through 
contractual agreements between shippers and carriers (OTA, 1986). Following the rapid 
industrialization in the aftermath of the Civil War, increasing amounts of oil and other 
materials were transported by horses, river barges, and eventually by rail cars and ships. 
It became evident that the federal government would need to step in to provide greater 
oversight of hazardous substances that endangered human life and infrastructure (TRB, 
2003). In July 1866, a new law was enacted that gave the federal government the 
authority to regulate and provide oversight of hazardous materials — specifically, 
shipments of explosives and combustible materials. In 1871, another statute was 
enacted which levied criminal penalties against anyone transporting hazardous 
materials on passenger vessels traveling on navigable waterways in violation of Treasury 
Department regulations (OTA, 1986). A key event for hazardous materials oversight 
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occurred in 1908, when the Explosives and Combustibles Act (later, the Explosives and 
Other Dangerous Articles Act) gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the authority 
to issue regulations pertaining to packing, marking, loading, and handing explosives and 
other hazardous materials that were bound for transit. Under this new law, the 
transportation of hazardous materials was prohibited unless approved by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. From the 1920s to the 1960s, hazardous materials regulations 
that were first applied to railroads were then extended to other modes of 
transportation (OTA, 1986).   
Hazardous materials governance remained more or less unchanged until the late 
1960s, when the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) was formed. All oversight of 
hazardous materials then fell to the USDOT and a number of subsidiary departments 
within it, creating a sort of regulatory patchwork (some would argue that has remained 
in effect through now). Efforts to pass a comprehensive hazardous materials 
transportation bill stalled in the U.S. Congress until the early 1970s. Interestingly, a new 
push for regulation did not occur until an accident involving a cargo jet transporting 
hazardous materials occurred in 1973. This incident underscored that shippers routinely 
did not comply with existing regulations and lacked knowledge about newly installed 
federal rules pertaining to hazardous materials transport (e.g., the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Control Act of 1970; OTA, 1986).  
The cargo plane crash was key in motivating the passage of the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) of 1975, the purpose of which was to “improve 
regulatory and enforcement activities by providing the Secretary of Transportation with 
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broad authority to set regulations applicable to all modes of transport” (OTA, 1986, p. 
148). Although the Secretary was given this power, the Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA) gained the rulemaking authority for issues related to transporting 
hazardous materials (TRB, 2002). RSPA, which houses the Office of Hazardous Materials, 
also enforces compliance to ensure that shippers — as well as manufacturers and 
repairers of hazardous materials containers — abide by federal laws. The HMTA of 1975 
remained the controlling law until 1990, when the Hazardous Materials Transportation 
Uniform Safety Act (HMTUSA) was signed into law. What precipitated this update was 
growing public awareness of hazardous materials shipments, which at the time 
numbered approximately 500,000 per day (Boyd, 1993; Cutter & Ji, 1997). The new law 
attempted to increase public safety by creating a more uniform regulatory landscape 
that would eliminate discrepancies between state and local enforcement. The 1990 Act 
addressed these issues by preempting state and local laws related to hazardous 
materials transportation which did not conform to federal laws and regulations (Boyd, 
1993). Further, the HMTUSA mandated that shippers and carriers that handled 
hazardous materials were to register at least once every five years and pay an annual 
registration fee. This law also introduced new requirements related to highway routing, 
emergency response training, incident notification, and vehicle safety permits, among 
other issues (Cutter & Ji, 1997). Another update to the Act in 1994 strengthened the 
USDOT’s authority to mandate that shippers and carriers of hazardous materials submit 
a registration to the federal government. Companies whose vehicles were involved in 
accidents while transporting hazardous materials were also required to report all 
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incidents to the USDOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration, which oversaw 
transport-related hazardous materials regulations (Field, 2004)2. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter, 9/11) prompted elected 
and public officials across all levels of government to rethink and change their approach 
to transportation security. In the 1980s and 1990s, most regulatory attention was 
focused on mitigating the accidental or incidental release of hazardous substance due to 
container failures (e.g., Abkowitz et al., 1989). However, what 9/11 crystallized was that 
the federal government would need to adopt new planning procedures and rules to deal 
with deliberate releases of hazardous materials. Indeed, just after 9/11 there were a 
number of arrests made and people charged with fraudulently procuring licenses to 
transport hazardous waste materials, individuals suspected of having terrorist 
connections (Mauer, 2003). Additionally, in the weeks after 9/11 the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) began a program under which agents made visits 
to motor carriers whose operations were particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks 
(Field, 2004). During the first four months following 9/11, FMCSA completed 36,000 
security sensitive visits. Many of these targeted hazardous materials carriers.  
Despite the renewed attention FMCSA paid to hazardous materials carriers 
following 9/11, the priority was given to new regulations that improved the safety of air 
transportation, given its involvement in the attacks (Johnston, 2004a). Several pieces of 
landmark legislation were passed soon after the 2001 terrorist attacks, including the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, which established the Transportation 
                                                 
2 With the exception of some radioactive waste materials, individual states typically do not directly 
regulate hazardous materials transported by carriers on state highways. 
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Security Administration (TSA) and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, responsible for 
creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Homeland Security Act vested 
the USDOT with the authority “to prescribe regulations for ‘the safe transportation, 
including security of hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign 
commerce” (TRB, 2005, p. 33–34).  
Despite the focus on transportation security that emerged following 9/11, 
surface transportation security was somewhat overlooked at the federal level (although 
see TRB [2002] for an early discussion of transportation security challenges), and it 
became clear that sweeping legislation or programs focused on hazardous materials 
would unlikely be forthcoming. But there were several watershed moments related to 
surface transportation that warrant mention. The USDOT issued two advisory notices in 
2002 and 2003, respectively, for carriers and shippers of hazardous materials, both 
related to preparing en-route security plans. In March 2003, the Research and Programs 
Administration issued a final rule on the Security Requirement for Offerors and 
Transporters of Hazardous Materials (68 FR 14510). This rule stipulated that carriers 
responsible for transporting hazardous materials must establish and implement security 
plans. Along with this, employee training was required to incorporate a security 
component (see also Johnston & Nath, 2004). Shortly afterwards, in 2005, the FMCSA 
initiated a new program that mandated carriers obtain hazmat safety permits for 
specified kinds of high-risk materials (69 FR 39350). Arguably, these new rules and 
policies motivated federal agencies to begin examining methods to improve vehicle 
security.              
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In late 2003, FMCSA undertook its Hazmat Safety and Security Field Operational 
Test. This initiative studied the benefits of using smart truck technologies and attempted 
to identify what benefits they would bring to the hazardous materials supply chain. The 
test found that using new technologies would save carriers money and reduce supply 
chain risks, but also that companies would be reluctant to submit data to a public sector 
reporting center, or use smart truck technologies, unless obligated to through federal 
regulations. Building on the 2003 field operations test, in 2005, TSA contracted out the 
development of a Prototype Hazmat Tracking System (PHTS). The goal of this study was 
to assess the feasibility of establishing a hazardous materials truck-tracking center (TTC) 
to monitor vehicles carrying these substances. From a regulatory standpoint, two 
further points contextualize efforts to improve surveillance of trucks moving hazardous 
materials. First, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 directed TSA to create a tracking 
program which targeted trucks carrying hazardous materials. Second, TSA issued a list of 
voluntary Security Action Items (SAIs) for carriers of highway security sensitive materials 
(HSSMs) in 2008.  
Table 2.2 lists each SAI, which are grouped into four categories — general 
security, personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. 
Understandably, the majority of SAIs apply to en-route security, as an overarching goal 
of these is to prevent shipments of hazardous materials from being compromised during 
transit. But it is critical to underscore the voluntary nature of these measures. The 
failure to codify these items into federal law is consistent with a broader trend of 
devolution, under which the federal government’s authority and willingness to impose 
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new regulations has declined, in favor of more indirect oversight that confers greater 
responsibility to either local governments or private entities for monitoring activities (cf. 
Thrower & Martinez, 1999). Short of a catastrophic incident that involves the deliberate 
or accidental release of hazardous materials, it is unclear whether robust, uniform 
legislation comparable to the HMTA will be forthcoming.    
 
Table 2.2 SAI Categories and Provisions 
SAI Category Provisions 
General Security Motor carriers should review their security 
assessments and plans in light of the new SAIs 
and address gaps accordingly. 
Employers should be familiar with the 
security practices that are recommended by 
industry groups and trade associations to 
improve transportation security. 
Employers should adopt inventory control 
processes, which will let them account for 
their containers, cylinders, and vehicles at all 
points along the supply chain. 
Employers should institute policies that 
protect critical security information. They 
should also work to secure communications 
between shippers, carriers, third-party logistic 
companies, and receivers. 
Personnel Security Drivers transporting hazardous materials 
should possess a valid commercial driver’s 
license hazardous materials endorsement.  
When an employer hires new people or 
contractors who will have unescorted access 
to motor vehicles (in transport), the motor 
carrier facility, or information critical to the 
hazardous materials transportation, they 
should conduct a thorough background check 
on them. 
Employers should have employees complete 
TSA-sponsored domain awareness training, 
the TSA Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self-
Assessment Training Program, or their 
equivalent. 
Unauthorized Access Employers should install an access control 
system. This should entail the issuance of 
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photo IDs or other visible forms of company 
identification to all drivers. 
Any employee, vendor, contractor, or visitor 
who will have unescorted access to restricted 
areas should be issued a photo ID. This 
system should control access to restricted 
areas. 
En-Route Security Motor carriers should adopt an 
implementation plan that will establish 
standard operating procedures for 
communications between drivers, company 
personnel, and emergency services agencies. 
Company vehicles should have security 
systems installed that will protect them when 
they are left unattended. 
There should be an appropriate security 
program established that will ensure that all 
cargo containers are secured when in use and 
unattended in order to prevent theft or 
sabotage of their contents. 
Employers should implement a seal/lock 
program to deter the theft or sabotage of 
cargo housed in containers or cylinders. 
Employers should institute policies that will 
govern operations during periods of increased 
threat conditions. 
Employers should establish security 
inspection protocols that will be performed 
alongside required safety inspections. These 
inspections should occur before the start of a 
trip and after any stop en-route when a 
shipment is left unattended. 
Employers should use standardized reporting 
procedures for documenting suspicious 
incidents, threats, concerns about 
transportation facilities, or problems with 
company vehicles. 
Shippers and receivers should implement 
shipment pre-planning to ensure that 
shipments are not handed over to motor 
carriers until they can be transported in a way 
that minimizes public exposure and potential 
delays. 
Before a shipment departs, employers should 
pre-plan primary and alternate routes. 
Routing should attempt to avoid densely 
populated urban areas or critical 
infrastructure 
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Employers should investigate security 
practices in light of hours of service available. 
They should adopt policies that will minimize 
shipment vulnerabilities associated with 
extended rest stops.  
Except under emergencies, employers should 
adopt policies that will ensure that contracted 
shipments remain with the primary carrier 
and are not subcontracted, that driver/team 
substitutions are not made, and that 
transloading does not occur until a 
subcontractor complies with federal safety 
and security regulations and company 
security policies. 
Employers should adopt technologies that 
require drivers to identify themselves with a 
password or biometric data to drive a tractor. 
Panic buttons should be installed on vehicles 
to let drivers transmit an emergency alter 
notification to dispatch. 
Employers should adopt methods that will let 
them track a tractor and trailer along their 
intended route with satellite and/or land-
based wireless GPS systems. 
Source: TSA 
 
The history of hazardous materials regulations in the U.S. is complex. The late-
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century was marked by the introduction 
of progressively more restrictive regulations on hazardous materials transportation. 
With the HMTA’s passage in 1975, the responsibility for overseeing these materials was 
consolidated within USDOT agencies. Although the HMTA has been amended many 
times, a renewed push for closer scrutiny of hazardous materials transportation did not 
emerge until after the 9/11 attacks. Somewhat paradoxically, while 9/11 strengthened 
some provisions related to hazardous materials monitoring, unlike the 1973 plane crash 
that was a key catalyst of the HMTA, it did not lead to sweeping legislation to protect 
the transportation of hazardous materials. Instead, rules have been constructed 
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piecemeal, with many (such as the new SAIs) being voluntary despite applying to the 
most dangerous substances carriers move through the highway network. This speaks to 
the tensions between regulation and deregulation, which the federal government 
commonly faces when dealing with private industry stakeholders while attempting to 
improve safety (Johnston, 2004b). As described previously and in the next section, the 
federal government, particularly TSA, has taken an interest in creating new 
technological innovations to monitor hazardous materials. Technological fixes such as 
these — if effective — can potentially facilitate great strides in hazardous materials 
security while not imposing onerous burdens on carriers and shippers. 
2.3 Prototype Hazmat Tracking System (PHTS) — Background, Description, and 
Accomplishments 
Under the direction of the U.S. Congress, TSA spearheaded the effort to develop 
a Prototype Hazmat Tracking System (PHTS) in 2005. TSA awarded this contract to a 
well-known aerospace and defense company (this company will be referred to 
Contractor A in the remainder of this paper in order to preserve its anonymity). 
Contractor A was tasked with: 1) developing and demonstrating the technological 
feasibility of a centralized truck-tracking center (TTC) that could continuously monitor 
the locations of hazardous materials shipments; 2) developing and demonstrating a non-
proprietary universal interface, or a set of communication protocols that could transmit 
alerts and tracking information to the prototype TTC; and 3) analyzing the feasibility and 
benefits of using a risk-based approach to managing hazardous materials security risks 
on U.S. highways. Development of the PHTS began in 2005 and concluded in 2008. The 
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remainder of this section describes the system that was engineered and what the 
development process revealed about the feasibility of monitoring hazardous materials 
shipments in real time.  
There were several key components of the PHTS. First, it adopted an XML3-
based interface. This interface let fleet-tracking vendors feed data to the TTC. A web 
interface, or portal, was created, enabling shippers and carriers to interact with the TTC 
and submit or view corporate data. The TTC’s main function was to aggregate data that 
it received and translate that data into a form that would produce actionable 
information for government agencies. To understand the risk associated with a 
particular shipment, the PHTS incorporated a risk engine (also referred to as a business 
rules engine). The risk engine dynamically calculated the risk profile of hazardous 
materials shipments from gate-out to gate-in. For operational testing, the PHTS used a 
pre-existing risk engine. The idea behind the risk engine is that it analyzes risk levels 
based on different factors, such as a shipment’s contents and where a vehicle is located. 
As such, it generated a dynamic risk assessment for each vehicle. The preceding 
elements served as the conceptual and analytical foundation of the PHTS.  
While this would have represented a step forward in risk-based hazardous 
materials management by itself, without visually mapping risk scores in a dynamic 
manner these data would have proven ineffective. The system required a means of 
visualization so that system operators who staff the TTC could quickly and easily identify 
                                                 
3 XML is shorthand for Extensible Markup Language. It is a text-based format that enables the electronic 
sharing of data on the internet as well as corporate networks. A full exposition of XML is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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high-risk shipments. After data were processed, the results were displayed on desktops 
and workstations in the TTC in the form of continuously updated maps and itemized 
databases. System operators, defined as security specialists, would be attuned to the 
fluctuations of a shipment’s risk levels as it passed through different portions of the 
highway network. The final piece of the PHTS was a robust communication 
infrastructure that supported rapid interactions between government agencies, 
hazardous material handlers, and first responders. Eighteen event types were 
recognized by the PHTS, which are listed in Table 2.3. The events selected represent 
some of the most critical for hazardous materials shipments, events that would signal 
the shipment had either been compromised or would require immediate attention 
because of an accident or other situation. The following paragraphs describe the 
architecture of the PHTS in more detail. 
Table 2.3 Events Recognized in the PHTS 
Shipment has gone off course Position report 
Driver alarm Vehicle hijacking 
Unexpected cargo weight change Unexpected cargo temperature change 
Attempted security bypass Automatic vehicle throttle down 
Automatic vehicle stopping Unexpected trailer separation 
Unauthorized system disabling Overdue shipment 
Entered geo-fence Exited geo-fence 
Unauthorized Cargo data 
Position at the time of the message Emergency contact number 
The PHTS used an enhanced version of Contractor A’s Transportation Event 
Analysis and Management System (TEAMS) to store and display event-based 
information received from transportation-based systems. TEAMS relied on a web service 
to receive and process event-based XML messages. Whenever the system received 
information about an event that had not already been processed through its database, a 
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new event was created. The output was in HTML format, which required that users only 
have a web browser to review the current event status. Further, the system used Esri-
formatted map data to display events. Once events were received and processed, they 
could be overlaid on map templates, which users could zoom into and out of to pinpoint 
the location of various shipments.  
Key characteristics of the TEAMs database included the risk engine, the ability to 
view historical tracks of vehicles, a notification system that informed users when new 
information/events became available, and geo-fencing capabilities. A geo-fence is a 
polygon that demarcates a zone that a vehicle should be unable to enter or exit. There 
were two types of geo-fences implemented in the system. First, an exclusive geo-fence 
was defined to prevent a vehicle from entering a specified area. That is, if a vehicle 
broke through the perimeter, the system generated an alert. On the other hand, an 
inclusive geo-fence effectively circumscribed a vehicle’s movements, if a shipment 
ventured beyond this zone the system produced an alert. Creating and maintaining geo-
fences is a key element for preventing hazardous materials shipments from adversely 
impacting densely populated areas, critical infrastructure, and other valuable assets. 
Their effective operation is imperative for a risk management system. All the pieces of 
TEAMS, combined, were used by TTC security specialists at a single workstation to view 
and manage shipments. Figure 2.1 illustrates the event scene users had access to when 
managing and mapping events.  
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Figure 2.1 Screenshot of TEAMS Interface 
Developing full featured geo-fencing capabilities was critical for enhancing 
TEAMS’s ability to detect potentially dangerous hazardous materials shipments. The 
system gave users the ability to create geo-fences through the use of several methods. 
They could delineate the boundary of a geo-fence by hand drawing it on a map or they 
could upload existing shapefiles into TEAMS. Rather than creating multiple geo-fences 
based on the properties of each substance, users were able to create distance buffers 
around each truck based on guidance related to Emergency Response Guide information 
about the materials it carried. Due to reporting lag times, a second buffer was generated 
for each truck that accounted for its reporting interval. Combining multiple buffers 
around each truck with the fixed geo-fences drawn on the landscape improved 
performance by reducing computational demands. When the geo-fence data were 
meshed with risk calculations from the risk engine, users had access to a robust suite of 
applications to understand how and why a particular shipment’s risk profile changes. 
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Because of limited data availability, however, the PHTS did not integrate a fully realistic 
set of risk estimates. However, this was sufficient to demonstrate that dynamic, spatially 
explicit risk calculations were feasible, which was the primary goal of the project. 
Though the project goal was met, there was no intent to create a full-blown system that 
tracked each individual shipment on a broad scale. 
Overall, the PHTS served as proof of concept for implementing the technologies 
that would be essential for a fully operational TTC. Further, the system showed that a 
centralized tracking facility had the resources to accept carrier tracking data and 
respond to emergency notifications from carriers when a geo-fence violation occurred. 
Although it would be necessary to make significant adjustments to operationalize a full-
scale TTC, the PHTS, with the deployment of TEAMS, demonstrated that calculating the 
risk profiles of hazardous materials shipments in real-time and mapping those profiles 
was possible and could provide a much needed added layer of security for the 
hazardous materials supply chain. This is not to say the system was without its 
shortcomings. A functional tracking system would require more frequent position 
reports from trucks to improve the accuracy of mapping and risk assessments. However, 
making this change would yield a considerable return on investment and strengthen the 
risk-based approach to managing security risks that underscores the TTC concept.       
2.4 Operational Testing Results and Gap Analysis 
2.4.1 Methodology 
Testing the reliability and accuracy of complex software presents many 
challenges. The methodology adopted to evaluate the prototype tracking system is 
35 
independent verification and validation  (IVV), a set of procedures that can be used to 
identify gaps between the desired or expected performance of a system and how it 
performs under operational conditions (Lewis, 1992; Thompson, 2015). For this study, 
gap analysis identified areas in which the prototype tracking system failed to meet the 
specifications articulated by the federal security agencies. That is, analysis questions 
whether the prototype system, as built, is suitable for a large-scale monitoring program. 
While IVV has been used in a variety of contexts, in the context of software engineering, 
the goal of IVV is to determine whether a product is free of errors and meets the needs 
of end users (Bailey, 2015). It can assist designers and developers in pinpointing a 
system’s design flaws, coding problems, and to determine whether it functions in a 
manner consistent with client expectations. IVV entails two processes — verification and 
validation. The purpose of verification is to demonstrate the consistency, completeness, 
and correctness of a software application: to show that the system has been 
constructed properly (see O’Keefe and O’Leary, 1993). Conversely, validation attempts 
to demonstrate whether the software’s operation aligns with specification and meets 
the needs of users (Adrion et al., 1982). It is critical for an independent team to perform 
the IVV — although developers may participate in the process and facilitate testing, they 
cannot be responsible for verifying and validating software (Easterbrook & Callahan, 
1998). Broadly, IVV is used to identify system flaws. Once the errors and drivers of 
substandard performance have been identified, software engineers can make revisions 
so it meets user expectations (Braude & Bernstein, 2016).  
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IVV has been used frequently by government agencies, such as the Department 
of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (Lewis, 1992). Likewise, it has been applied 
to the analysis of a broad range of software systems and software engineering problems 
(Wallace & Fujii, 1989). For example, Easterbrook and Callahan (1998) described the use 
of IVV to evaluate critical software required to operate the International Space Station. 
Rykiel (1996) examined the validation in the context of ecological modeling, discussing 
the circumstances under which validation can be used and evaluated strategies for 
adopting validation criteria. Oberkampf and Trucano (2002) provided an extensive 
discussion of the verification and validation of complex fluid dynamics models and 
outlined a set of experimental protocols for running validation experiments and 
quantifying experimental uncertainty. Robinson and Brooks (2009) used IVV to evaluate 
an industrial simulation model which had been developed to select waste storage sites 
for remediation; they determined the potential effects of remediation on hazardous 
materials supply chains. Indeed, IVV has often been applied to simulation modeling 
(Carson, 2002) in a broad array of areas, from the earth and environmental sciences 
(e.g., Oresekes et al., 1994; Niazi et al., 2015) to agent-based modeling of social systems 
(e.g., North et al., 2007). In a more topical example, Lathrop and Ezell (2016) analyzed 
nine terrorism risk assessment models using an IVV approach. As they observed, one of 
the challenges of validating models focused on terrorism is that only a small number of 
terrorist attacks have been observed. Consequently, traditional models of validation, 
which make conclusions based on correlations between model predictions and observed 
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events, are inadequate. In their place, Lathrop and Ezell (2016) recommended 
establishing alternative criteria (e.g., whether a model substantively informs 
policymaking decision) to evaluate the utility of models based primarily on subject-
matter expertise and theoretical knowledge.    
While the pilot study demonstrated the feasibility of designing and 
implementing the risk-based approach to tracking and mapping hazardous material 
shipments, many shortcomings would require correction before pursuing further system 
development. To identify the PHTS’s strengths and weakness, an Endgame IVV analysis 
was performed that assessed the system under simulated real-world conditions (Lewis, 
1992). Although it is ideal for IVV programs to stretch throughout the lifecycle of 
software and system development, often this is not possible. An Endgame IVV is a 
valuable tool that assesses the results of software testing after initial product design and 
development have been completed. As such, its purpose is to validate software 
performance and identify if that performance aligns with the required specifications 
validation (Lewis, 1992). The PHTS’s accuracy, functionality, and reliability were 
evaluated based on 92 hazardous materials transportation simulations. This operational 
testing revealed how well the PHTS handled three event types: 1) activation of the panic 
alert; 2) the effectiveness of the exclusionary geo-fence; and 3) the effectiveness of the 
inclusionary geo-fence (see previous section for descriptions). Test results, along with 
qualitative observations of system performance, were used to develop a gap analysis 
(see below). Along with gauging the PHTS’s performance, the IVV identified areas where 
its performance was not consistent with the specifications provided by DHS and TSA, 
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which are necessary to improve the risk management and tracking of Tier 1 HSSMs. The 
gap analysis also discusses specific failings that would prevent the PHTS from being 
adopted for a Tier 1 HSSM tracking system.  
2.4.2 Findings and Gap Analysis 
This section does not exhaustively describe all of the PHTS’s limitations. Although 
it is technically possible to exhaustively test any system, generally this not feasible due 
to time and resource constraints (Easterbrook & Callahan, 1998). Accordingly, a 
narrower, more targeted testing protocol is useful to identify key gaps that would pose 
the most significant challenges for a client, in this case DHS and TSA. The following 
discussion highlights the most pressing issues uncovered by IVV and operational testing, 
problems which, if left unaddressed would effectively prevent a PHTS from being 
deployed (Table 2.4 includes a list of gaps that were identified during the analysis). 
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Table 2.4 Key Gaps Identified in the PHTS 
Gap Identified Explanation 
Lack of support for a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory 
program 
The PHTS was designed and tested prior to 
the TSA releasing Tier 1 HSSM SAIs in 2008. 
Its functionality was not built with this use in 
mind and would need revisions. 
Underpowered and outdated software The PHTS relied on older versions of Esri 
ArcGIS, which limited its functionality and 
application. 
No electronic manifest solution Developing an e-manifest solution based on 
XMFL e-forms technology would facilitate 
communication of data on shipments to the 
TTC. 
The risk engine applied a single rule to 
perform risk assessments 
Because the PHTS used an already-existing 
risk engine, it was limited in the accuracy of 
the dynamic risk scores it could provide. 
Inability to determine whether a truck 
adheres to a route 
The PHTS could not load electronic route 
plans from shippers and carriers, which 
significantly diminished the effectiveness of 
geo-fences and its potential to aid with risk 
management. 
Vehicle immobilization not possible The PHTS did not provide a solution for 
immobilizing a vehicle, which is a critical tool 
for preventing a compromised shipment 
from entering a restricted area. 
Poor geo-fence performance As noted in Table 2.5, the geo-fencing 
solution was unreliable, creating a number of 
false positives. There should be the 
integration of new applications to create 
geo-fences. 
Single Incident Management As configured, the PHTS only allowed a 
security specialist to manage a single 
incident, which would hamper stakeholders’ 
ability to achieve a timely resolution. 
Limited communications options The PHTS did not support seamless 
communication between government 
agencies during incidents. It also relied too 
much on telephone communications. 
Lack of data mining capabilities Anticipating incidents requires that security 
specialists have the access to historical and 
current data they could examine to evaluate 
whether a situation poses a threat. 
 
Three of the most critical problems identified by the IVV were functional defects, 
unsatisfactory performance, and poor system security. Even though geo-fencing was a 
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key component of the system, during system testing this function was unreliable. Events 
that should have prompted alerts often failed to do so, while other events that should 
have removed a geo-fence from the PHTS did prompt the necessary system updates. 
Slow performance also hampered the system, a problem that was attributed to the 
event analysis and management system that served as the PHTS’s conceptual 
foundation. Along with cataloging information about individual hazardous materials 
shipments, the system was dynamically linked to the mapping application which visually 
displayed the location and movement of vehicles. The final problems that emerged 
during this testing were the PHTS’s security vulnerabilities. Although most password-
protected internet-based systems eventually time out after a certain period of inactivity, 
the PHTS did not. Further, it stored user identification on local machines rather than on 
the network, potentially leaving the system vulnerable to outside attacks.  
Table 2.5 summarizes the problems encountered during PHTS testing as well 
their frequency. Most tellingly, the system had problems in over 50 percent of the 
staged events. Many problems stemmed the TTC being inundated by multiple events in 
close succession. In other cases, the operator responsible for monitoring the system 
could not identify, based on information provided by the system, which trucks were 
sending an alert. Other problematic findings included the system operator not receiving 
or responding to alerts during approximately 25 percent of the staged incidents as well 
as numerous difficulties with interpreting carrier macros and knowing what type of 
cargo that a shipment contained. An outgrowth of these issues was a lag in response 
time. The system had an established response timeline for responding to a security 
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incident. This timeline accounted for: 1) the amount of time to detect an event, 2) how 
long it takes the system monitor to establish communication with the TSA, and 3) the 
amount of time to contact the carrier and verify the nature of the alert. Based on the 
operational testing and additional simulation runs, the mean response time for panic 
button alerts was 8 minutes. However, this climbed to 16 minutes for geo-fence 
violations. Taken together, the mean response time was 12 minutes. Although these 
numbers seem impressive, law enforcement officials consulted as part of this analysis 
stated that 12 minutes is significantly longer than would be acceptable to confirm that 
an incident as occurred and declare a transportation security incident is in progress, 
especially in highly populated areas where response times must be quick to ensure that 
nearby residents and businesses are protected from the consequences of a hazardous 
materials release. It is unclear how they arrived at this number, although presumably 
they take a cue from emergency medical services and the importance of responding to 
call in under 12–15 minutes, as this leads to the best patient outcomes (e.g. Blackwell & 
Kaufman, 2002). While the comparison between terrorist incident reporting and 
emergency response is not exact, it provides a starting point to understand what 
appropriate reporting timeframes should look like. As such, this operational test 
confirmed that the PHTS was underpowered, which has a negative repercussions 
response times.  
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Table 2.5 Quantitative Summary of Problems Identified in PHTS 
Problem/Issue Number of Geo-
Fence Violation 
Alerts 
Number of 
Panic Alerts 
Total 
Combined 
Alerts 
Percentage of 
Staged Events 
Impacted 
TTC did not receive or 
respond to alerts 21 5 26 28% 
TTC could not maintain 
current or multiple 
carrier contact 
information 
5 8 13 14 
TTC system operator 
could not identify which 
truck generated an alert 
for carriers 
20 32 52 57 
Interpretation of carrier 
macros to open up a trip, 
know what the cargo is, 
and respond to an alert 
19 3 22 24 
Carriers receive multiple 
contacts for the same 
event 
1 2 3 67 
TTC overwhelmed by 
multiple staged events* 1 1 2 67 
* Based on three staged events; the remaining findings were based on 92 staged events 
 
 The operational test revealed other critical flaws of the PHTS’s design. In 
addition to the performance shortcomings noted, the system was not constructed to 
support a tracking solution focused on Tier 1 HSSMs. This is understandable, given that 
the TSA did not issue its guidance on these materials until June 2008, after field testing 
was complete. Future system designs must be geared toward monitoring Tier 1 HSSMs. 
Other problems with the PHTS included the repeated failures of some system 
components that were integral to the system. As constructed, the PHTS lacked the 
ability to implement an electronic route solution that would also permit route 
adherence monitoring. More simply put, the PHTS could not accept route plans from 
shippers and carriers. Without these data, system operators were unable to know 
whether a vehicle deviated from its planned route. This feature’s absence diminished 
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the system’s risk management capabilities and the usefulness of geo-fences. The 
methods used to construct geo-fences were also cumbersome. The pilot study created 
buffers around individual trucks and made it difficult to determine when a vehicle 
neared a geographic threshold. While this seems like an attractive strategy, it will not 
stand up under everyday operations because it will generate too many false positive 
alerts. Indeed, the field testing revealed that the PHTS was vulnerable to producing false 
positives. Being inundated with false positives would distract system operators, 
preventing them from attending to activity going on elsewhere in the road network. 
While the geo-fence idea should not be abandoned, where they are sited and 
constructed should be the responsibility of state and federal officials. Equally troubling, 
the PHTS was missing a procedure to immobilize vehicles. In the event of an attack or 
hazardous materials release, it is imperative that there is an option to quickly 
immobilize a vehicle so that it cannot be weaponized and catastrophically impact 
surrounding locations.      
Looking a bit deeper into the operation and management of the PHTS, a critical 
drawback was that security specialists could only manage a single incident. Recalling 
that there are approximately two million Tier 1 HSSM shipments each year, a TTC will be 
responsible for monitoring over 5,000 shipments at a given time. As such, it will be 
critical that multiple security specialists be able to monitor and manage multiple 
incidents. Along with speeding up response times, this would enable better 
collaboration among system monitors and improve communication between the TTC, 
public agencies, carriers, and shippers. This arrangement could be enhanced through 
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the use of custom, dynamic risk modeling algorithms that iteratively calculate the risk 
associated with individual shipments. A more streamlined user interface combined with 
more agile risk modeling, while necessary, must be accompanied by significant 
improvements to the PHTS’s software. As noted previously, the system’s performance 
was somewhat lacking, compounded by persistently slow or inefficient operations. 
Certainly, if deployed as-is, the mixture of false positives, poor geo-fence performance, 
and sluggish responses would render the PHTS ineffective.  
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Reviewing the history of hazardous materials regulation from the late 19th to the 
late 20th century, the federal government, through legislation and rulemaking, 
progressively expanded its oversight powers. While previously catastrophic events were 
enough to usher in broad reforms to hazardous materials regulations, this does not 
appear to be the case anymore. Although there were modest yet vague expansions in 
government power with respect to hazardous materials regulation following 9/11, the 
fact that the TSA’s 2008 SAIs continue to be strictly voluntary suggests this is unlikely to 
change in the near future. That being the case, the federal government and other public 
agencies will need to identify alternative strategies to monitor hazardous materials 
shipped on U.S. highway networks. This paper contributes to ongoing discussions about 
the regulations and systems used to govern hazardous materials transportation by 
situating current regulatory practices within in a broader historical context. During the 
20th century, the federal government incrementally tightened restrictions on the 
shipment of hazardous materials, but while the 9/11 attacks led to the introduction of 
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some new regulations, the TSA’s newest SAIs are voluntary. There has been a move to 
develop new systems to monitor hazardous materials transported on highways. The 
FMCSA and TSA have conducted two studies since 2003 to examine the feasibility of 
smart truck technologies and telematics for tracking the location of hazardous materials 
shipments. Although it is unclear if shippers and carriers will sanction this type of 
monitoring, it provides a compromise which allows the government to increase 
oversight and ensure that companies are held accountable without imposing 
burdensome regulations that would interfere with the day-to-day operations of shippers 
and carriers. This paper discussed the results of the PHTS’s operational field tests, 
conducted from 2005 to 2008. Therein lies its practical contribution — in the 
demonstration of the powerful opportunity risk-based Tier 1 HSSM management holds 
for industry stakeholders. Arguably, the operational test offered evidence of the PHTS’s 
feasibility, even if the system had its share of problems. Most notably, system 
development and testing revealed that vehicles carrying hazardous materials can be 
dynamically tracked in real time. The PHTS combined information on the location and of 
the vehicle’s contents to evaluate the risk associated with it. These data were then 
processed and displayed using maps generated by a GIS. However, as the gap analysis 
demonstrated, the system was unable to perform satisfactorily in a number of areas.   
Future software engineering development needs to focus on creating an 
environment optimized for tracking Tier 1 HSSM movements. There were other 
deficiencies that would need to be addressed during a system redesign. The PHTS was 
underpowered, which led to substandard performance, hampering the ability of users to 
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track individual shipments. Upgrading the GIS software, developing new databases, and 
increasing computational power would be essential during the new system build. While 
the PHTS demonstrated that geo-fences are a valid tool for delineating where shipments 
can and cannot go, and therefore creating alerts when vehicles transgress their 
boundaries, there were a number of instances when they did not perform as intended. 
In many cases users were not alerted to a vehicle crossing a geo-fence. In other cases, 
they were unable to match an alert to a particular vehicle, or when multiple alerts were 
triggered, the system became overwhelmed. Perhaps most critically, the PHTS relied on 
a risk engine that was not created specifically for performing risk assessments of Tier 1 
HSSMs shipments.  
While this paper certainly moves the discussion on hazardous materials 
transportation forward, one limitation it presents is that the research is very narrowly 
focused on a subset of hazardous materials (Tier 1 HSSMs), which constitute a fraction 
of all hazardous materials shipped on U.S. highway networks. Periodization of current 
regulatory practices, however, can inform future debates on the best policymaking 
strategies to minimize the public health and safety threats posed by hazardous 
materials. Despite its targeted focus, the prototype software could be retooled to 
facilitate monitoring of other transportation modes of classes of hazardous materials. 
Future work should focus on rethinking how the PHTS conceptualizes and calculates risk. 
This would entail building a new risk engine that is more attuned to dangers posed by 
Tier 1 HSSMs. Populating a new risk engine with appropriate risk equations will demand 
extensive research on safety and security hazards posed by Tier 1 HSSMs. This 
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information can be gathered through a combination of expert knowledge and interviews 
with transportation officials in federal, state, and local government agencies. 
Interviewing or surveying key industry stakeholders would be valuable activities to 
establish what the most pressing threats with Tier 1 HSSMs are. Input from these 
subject matter experts could be used to develop risk equations to more accurately 
quantify the level of risk associated with shipments.  
Recent congressional inaction on issues related to hazardous materials 
transportation suggests that new regulations are unlikely without a catastrophic 
terrorist attack or accidental hazardous materials release. Nevertheless, even if 
participation in monitoring programs remains voluntary, shippers and carriers have a 
powerful incentive to buy into a more comprehensive risk management system. As 
such, it is imperative that public agencies, shippers, and carriers alike adopt a risk-based 
approach to managing Tier 1 HSSMs. Despite its shortcomings, the prototype software 
described in this paper offers a much needed foundation to move ahead with future 
work in this area. 
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Chapter 3 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
3.1 Introduction 
Academic researchers and U.S. federal, state, and local government agencies 
have devised numerous methodologies to analyze the level of risk associated with 
hazardous materials shipments transported via highways, rail, and waterways (Erkut & 
Ingolfsson, 2005; Liu et al., 2013; Van Raemdonck et al., 2013; NRC, 2010; Masse et al., 
2007). Risk analysis for hazardous materials transportation gained traction among 
academic practitioners during the 1980s (Erkut & Verter, 1998), however, many 
government agencies did not bring a concerted focus to the problem until after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (e.g., Willis et al., 2006). 9/11 demonstrated that 
terrorists could adopt unconventional and deadly methods to execute acts of terror, 
with airplanes being transformed into weapons. Although the early response to 9/11 
focused primarily on securing the air transportation system, concerned policymakers 
recognized that a more expansive response was in order, given that not just airplanes, 
but also trucks, waterborne vessels, and railroad cars could potentially be weaponized. 
Efforts by government agencies to improve their risk assessment capabilities followed 
over the next five years, with a number of new methods introduced to analyze risk. 
Nowhere was this more evident than at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
where a number of offices developed risk assessment methodologies based on 
techniques that had previously been applied to natural hazards (NRC, 2010). Further, 
DHS also introduced a grant program that allocated resources to state-level agencies. 
Despite DHS — and other agencies — speeding up efforts to quantify and mitigate risk, 
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serious problems remain, with DHS grant allocations being influenced more by political 
factors than by objective risk assessments (Nordyke, 2014) while new risk analysis 
methodologies remain unproven, poorly documented, and rarely exposed to the 
scrutiny of peer review (NRC, 2010).   
The main objective of this paper is to develop a semi-quantitative equation that 
can be used to measure the risk level of vehicles carrying Tier 1 Highway Security 
Sensitive Materials (HSSM) at specific points in the highway network. Risk 
methodologies and equations have been developed for a number of surface 
transportation domains, however, none have been created specifically for Tier 1 HSSMs 
— a critical oversight given the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) focus on 
these materials. Building this equation required a stepwise process that involved 
background literature reviews, a survey of personnel employed by transportation 
agencies, and semi-structured interviews with subject-matter experts. The literature 
review examines academic publications as well as risk assessment methodologies 
currently used by federal government agencies.  
To understand the day-to-day understanding of risk mobilized by staff local, 
state, and federal transportation agencies who are responsible for overseeing 
infrastructure security, a comprehensive survey was administered. The survey included 
questions on the 19 attack-and-release scenarios involving hazardous materials and 
their likelihood of occurring; the probability of terrorists failing due to technical hurdles 
or security measures under a subset of these scenarios; the potential impact of attacks 
on nearby populations, critical infrastructure, key resources, and the economy, among 
50 
 
others; and the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration’s voluntary 
Security Action Items (SAIs) for circumventing potential attacks. Many of the survey 
questions leveraged the Sherman Kent Scale (hereafter, Kent Scale) to discern the 
likelihood of different events (Meyer & Booker, 1991). The Central Intelligence Agency 
and other federal agencies routinely use the Kent Scale to elicit expert opinion about 
the likelihood of different events (e.g., a terrorist attack) occurring. The scale converts 
linguistic descriptions of an event to numerical probabilities. Once given a numerical 
value, these data can be incorporated into quantitative and semi-quantitative forms of 
analysis. The survey results provide critical insights into experts’ thinking about 
infrastructure security, where they perceive the most glaring security risks, and what 
terrorist attack scenarios transportation agencies believe are most likely. After survey 
data were collected, subject-matter experts from TSA, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and independent security consultants were consulted to offer feedback on the 
results and assist with the development of a comprehensive risk equation for Tier 1 
HSSMs.  
The survey and interview results were used to develop a semi-quantitative risk 
equation for evaluating the specific level of risk a Tier 1 HSSM shipment poses. The 
equation, following practices of DHS and other federal agencies, views risk as the 
product of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. The risk equation factors variables 
such as attack mode, type of hazardous material, trailer/container type, critical 
infrastructure and key resources, nearby population density, economic impacts, and 
proximate environmentally sensitive areas into its calculations. It highlights that risk 
51 
levels are dynamic and vary spatially — as such, risk values are calculated iteratively, 
with new risk estimates derived for a shipment when it enters a new portion of the 
highway network.    
3.2 Literature Review 
While it is critical to understand academic thinking on risk analysis, there is a 
disconnect between risk assessment methodologies discussed in the peer-reviewed 
literature and the strategies used by government agencies. There are many reasons for 
this, ranging from inadequate personnel numbers at federal agencies, which prevents 
staff from accumulating and retaining institutional expertise, to the need for analytically 
parsimonious methods to quickly assess risk levels for a particular situation (NRC, 2010). 
This review focuses on risk analysis frameworks proposed in the academic literature as 
well as those that have been implemented by the Departments of Transportation and 
Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, and Federal Motor Carrier 
Administration, and other federal agencies. The National Research Council’s (2010) 
review of risk analysis methodologies used within federal transportation and security 
agencies observed disconnect between agency practices and peer-reviewed literature. 
Reconciling these literatures is beyond the scope of this review. One area of agreement, 
however, is the importance of leveraging expert knowledge to conduct risk analyses due 
to the small number of events in which deliberate hazardous materials releases have 
occurred. Reviewing academic and governmental literature contextualizes the risk 
analysis framework articulated later in this paper. It also situates the proposed risk 
52 
 
framework by demonstrating it combines the analytical parsimony required by 
government agencies with the findings of academic research practitioners.   
Expert judgment has often been used as a foundation of risk analysis and to 
identify risk management strategies, especially within the context of hazardous 
materials oversight and terrorism. Otway and Winterfeldt (1992) identified the 
expanding role of expert judgment in regulating and managing hazardous industrial 
activities. Leung et al. (2004) proposed a methodology for assessing the vulnerability of 
critical bridges and infrastructure to terrorist attacks. Because there was little 
quantitative data available on critical transportation infrastructure’s vulnerabilities, they 
were largely dependent on expert judgments. Experts were asked to sort and filter risk 
scenarios based on their perceived likelihood and consequences (were the event to 
occur). Questions remained about the confidence of expert predictions, but lacking 
empirical data, Leung et al. argued that their work provided a foundation upon which to 
analyze terrorism scenarios. Apostolakis and Lemon (2005) combined a graph theoretic 
framework with a qualitative screening methodology to highlight the vulnerabilities of 
critical infrastructure. Decision trees were used to determine the impact of losing 
infrastructure services. Combining these methods offered decision makers a semi-
quantitative prioritization methodology to determine which pieces of critical 
infrastructure warrant the most robust security measures. Chang et al. (2013) 
developed a novel methodology to assess the resiliency of community infrastructure in 
the face of tectonic and flood hazards. They interviewed experts to elicit their judgment 
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about the disruptions produced by a hazard and the subsequent recovery time needed 
to return an urban area to normal functioning (see also McDaniels et al., 2015).   
U.S. government agencies evaluate risk as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences. However, various agencies define and measure these terms 
differently. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) developed 
qualitative self-assessment tools to let users estimate the risk profile of vehicles 
transporting hazardous materials. Threats, according to the FMCSA, are “sources of 
danger and can include both criminals and terrorists and the attacks that they might 
initiate to achieve their objectives;” vulnerabilities “are weaknesses that make a 
[carrier] more susceptible to attack or injury” (2009, p. 12)4. The FMCSA established a 
simple method to rank threats and vulnerabilities. The first step is to prioritize threats 
and rank them using verbal descriptions that are translated into numerical scores. For 
example, a threat may be viewed as highly likely, somewhat likely, possible, unlikely, or 
improbable. Next, vulnerabilities are ranked on a comparable scale (e.g., from very low 
to high). Threat and vulnerability scores are combined in a likelihood matrix to gauge 
how probable a terrorist attack is. Under this rubric, if a carrier deems a threat specific 
and credible and vulnerabilities are medium or high, the event receives the highest 
likelihood score. Conversely, if threats are improbable and vulnerabilities are very low, 
the likelihood of terrorist attack is small. There are several drawbacks to this approach. 
Most critically, the rankings are entirely subjective because they are performed by 
                                                 
4 The FMCSA does not define consequence explicitly, other than to say the outcomes of hazardous 
materials releases will vary based on the type of material involved. Despite this equivocation, 
consequences are integral to identifying and estimating risk. 
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individual carriers. As such, the system does not provide a reliable means of estimating 
how risk varies across transportation networks. Another problem (that applies to other 
risk assessment methodologies) is that the likelihood of an event is not synonymous 
with the probability. Because the number of deliberate hazardous materials releases 
that have occurred is very small, the lack of data prevents us from estimating the true 
probabilities. Currently, the FMCSA does not require carriers to submit formalized self-
assessment documents. While this is problematic, equally troubling is that the 
methodology the agency proposes does not necessarily require the input of subject-
matter experts, relying instead upon the employees of individual carriers. This has the 
potential to generate findings that are neither aligned with current understandings of 
risk nor validated by outside researchers or analysts. 
    Carriers in the railroad industry use the Rail Corridor Risk Management System 
(RCRMS) to select which routes security sensitive materials should be transported on. 
This methodology has been accepted and is relied upon by the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) (VRT, 2012). All Class 1 railroads and some smaller carriers use the 
RCRMS to perform risk analysis and route selection. Although it treats risk as the 
product of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, the RCRMS defines threats and 
vulnerabilities differently than the FMCSA. The RCRMS defines threats as a product of: 
1) a base level threat factor, 2) the amount of hazardous materials being transported, 3) 
the presence of high consequence targets, and 4) population density. Rather than 
framing vulnerabilities just in terms of the weaknesses that a carrier identifies, the 
RCRMS defines vulnerability as the likelihood of a person successfully executing an 
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attack if they actually begin an attack. Potential consequences are calculated based on 
the populations that would be impacted by a materials release, critical infrastructure 
and key resources affected, and environmentally sensitive areas exposed along a route. 
Carriers have the option to input a number of variables into the RCRMS. In addition to 
factors noted above, it also accepts data on the conditional probabilities of release 
(which vary based on USDOT tank car specifications), the proximity of key 
environmental assets, presence of nearby rail facilities, the location of police and fire 
stations, and historical incident rates. Based on these inputs, the RCRMS generates a 
single risk score for the entirety of a route. It accomplishes this by computing risk scores 
for individual rail segments and summing them across an entire route. Thus, while the 
final output is a single risk score, embedded within that score are spatially explicit 
considerations. Carriers use these data to identify the optimal routing. Because the 
system has built-in GIS capabilities, users can quickly grasp how spatial differences 
among different variables contribute to spatially uneven distributions of risk.   
The 9/11 Act mandated that DHS identify and exhaustively document the risks 
associated with terrorist attacks on the U.S. hazardous materials trucking system (VRT, 
2012). This motivated the development of the Trucking and Hazardous Materials 
Trucking Risk Assessment (THRTRA), which was performed jointly by TSA’s Highway and 
Motor Carrier Programs. While it delved into risk analysis methodologies, the 
assessment’s purpose was not to create an operational risk assessment system that 
could be used on a daily basis by federal agencies. Rather, it leveraged subject-matter 
expertise, open source research, and conversations with industry stakeholders to 
56 
 
implement a scenario-based approach that measured risk as a function of truck status, 
attack type, acquisition status. THTRA defined threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences 
similarly to the systems previously described (although see Table 3.x for a comparison). 
What distinguished THTRA from other assessment strategies was its use of the Sherman 
Kent scale (see below for a more detailed discussion) and qualitative binning to initially 
characterize and then quantify threat, vulnerability, and consequence levels. More 
specifically, the Sherman Kent scale translates verbal descriptions into quantifiable 
probabilities or likelihoods. Table 3.1 illustrates THTRA’s use of the Sherman Kent scale 
and how verbal descriptions align with one another. THTRA’s risk scores were relative, 
meaning they were reported for each non-asset specific attack scenario. Compared to 
the FMCSA and RCRMS methodologies, the assessments here relied more heavily on 
expert elicitations, which is more consistent with the tendencies identified in academic 
research. Drawing on subject-matter expertise is critical for identifying knowledge gaps, 
and has been used in disciplines ranging from natural hazards analysis (e.g., Meyer et 
al., 2013; Frickel & Vincent, 2011) and chemical risk communications (Cox et al., 2003), 
to risk analysis (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006) and identifying the risk of terrorism in a 
multimodal transportation context (e.g., Tsamboulas, 2010). Clearly, any effort to refine 
our knowledge of risk assessment in the domain of hazardous materials transport must 
tap into the knowledge of not just academic experts, but also individuals who have 
acquired practical expertise through their experiences working at transportation and 
security agencies.  
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Table 3.1 Application of the Kent Scale by THRTA 
Threat and Vulnerability 
(Kent Scale) 
Consequence Risk 
Certain Catastrophic Critical 
Almost Certain Significant Significant 
Probable Major High 
Chances About Even Elevated Medium 
Probably Not Moderate Minor 
Almost Certainly Not Minor Low 
Impossible Inconsequential Very Low 
The last risk system this review will examine is the Transportation Sector Security 
Risk Assessment (TSSRA), which was developed by the TSA in response to a 2009 DHS 
Appropriations requirement that asked TSA to examine and document transportation 
risks using a common analytic framework. Unlike the other systems discussed here, 
TSSRA was not mode specific. It established baseline characterizations of current risk 
levels across all transportation modes. TSSRA employed a scenario-based assessment 
framework that was not mode specific. Rather, it analyzed risk based on asset and 
attack type. As such, it adopted slightly more nuanced definitions of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences. Most notably, TSSRA quantified vulnerability using 
two metrics — first, a law enforcement/counter-terrorism metric, and second, a 
countermeasure effectiveness metric (see NRC, 2010; VRT, 2012). Starting from an initial 
database of 800 scenarios, experts pared that number to 200. Like THTRA, TSSRA relied 
on significant input from subject-matter experts to analyze the risk of particular 
scenarios. TSSRA comes with several drawbacks, however. The most salient is its 
inability to analyze how risk changes as a function of location. Because its analysis uses 
representative assets instead of specific locations, it is unclear whether it is possible to 
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make its risk evaluations spatially explicit (i.e., calculate risk for particular vehicles when 
they are at different points on the highway network). TSSRA assists stakeholders with 
exhaustively imagining various attack scenarios and outcomes, but it sacrifices realism 
through its asset-based framework.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of Definitions for Threats, Vulnerability, and Consequences by Risk 
Assessment System 
System Threat Vulnerability Consequences 
FMCSA - Sources of danger, 
including criminals, 
terrorists, and the 
attack they use to 
initiate or achieve 
their objective 
- Weaknesses that 
make a carrier 
susceptible to attack or 
injury 
- Not formally 
defined, but 
implicitly linked to 
the outcomes of a 
terrorist attack 
RCRMS - Product of a 
baseline threat level 
factor defined by 
experts and other 
variables, such as the 
amount of hazardous 
goods in a shipment, 
the proximity of high 
consequence targets, 
and population 
density 
- Characterizes the 
likelihood of an 
attacker succeeding. 
That is, they achieve 
their desired effect 
once an attack begins 
- Includes the 
population 
potentially 
impacted, any 
critical 
infrastructure and 
key resources 
exposed to an 
attack, and 
environmentally 
sensitive areas 
potentially affected 
THTRA - Relative likelihood 
of an attempt 
- Relative probability of 
success given that an 
attack is attempted 
- Human impacts, 
direct and indirect 
economic effects, 
and psychological 
impacts 
TSSRA - Viewed as a 
function of capability 
and intent 
- Capability is the 
conditional likelihood 
that an attacker has 
the resources and 
skills needed to 
undertake an attack 
scenario within a 
defined timeframe 
- Intent is the 
conditional likelihood 
of an attacker 
selecting a particular 
attack scenario once 
they have committed 
to launching one 
- Consists of two 
elements 
- Law 
Enforcement/Counter-
Terrorism factor, which 
is the conditional 
likelihood that 
national, state, and 
local law enforcement 
do not detect an attack 
- Countermeasure 
Effectiveness, which is 
the conditional 
likelihood of an 
attacker successfully 
circumventing an 
asset-specific defense 
system 
- Includes human 
consequences, 
direct and indirect 
economic 
evaluations, and a 
psychological impact 
factor  
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Peer-reviewed literature and governmental documents are in agreement that (in 
the absence of a large historical database of attacks on vehicles that move 
transportation materials) relying on expert judgment to estimate the level of risk 
associated with particular shipment types is critical. Although using judgment introduces 
subjectivity into the assessment process, this is unavoidable. As the NRC observed, 
problems with subjectivity can be overcome if expert judgments are vetted through 
peer review. Existing risk assessment methodologies used by the federal government 
are consistent in positioning risk as the product of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences, however, each has various strengths and weaknesses (see Table 3.2). 
Some methodologies — like those proposed by the FMCSA — do not incorporate the 
feedback of subject-matter experts, while others depend too greatly on academic 
expertise. Academic expertise is valuable, however, it should not be used exclusively. 
Doing so omits the perspectives of transportation agency personnel who engage with 
matters of risk assessment at an everyday practical level. The risk analysis equation 
described later in this paper will use the methodologies described in this section as a 
starting point, but will incorporate changes based on survey and interview findings.  
3.3 Methodology and Methodological Justification 
To understand the security priorities of transportation officials around the 
United States, a web-based survey was administered to expert stakeholders from 
around the country. People employed at local, state, and federal agencies who are 
directly responsible — as part of their official job function — for securing some 
component of the United States’ transportation networks were included in the sample 
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pool (see below for a discussion of the role expertise plays in prioritizing security 
priorities). Survey methods followed the protocols laid out in Dillman et al. (2014). To 
ensure all regions of the United States were represented, at least one official from each 
state was invited to participate. As Dillman et al. noted, a probability sample survey only 
succeeds to the extent that results can be extrapolated and generalized to a broader 
population. Targeting officials from multiple states and occupations satisfies this 
requirement by minimizing potential coverage and sampling errors.  
The survey consisted of approximately 50 question and was administered using 
Qualtrics online platform. Appendix A contains the entire survey as well as tabulated 
responses and descriptive statistics. 295 individuals were invited to participate in the 
survey. Potential respondents were sent an initial email that explained the purpose of 
the survey and invited them to participate. A second round of follow-up emails were 
sent one week after the invitation to remind prospective respondents of the survey and 
to boost response rates. In total, 57 people completed the survey, for a response rate of 
19.3%. Although this perhaps seems low, it is an acceptable response rate based on a 
review of other studies that adopted online surveys. Response rates for online surveys 
generally fall between 15% and 30% (Monroe & Adams, 2012). Survey questions asked 
about the likelihood of various terrorist attacks involving a Tier 1 HSSM release, risk 
factors that contribute most significantly to the aggregate impacts of a hazardous 
materials release, the probability of specific release scenarios occurring, whether the 
United States generally does an adequate job of securing the Tier 1 HSSM supply chain, 
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and the effectiveness of TSA’s voluntary SAIs, which have been recommended for 
implementation — but which are not legally mandated.  
Questions about the likelihood of particular events, scenario assessment, and 
the effectiveness of SAIs adopted a modified version of the Kent scale (e.g., Meyer & 
Booker, 1991). The purpose of the Kent Scale, which was originally developed for the 
CIA and has been used on a widespread basis for governmental studies, is to convert 
ranks or ratings to verbal descriptions, or vice versa. Figure 3.1 (Meyer & Booker, 1991) 
illustrates the Kent Scale’s underlying logic. Survey respondents read about a particular 
scenario and are then presented with a number of written descriptions (usually 7–10). 
After interpreting the scenario, they will decide how likely it is to occur and chose the 
corresponding phrase that best reflects their assessment (e.g. “virtually certain,” “very 
likely,” “extremely unlikely”). Each phrase is then converted to a numerical probability, 
which facilitates semi-quantitative analysis. As such, use of the Kent Scale may 
underwrite a probabilistic approach to risk assessment. The adoption of the Kent Scale 
for academic studies has been uncommon, however, because a key motivation of this 
study is to develop a method of evaluating risk appropriate for government agencies, its 
use is warranted (see Jones & Hillis, 2003; Kreuzer et al., 2008; Gonzalez-Alvarez et al., 
2010 for examples of the Kent scale being adopted to elicit expert judgments). Survey 
results and interviews with key stakeholders were used to develop a preliminary rating 
scale for quantifying the likelihood or consequences of particular release scenarios. 
Before discussing survey results, further elaboration on the nature of expertise and its 
importance for understanding hazardous materials releases is warranted.  
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Figure 3.1 Meyer and Booker's Presentation of the Kent Scale. An illustration of the Kent 
scale. Verbal statements about the likelihood of a particular event are converted to 
numerical probabilities. These probabilities can then be incorporated into quantitative 
or semi-quantitative risk assessments. 
Expertise is a contested concept. Sometimes it is used pejoratively or 
dismissively to discount particular forms of knowledge that are inconsistent with one’s 
ideological preferences. However, in this study, expert refers to a person who has a 
deep background in a particular subject area and is recognized by their peers as 
qualified to answer questions about it (Meyer &  Booker, 1991). Expert judgments are 
data provided in response to a technical problem. They are not guesses — they are the 
product of an individual’s training and relevant experience. Expert judgment can be 
used to interpret rare or complex phenomena on which information is lacking, to 
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forecast future events, and to integrate and analyze existing data, which can entail 
blending quantitative and qualitative data into a unifying interpretive framework 
(Meyer & Booker, 1991). Expertise is also valuable as an input for decision models. Once 
experts have rendered judgment on a question, it is possible to convert their responses 
to probabilistic values, combine those with external sources of information, and 
probabilistically estimate the likelihood of specific events (Hora, 2007). 
Much research has investigated whether expert judgment has more value than 
other types of knowledge. For example, a number of studies from cognitive science have 
demonstrated that experts possess sophisticated mental models of the world based on 
years of training and experience that preferentially situates them to render judgment on 
the topics they are familiar with. Conversely, research on judgment and decision making 
has found that experts are sometimes prone to intentional or unintentional biases, 
which diminishes the quality of their conclusions (e.g., Shanteau, 1992; Washington et 
al., 2002; Hester, 2012). Although relying on expert judgment has potential drawbacks, 
gauging the likelihood and consequences of different Tier 1 HSSM release scenarios 
based on historical probabilities alone is not possible due to their rarity. There is a long 
tradition in the risk analysis literature of leveraging expertise when a situation is 
complicated by inherent uncertainties. As such, expert judgment is required to appraise 
the likelihood of a deliberate or accidental release occurring as well as the social, 
economic, political, and environmental consequences of such an event (cf. Meyer & 
Booker, 1991).  
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After completing survey analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 12 subject-matter experts who specialized in hazardous materials transportation 
security. These professionals work for a variety of state and federal government 
agencies, including DHS and TSA, and as academic researchers. Interview sessions 
presented respondents with the survey findings. They were asked to validate these 
findings and evaluate their potential implications for risk analysis and management. 
Based on survey findings and published literatures, a preliminary risk equation was 
developed that can be used to estimate the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences 
associated with particular shipments. Developing this equation leveraged risk 
assessment methodologies and frameworks currently used by the federal government, 
and was designed so that the results it generated were commensurate with risk analysis 
performed at other agencies, thus ensuring one-to-one comparisons across 
transportation domains and attack scenarios. The equation was developed iteratively, 
with continual input from subject-matter experts to ensure its reliability and validity.   
3.4 Survey Results and Discussion 
Respondents felt it probable that attack scenarios could materialize at some 
point. With the exception of Scenarios 11, 12, 14, and 15, which between 60 and 85 
percent of the respondents viewed as unlikely or extremely unlikely, the remaining 
scenarios generally scored between 30 and 40 percent. This suggests that security 
experts believe hazardous materials supply chains are vulnerable to potential attacks. 
Scenarios rated as the most unlikely to transpire would require the sophisticated and 
elaborate planning compared to those experts think are more probable. For example, 
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Scenarios 11, 12, 14, and 15 involve airborne devices or vehicles (drones, airplanes) or 
the use of improvised explosive devises to initiate an attack, with Scenario 15 
encompassing a coordinated series of attacks. From this, we can infer that most security 
experts believe the most feasible attacks would be opportunistic. Although 
opportunistic attacks require planning, they would not demand that attackers commit 
the same level of resources to executing a terrorist action.  
Scenarios that experts viewed as the most likely to occur: 1) explosive devices 
being detonated on or in close proximity to a vehicle, 2) hijackings, or 3) persons with 
insider knowledge taking control of a vehicle to purposefully release or detonate 
hazardous materials. While experts clearly believe that deliberate attacks are plausible, 
and in most cases at least more likely than not to happen at some point, they expressed 
the greatest confidence in hazardous materials being released accidentally or 
incidentally (i.e., not prompted by an intentional attack). Looking at the record of 
hazardous materials releases, the overwhelming majority were the product of vehicle 
accidents or accidental releases at processing, manufacturing, and holding facilities 
(Cutter & Ji, 1997). This knowledge should not be used to dismiss the possibility of 
terrorist attacks instigating the release of hazardous materials in the future. However, 
when ranking each scenario, experts likely drew from their knowledge of past events, 
leading them to score accidental releases higher than deliberate ones. 
Following the questions on the likelihood of attack scenarios, the survey asked 
respondents to examine seven new attack scenarios to determine each one’s probability 
of ending in failure. Each attack scenario presented the respondent with an attack 
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mode, the class of hazardous materials, and the type of shipping container that would 
be transported. Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood of each attack failing 
due to either technical difficulties or security measures. For Scenarios 1–5, between 30 
and 50 percent of respondents claimed that attacks were at least probable to fail due to 
technical difficulties encounters or preventative security measures. However, 
respondents suggested that under Scenarios 6 and 7, the attacks would be much more 
likely to fail due to technical difficulties, whereas security measures would be much less 
effective. Intuitively, this makes sense. Scenarios 6 and 7 relate to a commercial vehicle 
being attacked with an explosive device placed on the side of a roadway. Arguably, 
policing every mile of roadway would be exceedingly difficult and consume immense 
financial and labor resources, and unless attackers attempted to sabotage a highly 
securitized route, it is exceedingly unlikely they would fail because of security 
provisions.  
Interestingly, for the remaining scenarios — with the exception of Scenario 3 —
respondents felt it was more probable attackers would fail due to security measures 
rather than succumbing to technical challenges. Under Scenario 3, respondents viewed 
technical mishaps and security measures as equally likely to ward off an attack. 
Analyzed collectively, the responses for Scenarios 1–5 indicate that the security 
measures currently in place are — in the participants’ minds — somewhat effective at 
preventing attackers from placing explosive devices on vehicles. Although it is important 
to recall that more respondents than not felt that the likelihood of security measures or 
technical problems thwarting an attack were greater than or equal to 50 percent, it is 
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equally important to remember that with the exception of Scenarios 6 and 7, 
respondents felt that technical difficulties and security measures were likely to produce 
failure. The Chances Even category accounted for a plurality of responses under many of 
the scenarios, which introduces interpretive ambiguities because it does not establish a 
clear picture of what respondents were thinking.       
Next, respondents answered a series of questions about the overall security of 
the U.S. hazardous materials supply chain and the potential consequences for a number 
of socioeconomic variables were an attack to occur. Approximately 75 percent of the 
respondents described the Tier 1 HSSM supply chain as being either vulnerable or very 
vulnerable to attacks. However, because the survey did not ask about the 
appropriateness of regulatory actions, we cannot infer whether recognizing this 
vulnerability would translate into support for new laws or mandatory policies designed 
to increase security.  
Respondents were then asked to imagine that a Tier 1 HSSM release took place 
and speculate about the contribution different variables would have on the aggregate 
impacts of an attack. A significant majority felt damage inflicted on nearby populations 
(through exposure and subsequent injuries or deaths), critical infrastructure, local and 
national economies, and public psychology would contribute highly to the composite 
impacts. This mirrors the findings of many studies. For example, considerable research 
has demonstrated that terrorist attacks traumatize children and adults alike, leading to 
post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and behavior abnormalities (see 
Fremont, 2004 and Shalev and Freedman, 2005 on the psychological consequences 
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experienced by victims of terrorism; Fullerton et al., 2003 reviews the psychological 
effects that radiate throughout broader communities and nations).  Moreover, 
respondents believed that key resources, international political fallout, and the erosion 
of civil liberties on the domestic front would produce a medium–high effect on the 
overall consequences. Respondents expressed comparatively little concern for 
environmentally sensitive areas, seeing the injuries they would be afflicted with as not 
factoring hugely into the aggregate damages.  
Because the number of variables was limited in the survey, respondents were 
asked to identify any additional factors that should be examined when deriving an 
attack’s gross consequences. The most common answer was the event’s duration. Even 
though an attack and ensuring materials release are point disturbances — i.e., they 
occur at a single point in time — the aftereffects could linger for days, months, or even 
years. The amount of time needed to contain and remediate a release is therefore an 
essential consideration. Depending on the chemical properties of the material released, 
the impacts could spread over a broad area. Some materials would be more toxic and 
damaging than others. One drawback of the survey is that it did not specify what type of 
material was released. Without this information, respondents had to make a 
generalized evaluation. While this does not invalidate the question’s findings, it points 
out that risk assessments will need to account for the type of material that a vehicle is 
transporting. One respondent observed that it could be important to consider whether 
a successful attack would influence attackers and/or sympathizers, leading to future 
attacks. Although it is difficult to quantify this, and any analysis would be speculative, 
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risk assessments could benefit from studying whether a successful attack would lead to 
a clustering effect, whereby one attack spurs on others. Taken collectively, the answers 
about the net consequences of attacks and materials releases establish a starting point 
from which to develop ways of ranking and quantifying the risk levels associated with 
particular shipments. For example, vehicles passing through densely populated urban 
areas would pose more risk than vehicles moving through a landscape dominated by 
open land — even if it does contain environmentally sensitive assets. Clearly, 
respondents were most concerned with the effects an attack would have on human, 
social, and economic capital (cf. Sandler & Enders, 2008). 
Respondents were also queried about their perceptions of what security 
challenges are most daunting for shippers, carriers, and consignees when moving 
hazardous materials. Approximately 90 percent of them viewed en route or personnel 
security as the most pressing issues. Business information security and inventory control 
processes were not viewed with the same degree of urgency. These results mirror what 
we would intuitively expect — preventing an attack and release of hazardous materials 
is largely an issue of protecting the shipment when it moves from origin to destination. 
Safeguarding a vehicles’ physical integrity and the roadways they travel on is of 
paramount concern for averting terrorist actions. Likewise, if supply chain stakeholders 
are not vigilant about the personnel they hire, shipments are potentially endangered 
and the likelihood of an attack increases because individuals are entrusted with 
materials they could readily exploit for violent purposes. 
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A final set of questions probed respondents about their knowledge of the 
voluntary security action items (SAIs) released by the TSA in 2008. Approximately 65 
percent of the respondents said they were not familiar with these items. There are 
several ways to interpret this number. On the one hand, the measures are voluntary, so 
none of the respondents would be tasked with enforcing them as part of their daily job 
routines. However, this astonishing lack of knowledge is also unsettling because it 
reveals a significant proportion of transportation security experts have no or very little 
understanding of recommended best practices for securing vehicles carrying Tier 1 
HSSMs. It likely demonstrates that unless rules are formalized through legislation or 
other legally binding policies, a large majority of security professionals will have no 
incentive to become intimately acquainted with them. While the survey was not 
distributed to carriers and shippers, there is no reason to believe they will have greater 
knowledge of SAIs.  
Despite the pessimism that could understandably result from this finding, the 23 
follow-up questions, which asked respondents to evaluate the importance of SAIs (see 
Table 3.5 for a complete list), revealed that approximately 80–90 percent of those 
surveyed believed that each was very or extremely important for securing Tier 1 HSSM 
shipments and the hazardous materials supply chain more broadly. While this does not 
necessarily argue for the implementation of new regulations, it reinforces 
interpretations of earlier survey questions, principally that government agencies lack 
the infrastructure, policies, and procedures to effectively police hazardous materials 
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transportation. More important, it convincingly demonstrates that security experts 
largely endorse the purpose and intent of the SAIs.        
3.5 An Equation for Assessing the Risk of Tier 1 HSSMs 
Drawing from the information collected via the survey and interviews with 
subject-matter experts, this section advances a risk equation developed by Virtual Risk 
Technologies (VRT, 2013) that may be used to evaluate the level of risk associated with 
a Tier 1 HSSM shipment. Along with data garnered from interviews, the risk question 
builds from other equations that are already in use at federal governmental agencies. As 
noted previously, the goal of this project is to develop an approach to risk analysis that 
is both methodologically robust and can be used by DHS, TSA, and other agencies 
concerned with hazardous materials transportation. It is thus imperative for the 
equation and its constituent parts to take on a form that are compatible with existing 
risk analysis frameworks. This will facilitate implementation and ensure that the 
estimates — and values — of risk generated by the equation are commensurate with 
those produced by other government methodologies, thus enabling meaningful 
comparisons across risk domains.  
Risk is the product of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (Eq.1). The 
definitions of each risk component are consistent with the DHS Lexicon. For a given Tier 
1 HSSM shipment, risk is calculated iteratively as it moves through highway networks. 
These iterative calculations are based on a set of spanning scenarios, which are then 
summed to produce a total security risk score (Table 3.3). Using a subset of possible 
attack scenarios constrains the number of calculations, which improves analytical 
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tractability. The attack modes were selected from existing — albeit classified — DHS and 
TSA documentation. These attack modes have been identified as the most likely to 
affect a Tier 1 HSSM shipment. All of the scenarios chosen appear in other risk 
assessment methodologies used by federal agencies. Other attack modes were 
considered (e.g., aircraft attack; chemical, biological, or radiological attacks; IEDs 
conveyed by waterborne vessels), however, subject-matter experts argued the 
likelihood of these being executed were too low to merit inclusion. Numerical values for 
each of the equation’s variables are derived through separate calculations, which are 
described below.      
(Eq. 1)  R = T x V x C 
 
Where: 
R = level of risk 
T = threat 
C = consequence 
 
 
Table 3.3 Attack Modes Used to Populate Risk Equation 
Attack 
Mode 
Description 
1 Explosive device placed on a CMV 
2 Explosive placed on the highway infrastructure 
3  Weapon launched at CMV from a distance 
4 Explosive device placed in a vehicle near a CMB 
5 Outsider hijacks CMV to immediately release or 
explode materials 
6 Outsider hijacks CMV to release to explode 
materials at a nearby location 
7 Insider hijacks CMV to immediately release or 
explode materials 
8 Insider hijacks CMV to release to explode materials 
at a nearby location 
9 Sabotage of a cargo tank motor vehicles carrying 
toxic inhalation hazard materials 
10 Initiating a crash 
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Threat values are contingent on two elements — static and dynamic factors. 
Static factors are fixed variables for a given shipment, and they determine the baseline 
threat value. They include the attack mode, type of hazardous material a vehicle is 
carrying, and the trailer and container types. Recall that risk scores are calculated across 
all spanning scenarios — thus, since each attack mode is incorporated into risk analysis 
during each step of the calculation, they are considered as fixed variables. Baseline 
threat levels are derived from DHS lookup tables that reflect subject-matter experts’ 
assessments of the different scenarios, which consist of various combinations of attack 
mode, hazardous materials, and containers. The other static factors are regarded as 
fixed because they remain unchanged during the course of a trip. Dynamic factors 
include population density and a shipment’s proximity to critical infrastructure and key 
resources (CIKR). The later encompass vital assets and systems which, if they were 
damaged or destroyed, would have severe repercussions for national security, economic 
security, and public health and safety. Equation 2 is used to calculate threat values for 
each attack scenario. Dynamic factors are place-based. The values assigned to tpop and 
tCIKR fluctuate based on the location of a shipment on the highway network and its 
relation to nearby areas. tCIKR is positively correlated with the number of CIKR located in 
the exposure zone. If there are few CIKR in a particular area, the probability of an attack 
declines because the shipment will be less attractive to potential attackers. When a 
shipment passes through an area with a higher population density or greater number of 
CIKR, threat values increase because more people and assets would suffer exposure if 
an attack were to occur. The underlying assumption of this equation is that attacks are 
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more likely to occur in areas with large populations and an abundance of CIKR. Extensive 
research has demonstrated that densely populated urban areas face a high risk of 
terrorist attacks compared to less developed or rural areas, which has been reflected in 
part by national, state, and local governments prioritizing the defense of cities in their 
security planning (e.g., Brown et al., 2004; Coaffee, 2009; Raleigh, 2015; Martin, 2015). 
The method used to assess risk here is consistent with other methods the DHS and 
federal government have adopted for risk analysis, including RCRMS, which was 
described in the previous section, and the Office of Risk Management and Analysis’s 
Special Events Awareness Report (SEAR).     
 
(Eq. 2)  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖 ∗ (
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖+ 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖
2
)  
 
Where:  
Ti = threat for attack mode i 
Tbase = baseline threat value 
tpop = threat modifier based on population density of the exposed area 
tCIKR = threat modifier based on CIKR in the exposed area 
i = ith attack mode 
 
The DHS Lexicon defines vulnerability as “a physical feature or operational 
attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard” 
(DHS, 2010). The risk equation’s vulnerability term denotes the likelihood that, once 
begun, an attacker will achieve their stated goal. An unsuccessful attack is one that fails 
due to the attackers being unable to surmount technical challenges or because the 
security measures put into place will deter potential attacks. Equation 3 is used to 
calculate a shipment’s vulnerability. The values for Vno failure (tech) ,i and Vno failure (security),i  
vary according to the scenario, container type, and installed security measures.   
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(Eq. 3)  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 =  𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡ℎ),𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 (𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠),𝑖𝑖 
 
Where: 
Vi = vulnerability to the ith attack mode 
Vno failure (tech), i = the likelihood that attackers do not fail due to their own failures for the 
ith attack mode  
Vno failure (security),i = the likelihood that attackers do not fail due to security measures for 
the ith attack mode 
i = ith attack mode 
 
Estimates of failure due to attacker incompetence or security measures are 
made by subject-matter experts using the Kent scale. As noted, the Kent scale is used to 
translate linguistic descriptions of each variable into a quantitative value (Meyer & 
Booker, 1991). Table 3.4 contains descriptions of particular scenarios, which are 
translated into linguistic probabilities, which are then converted into numerical 
probabilities. Once they have attained their numerical form, the probabilities can be 
used to populate the vulnerability equation. Vulnerability is a function of attack mode, 
trailer and container type, and the security processes and procedures that are used to 
safeguard hazardous materials-truck-container combinations.  
All of this information is summarized in a single table, which comprises the 
overall vulnerability framework — this table succinctly captures vulnerability scores for 
all of the scenarios being considered during a risk analysis (Table 3.4). Many government 
agencies have implemented a framework like this for vulnerability assessments. 
Adopting it here preserves heuristic continuity across analytical methods, which is 
critical for these agencies to have a unified baseline from which to evaluate 
vulnerability. Similarly, the Kent Scale has been used frequently in governmental risk 
assessments (e.g., THTRA, the Office of Risk Management and Analysis’s Risk 
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Assessment Process for Informed Decision-Making [RAPID], the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection’s National Comparative Risk Assessment [NCRA]) to quantify vulnerability 
based on subject-matter expertise.  
Table 3.4 Kent Scale for Vno failure (tech) 
Description Linguistic 
Probability 
Numerical 
Probability 
Attack is not challenging and simple to execute. Certain 1.0 
Attack is somewhat challenging but relatively 
simple to execute. 
Nearly Certain 0.93 
Attack is challenging and somewhat complex, 
requiring good logistics and coordination. 
Probable 0.75 
Attack is challenging and complex, requiring 
substantial logistics and coordination. 
Chances Even 0.50 
Attack is very challenging and complex, requiring 
substantial logistics and coordination. 
Probably Not 0.30 
Attack is very challenging and very complex, 
requiring substantial logistics, coordination, and 
resources. 
Highly Doubtful 0.07 
Attack is very challenging and extremely complex, 
requiring substantial logistics, sophisticated 
coordination, and significant resources. 
Practically 
Impossible 
0.01 
Attack is not possible. Not Possible 0.0 
 
The consequences of an attack are based on the number of people affected, 
nearby CIKR, potential impacts to environmentally sensitive areas, and economic 
repercussions (Equation 4). Population refers to the number of people who lie within 
the exposure zone for a particular hazardous material. Population data come from the 
U.S. Census, which are disaggregated to match up with individual roadway segments. 
Because the number of people in a location fluctuates based on the time of day 
(especially in urban settings), it is necessary to calculate separate population values for 
day and night. CIKR is partitioned into two terms (CINCIKR1,i and CINCIKR2,i), based on the 
Level 1 and 2 CIKR lists maintained by DHS. The next factor, environmentally sensitive 
areas, refers to parks, rivers, streams, lakes, and reservoirs. This term’s value is based on 
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the number of environmentally sensitive areas located within 0.1 mi (0.16 km) of the 
vehicle carrying hazardous materials. Lastly, the consequence term accounts for the 
economic impact of a hazardous materials release. This valuation is based on the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of the nearest metropolitan area. GDP measures the total value 
of goods and services produced within an area’s economy during a single year. The 
economic impacts of an attack are likely to be positively correlated with an area’s GDP 
— as GDP increases, so do the expected losses from an attack.  
(Eq. 4)  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 
 
Where: 
CIN = consequence index number 
CINpop = consequence equivalence of the exposed population 
CINCIKR1 = consequence equivalence of exposed Level 1 CIKR 
CINCIKR2 = consequence equivalence of exposed Level 2 CIKR 
CINenv = consequence equivalence of environmentally sensitive areas 
CINecon = consequence equivalence of economic impact within exposed areas 
i = ith attack mode 
 
Consequence equivalence scales are developed (Table 3.5) to derive the 
appropriate consequence index numbers (CIN). The CINs are environmental impacts and 
CIKR are always positive integers, whereas the CINs for affected populations and 
economic impacts may be any positive number. Two additional equations are used to 
estimate the consequence equivalence of the population and economic impacts 
(Equations 5 and 6). Several resources are used to estimate an attack’s consequences, 
including the USDOT Emergency Response Guidebook; U.S. Census Bureau data (from 
which population numbers are collected); CIKR lists; U.S. Geological Survey, 
Environmental Protection Agency, and National Park Service databases of 
environmentally sensitive areas; and GDP data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
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Analysis. The methodology used to assess consequences enjoys widespread purchase 
across a number of federal government agencies. For example, U.S. Customs and 
Boarder Protection has implemented a similar methodology as part of its Security 
Management Assessment Risk Tool (SMART). 
(Eq. 5) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 = log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) − 2 
(Eq. 6) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = log(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝) − 8 [𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 >
$1 𝐵𝐵; 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 < $1𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0] 
Table 3.5 Sample Consequence Equivalence Table 
Population 
Exposed 
# Level 1 
CIKR 
Present in 
Exposure 
Zone 
# Level 2 
CIKR 
Present in 
Exposure 
Zone 
Environmentally 
Sensitive Areas 
in Exposure 
Zone 
Economic 
Impact 
Consequence 
Index 
Number 
1,000,000 2 4 - $1T 4 
100,000 1 3 - $100B 3 
10,000 - 2 - $10B 2 
1,000 - 1 1 $1B 1 
100 - - - <$1B 0 
Once the different components of risk have been evaluated, the security risk for 
a particular shipment can be evaluated using Equation 1 for each attack mode (by 
substituting the appropriate values for the threat, consequence, and vulnerability 
factors). A shipment’s dynamic security risk — that is, the overall risk when the 
shipment is at a specific location on the highway network — is then calculated by adding 
together the risk for each attack mode, as per Equation 7.  
(Eq. 7)  𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖10𝑖𝑖=1  
It is critical for recall that risk scores are both relative (i.e., not absolute) and 
non-dimensional, meaning that the numbers used to signify risk do not have units. 
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However, risk scores are calculated using a ratio scale, which enables direct comparisons 
of risk across multiple shipments.     
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper makes several contributions to the growing literature on risk, 
transportation security, and hazardous materials transportation. A survey administered 
to transportation professionals who deal with hazardous materials security on a daily 
basis revealed that — for most of the attack scenarios presented — they felt there is a 
low to moderate likelihood of an attack being initiated. When queried about TSA’s 
Security Action Items, there was near universal consensus that adoption and 
implementation would prove fruitful and measurably enhance the security of hazardous 
materials shipments. With respect to the factors that would most significantly 
contribute to the aggregate consequences of a terrorist attack, survey participants cited 
impacts to local populations, critical infrastructure and key resources, adjacent 
economies, and public psychology as most important. Terrorist attacks produce a 
cascade effect, meaning their effects reverberate across multiple domains.  
The survey results and interviews with subject-matter experts underscore the 
importance of adopting a holistic framework for risk analysis. Estimating the number of 
people who will potentially be affected by a hazardous materials release is an essential 
component of any risk analysis, however, this should not be viewed in isolation form 
other resources that constitute the social fabric which defines individuals’ everyday 
lives. As such, the risk equation developed in this paper weighs the potential 
consequences a hazardous materials release would have on the exposed population, 
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critical infrastructure assets, key resources, environmentally sensitive locations, and 
aggregate economic impacts. A key consideration in developing this risk equation was 
analytical tractability, thus, definitions of risk and equation structures that are currently 
used by federal agencies were adopted. While it is possible to envision other 
approaches to perform risk analysis that are more complex and integrate a larger 
number of variables, the methodology proposed in this paper will facilitate agency-led 
programs (e.g., by DHS and TSA) to improve real-time monitoring of vulnerable 
shipments.  
Further, the risk equation proposed here may be calculated quickly, which makes 
it possible to repeatedly derive risk scores for a vehicle as it navigates highway 
networks. Accordingly, this equation could underwrite a comprehensive, spatially 
explicit risk monitoring protocol. Any model or equation must balance a commitment to 
realism and parsimony — while it is important to include as many variables as possible 
to generate an accurate evaluation of a shipment’s risk, incorporating too many factors 
would render them unusable. The risk equation and assessment framework described 
here, because it distills risk into a few key variables, can inform the development of risk 
monitoring systems to assist with routing (e.g., Razo & Gao, 2012) across a host of 
transportation domains (e.g., rail and waterborne commerce). Future work should 
attempt to define the conceptual architecture of a system to monitor Tier 1 HSSMs 
throughout the United States. Once operational, this kind of system would be critical for 
reducing the likelihood of terrorist events. 
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Chapter 4 The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment Framework—DHMRA 
4.1 Introduction 
According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), approximately 2.2 
billion tons of hazardous materials were shipped in the United States in 2007. Of this 
total, 1.2 billion tons were transported with trucks. In aggregate, the value of hazardous 
materials shipped on trucks that year exceeded $800 billion (FHWA, 2013). Based on 
these figures, it is clear that the shipment of hazardous materials drives a significant 
amount of domestic economic activity. While there are many risks involved with the use 
and movement of hazardous materials, because they are key inputs into many industrial 
and manufacturing operations and go into products that enable U.S. consumers to enjoy 
a modern and comfortable standard of living, their use is unlikely to wane in the near 
future (Zhang et al., 2000). By extension, the tonnage and value of hazardous materials 
carried on trucks and other surface transportation modes is anticipated to grow.  
Yet, if hazardous materials are released into the surrounding environment — 
either due to an accident or a malicious act — they can produce significant damage. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the number and types of incidents involving the shipment of 
hazardous materials on highways in 2015 (U.S. Department of Transportation — 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2016). Just over 15,000 
incidents were recorded, which caused numerous injuries, 11 fatalities, and over $52 
million dollars in damages. What stands out most about these statistics is that while a 
majority of incidents occurred during the loading or unloading phase, the incidents that 
took place during transit accounted for the overwhelming majority of financial damages 
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and all fatalities. It is critical to note that 2015 was not an anomaly. From 2006–2016, in-
transit events routinely exacted the greatest monetary damages, produced the severest 
injuries, and were the most likely to cause fatalities. Were a catastrophic release event 
to occur, either because of an accident or through intentional means (e.g., a terrorist 
attack), the magnitude and extent of the ensuing destruction, injury, and death would 
be immense — especially in densely populated urban locales. To improve emergency 
management efforts, it is critical for federal, state, and local government agencies to 
have dynamic information regarding the contents, position, and movement of 
commercial vehicles transporting hazardous materials (Milazzo et al., 2009).  
Table 4.1 Summary of Injuries, Death, and Financial Damages Attributable to Hazardous 
Materials Incidents in 2016 
Transportation 
Phase 
Incidents Hospitalized Non-
Hospitalized 
Fatalities Damages 
In-Transit 3,824 6 19 11 $43,230,106 
In-Transit 
Storage 
330 2 1 0 $1,920,906 
Loading 3,143 4 26 0 $1,152,879 
Unloading 7,794 14 82 0 $6,249,990 
 
Although terrorist attacks have rarely been directed at hazardous materials 
shipments, the events of September 11, 2001 offer a vivid reference point which 
exemplifies the devastating consequences of a single attack. The number of attacks 
during the ensuring 15 years demonstrate, as well, that terrorism is a ubiquitous threat. 
Recent incidents in the United States and around the world illustrate that terrorists are 
opportunistically selecting targets based on their ease of access and the possibility of 
maximizing damage (e.g., Becker, 2014; Morris, 2015). Open highways and hazardous 
materials shipments present an attractive target for terrorists. Some measures have 
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been put in place to safeguard U.S. highways, however, infrastructure is characterized 
by numerous vulnerabilities that present potential exposure to terrorist attacks (Fink, 
2007). Highways are easily accessed, unsecure, move a large number of goods and 
people, and do not receive the same level of oversight currently directed towards 
airports and port facilities. The openness of roadways makes it difficult to ensure 
security measures will successfully protect vehicles and hazardous materials from 
potential attackers. Remedying the security gaps related to hazardous materials that 
characterize U.S. highway networks is critical for eliminating or mitigating the effect of 
potential attacks. Although considerable work has previously examined hazardous 
materials routing on transportation networks (Kang et al., 2014a), the real-time risk 
posed by individual shipments has been understudied. Because of this, federal, state, 
and local governments have no comprehensive way to understand the levels of risk 
shipments of hazardous materials are exposed to. Protecting hazardous materials 
shipments against terrorist threats is obviously critical, but a dynamic risk management 
system could also facilitate swifter responses to accidental releases. 
A comprehensive yet real-time risk management system must incorporate a 
sophisticated understanding of how risks, threats, and consequences are spatially 
distributed. Many perceive all locations as being equally likely to experience a terrorist 
attack, however, terrorism threats are distributed in a spatially uneven manner. Not all 
places are equally vulnerable to terrorist attacks (or hazardous materials shipments). 
Opportunistic target selection means that actors are most likely to select locations 
where there are few security measures or barriers in place (e.g., Drakos & Gofas, 2006; 
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see also Mustafa, 2005). For example, the risk profile of a commercial vehicle with 
hazardous materials onboard fluctuates during the course of its journey. Shipments 
traveling on an isolated rural road pose little risk because an attack would inflict 
relatively little damage. Conversely, hazardous materials shipments passing through a 
densely populated urban area would be potentially catastrophic. Given the complex 
array of variables that influence not only the choice of a target but the consequence of 
an attack involving hazardous materials, a fully parameterized risk management system 
must leverage analyses of historical incidents alongside expert knowledge to generate 
realistic vulnerability, threat, and consequence assessments (Haimes & Longstaff, 2002). 
This paper describes the conceptual architecture and implementation of a risk 
management system that provides government security specialists with the tools and 
information needed to track individual shipments of Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive 
Materials. Current methods used to evaluate shipment risk are lacking because they 
focus on estimating the probability that a hazardous materials release will occur along a 
particular roadway segment.    
The methods account for the expected consequences of an incident, but they 
focus on total population exposure (Erkut & Verter, 1998), which overlooks other social, 
economic, and environmental impacts of hazardous materials releases. These methods 
provide a useful way of summarizing risk, however, they do not provide stakeholders 
with the means to dynamically evaluate the level of risk posed by an individual 
shipment. Similarly, recent work on shipment routing has tended to focus on 
optimization problems or devising algorithms to minimize the impacts of a potential 
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incident, while failing to develop sophisticated analyses of the multivariate drivers of 
risk (e.g., Kang et al., 2014a,b; Toumazis et al., 2013; see below). Other methods treat 
the consequences of a hazardous materials release purely in terms of its effects on 
human health (Inanloo & Tansel, 2016). Such a narrow view is problematic because it 
disregards the specific contents of individual vehicles and the impacts materials will 
have on human health and the environment if released intentionally or accidentally. 
These data, combined with information about demographics, environmentally sensitive 
areas, and economic activity, can be used to generate context-sensitive assessments of 
the risk posed by hazardous material shipments.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section briefly 
reviews literature on risk and the methods that have most frequently been used to 
quantify the risks associated with moving hazardous materials on road networks. Next it 
describes an equation which locates risk as the product of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences that can be used to instantaneously assess the risk profile of a hazardous 
materials shipment. Unlike more classical approaches to risk evaluations that base 
consequence assessments on population exposure, this methodology also accounts for 
the presence of critical infrastructure, key resources, environmentally sensitive areas, 
and economic impacts to holistically manage risk. After this, the conceptual architecture 
of a GIS environment is described which enables users to visualize and map the risk 
profiles of hazardous materials shipments. To illustrate the logic underpinning this 
system and the risk equation (see also Chapter 3), a case study is used to demonstrate 
how risk varies spatially. Knowing that the risk associated with a hazardous material 
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shipment changes dynamically as it crosses networks of roadways demands that we 
develop a method of risk assessment and management that accurately represents the 
spatial variability of that risk. Developing such a method is useful because it leads to 
more targeted security policies, and provides government agencies with the tools to 
understand how a hazardous materials release will impact specific locations. The 
equation and risk management system will give emergency managers the information 
needed to respond quickly and appropriately to an attack in order to mitigate its worst 
effects. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Due to the relative scarcity of accidents involving hazardous materials (Harwood 
et al., 1993 estimated a rate of 0.000001 accidents per kilometer of roadway), 
calculating the exact level of risk an individual shipment poses is challenging. Data are 
scarce, which means that researchers must leverage a combination of historical data 
and expert knowledge to generate risk estimates. Researchers generally approach risk 
calculations and hazardous materials routing problems from two points of view — local 
and global (Kang et al., 2014a). The goal of local route planning is to select optimal paths 
for individual shipments; global route planning attempts to coordinate multiple trips 
across one or multiple fleets in order to evenly distribute risk across the entire road 
network. Although individual shippers tend to be most concerned with routing 
individual trucks because they want to minimize their expenses and the potential for an 
individual release event (Dadkar et al., 2010a, b), government agencies, because they 
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have broader regulatory missions, are more focused on global routing and minimizing 
social risk (e.g., Erkut & Ingolfsson, 2000; Erkut et al., 2007).     
Definitions of risk vary across academic disciplines, however, in the context of 
hazardous materials transportation, there is a general consensus among researchers 
that public risk is the product of population exposure and accident rates (Saccomanno & 
Shortreed 1993; Erkut & Verter 1998; Chang et al. 2005; Erkut & Ingolfsson 2005; 
Dadkar et al. 2008, 2010a). These metrics may be combined into a single consequence 
measure by adding together the product of accident rate and public exposure along all 
of the road segments — or links — where a shipment will move (Dadkar et al., 2010a. 
This path evaluation function (Chang et al., 2005; Erkut & Verter, 1998; Erkut & 
Ingolfsson, 2000) is additive and takes on the following form:   
 
where pi denotes the probability of an accident occurring along segment i of a road; Ci 
measures the consequence of a release accident taking place along segment i. Although 
the definition of consequence varies among authors, generally it refers to the number of 
people who are located along a road segment within a buffer zone that would be 
exposed to a release event. This traditional risk model does not capture the magnitude 
of potential impacts, the severity of injuries and fatalities, and short- and long-term 
economic and environmental damage. Erkut and Verter (1998) observed that for most 
hazardous materials shipments, the value of pi falls between 0.1 and 0.8 per million 
miles. More recent work on routing and risk has adopted more expansive concepts of 
risk and consequence, noting that factors other than population should be taken into 
TR(r) = pi Ci
i=1
n
∑
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account. Pradhananga et al. (2016) proposed a solution to hazardous materials routing 
that minimizes the sum of population-based and congestion-based risk costs, reasoning 
that incidents involving hazardous materials lead to significant congestion problems on 
directly impacted and nearby roadways. Cordeiro et al. (2016) introduced a modeling 
approach that explicitly incorporated the risks posed to the environment and nearby 
populations by hazardous materials shipments. Inanloo and Tansel (2016) also took a 
broad view to the problem, developing a tool that compared routing options based on 
the level of public exposure, economic benefits, and the health risks and delay costs 
associated with a release. Along with traditional network analysis, Inanloo and Tansel 
(2016) integrated modeling to estimate the geographical reach of a hazardous materials 
release based on atmospheric conditions.   
Other recent work has expanded on the classical approach to risk modeling. Van 
Raemdonck et al. (2013) proposed a risk analysis framework that can be applied to 
multimodal transportation systems. This spatially explicit framework derives the 
probability of hazardous materials releases based on past events. From these 
calculations, global and local probability maps, which let users visualize locations on 
transportation networks that are especially vulnerable to release incidents, are 
generated. Panwhar et al. (2000) developed a GIS-based hazardous materials routing 
framework to minimize the likelihood and impact of accidents. The probabilistic risk 
assessment framework adopted within the system calculated the probability of a 
hazardous materials release taking place on a road segment while also accounting for 
impacts to critical resources that were located nearby. Considering that the facility’s 
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vulnerability is critical for understanding the consequences of an incident — as such, 
Panwhar et al. (2000) demonstrated that routing and risk calculations must account for 
facilities such as schools, hospitals, and other critical infrastructure to accurately 
evaluate risk. Bubbico et al. (2004) established a simplified approach to transportation 
risk analysis that analyzed the probability of discrete release scenarios and estimated 
consequences based on ambient weather conditions and the characteristics of the built 
environment. This framework took into account the effect of population density on total 
risk while also leveraging a catalog of release scenarios to quickly estimate the social risk 
posed by individual shipments. More recent approaches to risk and routing analysis 
have used sophisticated techniques, using game theory (e.g., Dadkar et al., 2010a) and 
Value-at-Risk modeling (Toumazis & Kwon, 2013; Toumazis et al., 2013 Kang et al., 
2014a, Faghih-Roohi et al., 2015). The latter is a risk measurement tool that was 
originally developed in the context of financial risk management, but has since been 
used to estimate the measure of risk associated with high-consequence, low-probability 
events.    
Although increasingly complex forms of mathematical analysis and algorithms 
have been used to quantify the risk of hazardous materials shipments to develop 
optimal routing strategies, the measures used to assess the consequences of a release 
incident have been too narrowly focused, often privileging measures like population — 
which are easy to obtain — while sidestepping the role of nearby critical infrastructure, 
vulnerable resources, economic and environmental impacts, and the spatial and 
temporal magnitude of an event. Although there have been some attempts to 
91 
conceptualize risk and consequence more broadly, frameworks that have done so have 
generally integrated only one or two of these factors into their models (e.g., Panwhar et 
al., 2000; Van Raemdonck et al. 2013).  
More holistic forms of risk management have increasingly captured the attention 
of researchers. One example is the all-hazards risk management framework (AHRM), 
which proposes a holistic evaluation of methods to mitigate natural- and humanly-
created hazards (Chaterjee & Abkowitz 2009; Abkowitz & Chaterjee 2012). Unlike the 
other forms of risk analysis discussed above, this framework is not strictly mathematical, 
although it is quantitative. The AHRM converts risk into a monetary value to calculate 
the level of insecurity created by particular hazards. Despite its more holistic 
perspective, the AHRM does not deviate from more traditional models of risk 
calculation, and by viewing risk in purely monetary terms, researchers risk overlooking 
more qualitative dimensions of hazardous materials releases that cannot be distilled 
into a single metric, such as habitat loss or the disruptions that are caused when 
affected populations have to reconfigure their livelihoods. Furthermore, the AHRM 
omits any consideration of how risk varies spatially. As Liu et al. (2012) persuasively 
argues, the principal failing of traditional risk models is their propensity to evaluate risk 
for an entire route before a shipment even leaves its departure point, and to not 
recalculate risk profiles during the course of a journey (see also Fabiano et al., 2002). 
Certainly, it is more computationally parsimonious to use fixed probability and 
consequence values to measure risk; however, this leaves government agencies and 
other emergency responders with an incomplete understanding of what road segments 
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have elevated vulnerability to the effects of an intentional or accidental release (Oggero 
et al., 2006). Risk modeling has either highlighted accidental releases or left the type of 
release unspecified. But accurately evaluating the nature of the risk (and coordinating 
appropriate responses in the event of an incident) demands knowledge of the goods 
contained in a shipment (e.g., Griffin, 2009). A final problem with current risk modeling 
techniques is that they use definitions of risk, consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats 
which do not align with those employed by the local, state, and federal agencies tasked 
with overseeing the security of hazardous materials (see below).  
Although there have been many strides made in risk assessment and the routing 
of hazardous material shipments, this brief review indicates that traditional risk 
evaluation methods lack a cogent framework to analyze the vulnerabilities and 
consequences that accompany different modes of terrorist attacks or release events. 
Developing a fully parameterized risk management and routing system entails moving 
beyond the development systems whose principal aim is to optimize shipment 
movements — and toward fine-grained individualistic analyses that can equip 
government agencies with the knowledge required to identify and contextualize the 
security vulnerabilities Tier 1 HSSM shipments are exposed to. The following section 
describes a methodology and risk equation that can be used to accomplish this task, 
both of which are compatible with methods currently in use at domestic homeland 
security agencies (e.g., Transportation Security Administration).   
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4.3 Methodology — Spatially Explicit Modeling of Tier 1 HSSM Shipment Risks 
4.3.1 Calculating Risk 
This section describes a methodology and conceptual architecture to evaluate 
the risk of Tier 1 HSSMs. The goal of the methodology is to offer a corrective to the 
deficiencies of current risk models while being consistent with the definitions of risk 
currently accepted by the federal government. Indeed, the practical objective of this 
intervention is to develop a holistic risk management system that can be used by 
government agencies. The previous chapter included an exhaustive overview of how 
different segments within the transportation industry measure risk. Although the 
starting point of this methodology is the federal government’s definition of risk, this 
builds upon previous academic work. Risk is calculated by multiplying threats, 
vulnerabilities and consequences (in accordance with the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Lexicon). Willis et al. (2005, p. 6) defined threat as “the probability that a 
specific target is attacked in a specific way during a specified period of time.” Similarly, 
vulnerability refers to the probability that “damages occur, given a specific attack type, 
at a specific time, on a given target” (p. 8). The following equation is used to quantify 
risk: 
(Eq. 1) R = T x V x C 
Where: 
R = level of risk 
V = vulnerabilities 
T = threat 
C = consequence 
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This parameterization of risk shares commonalities with an equation proposed by Zhang 
et al. (2000), who adopted an expected consequence approach to risk, which used the 
following equation to estimate the level of risk of individual road segments: 
R l = S l x P l x N l: 
Where: 
R l = total risk of hazmat movement along link l  
S l = number of shipments on link l 
P l = probability of a release accident for an individual shipment on link l  
N l = cumulative population of individuals affected by a release even on link l 
The methodology proposed here diverges from Zhang et al.’s (2000) model, 
however, by including a variable that estimates the risk encountered by a shipment due 
to the threat of an attack. Threats and vulnerabilities are each measured using 
probabilistic distributions based on a combination of historical data and expert 
knowledge instead of on less reliable point estimates. Three separate equations are 
used to derive risk scores for individual shipments. A full derivation of these can be 
found in Chapter 3. Following Bubbico et al. (2004), a series of look-up tables are used 
to populate threat, vulnerability, and consequence equations with specific values. 
Briefly, the following equations are used to calculate these parameters: 
(Eq. 3) 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖 ∗ (
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖+ 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖
2
) 
Where:  
Ti = threat for attack mode i 
Tbase = baseline threat value 
tpop = threat modifier based on population density of the exposed area 
tCIKR = threat modifier based on CIKR in the exposed area 
i = ith attack mode 
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(Eq. 4)  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 =  𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡ℎ),𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 (𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠),𝑖𝑖 
 
Where: 
Vi = vulnerability to the ith attack mode 
Vno failure (tech), i = the likelihood that attackers do not fail due to their own failures for the 
ith attack mode  
Vno failure (security),i = the likelihood that attackers do not fail due to security measures for 
the ith attack mode 
i = ith attack mode 
 
(Eq. 5)  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 
 
W here: 
CIN = consequence index number 
CINpop = consequence equivalence of the exposed population 
CINCIKR1 = consequence equivalence of exposed Level 1 CIKR 
CINCIKR2 = consequence equivalence of exposed Level 2 CIKR 
CINenv = consequence equivalence of environmentally sensitive areas 
CINecon = consequence equivalence of economic impact within exposed areas 
i = ith attack mode 
 
 Unlike other modes of risk assessment, this equation can be iteratively calculated 
to estimate the risk exposure of a hazardous materials shipment at any point along a 
road network. Dynamically updating risk values is critical for government agencies to 
have an up-to-date, real-time picture of what shipments merit scrutiny. After each 
variable of the risk equation has been calculated, the dynamic security is calculated. This 
score represents the overall risk of a shipment when it is at a particular location on the 
road network. It is derived by summing the risk for each of the attack modes which have 
been defined: 
 
(Eq. 8)  𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖10𝑖𝑖=1  
 
 Risk scores are relative and non-dimensional. Because they are based on a ratio 
scale, the risk exposure of various shipments can be directly compared with one 
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another. Although these scores provide valuable information, taken alone they do not 
solve key problems that confront security agencies — to visualize where shipments are 
located and determine the spatial and temporal variability of risk’s three components. 
The risk equation should be viewed as establishing a means of calculating the spatial 
variability of risk in numerical terms. A complementary system that converts these data 
into mapped information using geo-algorithms is necessary to display fluctuations in risk 
levels and to generate hypotheses about the underlying drivers of risk. Unlike the most 
conventional methods of calculating risk, the equation presented here captures not just 
population exposure, but also the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of 
risk, which results in a more comprehensive understanding of what locations are most 
vulnerable to hazardous materials releases. The next section briefly sketches out the 
conceptual architecture and platform of a Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk 
Assessment Framework (DHMRA).   
4.3.2 Conceptual Architecture of the Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment 
Framework 
The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment Framework (DHMRA) 
combines a desktop GIS-based application with an underlying risk engine that iteratively 
calculates the risk profiles of hazardous materials shipments. Government security 
specialists can use the GIS-based application to visualize how individual risk profiles 
change over time, identify roadway segments where shipments are concentrated, flag 
security anomalies (e.g., whether a shipment has deviated from its planned course), and 
coordinate responses to potential security incidents or hazardous materials releases. 
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Indeed, if risk scores were left in their raw numerical form, government agencies would 
be unable to quickly identify the most pressing vulnerabilities, being overwhelmed by 
tabular, unmapped data. As such, computing risk scores and visualizing risk complement 
one another, thus providing government agencies with detailed national, regional, and 
local summaries of shipment activities. This section briefly describes the software and 
desktop environment that are used to visualize the risk profiles of hazardous materials 
shipments. Discussions of software development and its underlying code are beyond the 
scope of this paper — rather, the aim is to illustrate the mapping platform and its 
capacity to translate risk scores and monitoring data into actionable intelligence.  
The DHRMA’s mapping environment is the Security Specialist Desktop (SSD), 
which provides users with three distinct screens — a situational awareness screen, a 
research screen, and an action screen. Each screen has different capabilities and 
presents risk calculations and individual shipment data at different levels of detail. In an 
operational environment, security analysts would be assigned a focal geographic area, 
which is captured on the situational awareness screen (Figure 4.1). This screen provides 
security analysts with a synoptic view of their assigned area. Summary consequence 
data are located in the lower left-hand portion of the screen, including the region’s 
exposed population, potential economic impacts, the number of critical infrastructure 
elements and key resources, and environmentally sensitive assets. These data are 
integral for determining a shipment’s risk profile, so displaying them on the situational 
awareness screen lets users immediately apprehend what factors are driving risk scores. 
Circles are used to represent individual shipments, the color of which varies based on 
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the calculated risk (e.g., shipments that warrant greater attention are colored orange 
and red). Users have the ability to click on individual shipments, which brings up key 
intelligence that would be used during an emergency situation, such as the driver’s 
personal information, vehicle and trailer type, and the carrier and consignee contact 
data. Along with these data, in the upper right-hand corner, security specialists have 
access to an Intelligence Analyst List. Included on this list are materials which the TSA 
has prioritized based on intelligence it has received (e.g., if terrorists have targeted a 
material, it will appear here). Additionally, there is a high-risk shipments list, 
automatically generated by the SSD software based on risk profiles and intelligence, 
which contains all of the active hazardous materials shipments in the security analyst’s 
designated area.    
Figure 4.1 Screen Capture of the SSD’s Situational Awareness Screen 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the research screen, which provides a security analyst with 
fine-grained details on individual shipments. If an analyst decides — based on 
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information gleaned from the situational awareness screen — that a shipment merits 
scrutiny, the research screen is used to track it. A panel on the left side lists shipment 
data, including the shipper information, the gate-out time, emergency and carrier 
contacts, an option to open up a new window that presents a detailed analysis of risk 
scores, and the planned destination. An analyst can flag a shipment to indicate it bears 
watching, and if the situation warrants, escalate its security/risk status. Once a shipment 
is placed on this screen, an analyst can watch it move in real-time. If the security risk 
presented by a shipment is high enough, an analyst can move it to the action screen, 
which enables a more thorough investigation (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.2 Screen Capture of the SSD’s Research Screen 
While analysts have the option to move a shipment to this screen of their own 
volition, the SSD software can automatically load a shipment here if it detects an 
anomaly. The action screen’s purpose is to help a user determine whether a security 
incident is in progress. It supplies information the security analyst needs to make this 
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decision, including intelligence on shipment’s current risk profile, nearby targets, the 
type of hazardous materials contained on the vehicle, the shipment manifest, driver 
information, and the nature of the anomaly detected (e.g., a shipment has departed 
from its planned route). Once a security analyst has determined that a security incident 
may be taking place, the action screen facilitates a rapid response.  
The action screen contains a workflow panel that outlines step-by-step 
instructions on how to resolve a case. With the graphical layout, an analyst can quickly 
scan all relevant information. After working through the prescribed workflow, analysts 
have two options:  1) if further investigation reveals a shipment does not present a 
threat, they can close the case without taking actions, or 2) if they believe a shipment 
has been compromised, they can use the SSD’s Fusion tool. The Fusion tool launches a 
virtual collaboration session that initiates dialogue among all relevant stakeholders. 
Critical stakeholders would typically include shipping partners; TSA officials; local, state, 
and federal agencies; and emergency response centers. Collaboration takes place over a 
secured network and is essential for coordinating a swift response to security incidents 
or accidental hazardous materials releases.  
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Figure 4.3 Screen Capture of SSD’s Action Screen 
All of the DHMRA’s visualizations, workflows, and analysis are underpinned by 
the risk equation described in the previous section (and Chapter 3). The SSD’s mapping 
environment provides security analysts with the insights they need to evaluate and 
manage the risk posed by shipments at the individual and collective levels. To illustrate 
the combined strength of the SSD and risk equation, the following section presents a 
brief case study. This case study reinforces the argument that threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences — and therefore risk — exhibit dramatic spatial variability. 
4.4 Case Study: Calculating and Visualizing the Risk of Simulated Hazardous Materials 
Shipments 
The case study presented here considers the movement of six hazardous 
materials (in different containers and quantities) from Ashland, Kentucky to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Because each material presents different threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences, the level of risk posed by each varies (Table 4.2 lists 
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the characteristics of each shipment). The SSD’s underlying software was used to 
generate risk scores for each shipment for their entire trip. The framework’s 
visualization tools give users the opportunity to quickly analyze the entire risk landscape 
and determine, in real-time, which shipments power the greatest danger. Proprietary 
look-up tables (cf. Bubbico et al., 2004) were used to generate threat and vulnerability 
values for each shipment.     
Table 4.2 Shipping Profiles for Simulated Case Study 
Material Container Weight (lbs.) 
Explosive, Blasting Type A Explosive Packages 5,000 
Division 1.1 Explosives: Not 
Heavily Encased 
Explosives Packages 20,000 
Radioactive, Plutonium 238 Radioactive Type B 1  
Radioactive, Cobalt 60 Radioactive Type A 1  
Chlorine Pressurized Tanker 20,000  
Acrylonitrile, Stabilized Pressurized Tanker 20,000  
 
As noted previously, risk scores tend to be amplified by the presence of large 
populations. Figure 4.4 captures this trend; the risk posed by all of the shipments 
increases dramatically when they enter densely populated urban areas such as 
Charleston, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Trend lines reveal shipments 
pose little risk for much of their journey, with scores flatlining at low values throughout 
the more rural portions of West Virginia and Virginia. The release of chlorine — given its 
toxic inhalation properties and dispersal potential — would potentially cause the most 
significant damage. These findings are consistent with past events. Barrett and Adams 
(2011) showed that dispersion of chlorine gas can produce a high number of fatalities in 
urban areas. Jones et al. (2010) cited a number of recent incidents that involved the 
release of chlorine gas. For example, in 2005 a railroad tanker filled with chlorine gas 
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collided with another train near Graniteville, South Carolina. The accident diffused 90 
tons of chlorine into the air, leading to nine fatalities and forcing 5,400 of the town’s 
residents to evacuate. Underscoring the effects of chlorine is not meant to downplay 
the potentially severe impacts of the other materials, it is to illustrate that the impact of 
hazardous materials incidents is contingent upon their chemical properties. Although 
the release of chlorine may lead to the greatest number of injuries and fatalities, 
explosives will tend to inflict more lasting damage on the built environment. While 
injuries and fatalities would no doubt result from the detonation of explosive materials, 
the possible destruction of critical infrastructure and key resources, along with 
attendant economic damage, contribute most significantly to risk.   
Figure 4.4 Risk Score Trend Lines for Simulated Trip 
Figure 4.5 decomposes the risk profile of a vehicle carrying chlorine gas by 
displaying threat, vulnerability, and consequence scores. Consistent with the results 
above, the shipment’s risk exposure is greatest in urban areas. Note that threat and 
consequence scores peak in these locations because attackers are most likely to execute 
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a vehicle attack in places where the amount of damage inflicted can be maximized. 
Vulnerability, on the other hand, bottoms out in cities. Recall that a shipment’s 
vulnerability hinges on the relative likelihood of attackers successfully executing an 
attack. In rural locations, it is unlikely robust security measures will be in place to ward 
off an attack. Vulnerability scores tend to decline in urban settings there are more 
barriers to pulling off a successful attack. Generally, there is an inverse relationship 
between vulnerability and threat and consequence scores.  
Figure 4.5 Sample Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Score for a Shipment of 
Chlorine Gas 
To clarify the geographies of risk produced by hazardous materials, the SSD 
generates heat maps which visualize how a shipment’s risk varies spatially. Table 4.3 
summarizes risk scores for rural, urban, and high-threat urban areas (HTUAs), while 
Figure 4.6 illustrates detailed risk scores for the aforementioned chlorine shipment. The 
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map clarifies the trends depicted by the trend lines. Areas in West Virginia are relatively 
insulated from the risk posed by hazardous materials. Risk scores are generally under 
14,000 from there and into western Virginia. Risk skyrockets as the shipment 
approaches the densely populated Eastern Seaboard, stretching from Washington, D.C, 
to Philadelphia, in large part due to much higher consequence scores, which are driven 
by the number of people who live there as well as the concentration of economic 
activity. Unlike traditional methods of calculating transportation risk, the DHMRA offers 
a more detailed assessment of risk by demonstrating, in this case, that economic factors 
magnify risk. Relying on population alone to determine the consequences of a 
hazardous materials release provides agencies with an incomplete picture of risk.   
Figure 4.6  Spatial Distribution of Risk for a Chlorine Shipment 
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Table 4.3 Sample Risk Scores for Chlorine Shipments in Rural, Urban, and High-Threat 
Urban Areas 
Variable Rural Setting Urban Area HTUA 
Consequence Radius 
(mi) 5.53 5.53 5.53 
Threat 0.765 0.765 1 
Vulnerability 0.5 0.75 0.5 
Consequence: 
Decontamination 9,612 9,612 9,612 
Consequence: 
Economic 0 589 16,307 
Consequence: 
Environmental 1 1 0 
Consequence: 
Population 4,861 14,980 104,995 
Overall Consequence 15,473 25,593 114,609 
Risk Score 5,918 14,684 57,304 
This case study demonstrates that HTUAs will be most impacted by hazardous 
materials in the event of a release. Although this is only one example, it illustrates how 
the SSD provides users with the visualization tools required to make quick and informed 
determinations about shipment risk. Modeling risk in this manner offers government 
agencies, planners, and emergency responders a precise idea of the most likely 
consequences following a release. This case study has focused on intentional acts which 
compromise hazardous materials shipments, however, the information generated by 
the DHMRA applies to unintentional releases, which arguably occur much more 
frequently. Given large numbers of accidents which involve hazardous materials each 
year (see Table 4.1), the information presented on the SSD can assist stakeholders with 
mitigating the worst effects of a release. This, in turn, can assist in reducing the number 
of injuries and fatalities as well as economic damages. Compared to traditional risk 
assessment models, DHMRA provides more intuitive representations of risk, which are 
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critical in emergency situations.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The DHMRA significantly improves our understanding of the risk hazardous 
materials shipments present as well as the spatially distributed nature of that risk. 
Although the overwhelming number of incidents which involve hazardous materials 
occur due to accidents, the possibility exists that terrorists could opportunistically target 
a hazardous material shipment to produce spectacular infrastructure damage, destroy 
critical resources, and injure or fatally wound large numbers of people. Because security 
risks are continuously changing, it is critical to build on traditional risk assessment 
methodologies (Erkut & Ingolfsson, 2005) by taking a more dynamic view of risk, one 
attuned to how risk profiles of vehicles vary as they move through areas with unique 
demographic, economic, and environmental characteristics. Along with operationalizing 
this dynamic view of risk, the DHRMA’s risk equations more accurately conceptualize 
the far-ranging consequences of a hazardous materials release. Because the DHRMA 
uses straightforward equations to derive risk scores, they can be calculated quickly and 
efficiently. Potentially, the system could be used to optimize shipping routes, as 
knowledge generated from ongoing analysis will give transportation planners and 
private shippers the information needed to effectively modify route choice to reduce 
exposure to risk while minimizing travel times and costs.  
This framework, once fully implemented, will improve our understanding of how 
risk varies along U.S. highway networks, which can inform more targeted policies to 
enhance the security of hazardous materials. In the process, it will contribute to 
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maintaining secure and efficient supply chains while protecting the communities that 
live nearest to the most heavily trafficked routes. Over the long-term, the DHMRA can 
promote a more adaptive form of risk management (e.g., Wise, 2006; Bjerga & Aven, 
2015). Adaptive risk management encourages the use of iterative risk evaluations, 
anticipates hazardous materials release scenarios, and catalogs a set of alternative 
responses and flexible emergency responses. Responses to security incidents cannot be 
static or rely on a set of prescribed instructions. Once a release event occurs, 
stakeholders require tools that will enable them to coordinate with one another 
effectively and decide the most effective course of action — DHMRA’s desktop platform 
makes these forms of collaboration possible. Adaptive risk management will produce 
better outcomes when hazardous materials releases occur because it encourages 
flexible responses that can be modified as stakeholders acquire new information. 
Although risk can never be completely eradicated, the risk management framework 
presented in this paper at least improves manageability, ensuring that hazardous 
materials are safer and more secure than they otherwise would be. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Recommendations 
Terrorism is an omnipresent problem. Although the 9/11 attacks were 
unprecedented in the scale and scope of destruction they inflicted, smaller terrorist 
attacks are unfortunately, routine. Most attacks are uncoordinated, but the act of a 
perpetrator working independently or with only very tenuous connections to broader 
terror networks. While terrorists use a variety of equipment and methods to execute 
their attacks — ranging from firearms and improvised explosive devices to suicide 
bombings — relatively few incidents have involved the weaponization of cars, trucks, 
waterborne vessels, and other vehicles that move on surface transportation networks. 
Although the recent terrorist attack in Nice, France, during which an individual drove a 
cargo truck at high speeds through a crowded promenade (killing 85 and injuring 
hundreds), offers a vivid reminder of the consequences which stem from a vehicle being 
used as a weapon— even without hazardous materials onboard. Given their relatively 
poor or nonexistent defenses and inconspicuousness, commercial vehicles transporting 
hazardous materials are an easy target. Terrorist actors could easily seize these vehicles, 
and before carriers or security agencies recognize that something is amiss, their 
contents could be detonated or released. Continuously monitoring hazardous materials 
provides a viable way to understand the risks presented by a shipment at a given 
moment and enables better, more coordinated responses in the event of a release. This 
is why the risk management framework outlined in this dissertation is so valuable — it 
can arm multiple stakeholders with the knowledge they need to reduce the likelihood of 
attacks against commercial vehicles with onboard hazardous materials.  
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As noted, this dissertation makes novel contributions to several literatures, 
including risk analysis and management, the transportation of hazardous materials, 
systems engineering, and shipment routing. Chapter 2 highlights the existing regulatory 
landscape for hazardous materials and the challenges of imposing new methods of 
surveillance on carriers reluctant to shoulder regulatory burdens. It describes, as well, 
the strengths and limitations of a prototype hazardous materials tracking system (PHTS) 
and potential strategies to improve monitoring of hazardous materials. Building from 
this point, Chapter 3 proposes the use of a newly created risk equation to characterize 
and quantify the risks posed by hazardous materials shipments. The straightforward 
equation is compatible with the risk assessment protocols used by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation Security Agency (TSA). Finally, Chapter 4 
presented the conceptual outlines of the Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment 
Framework (DHMRA), which offers users a comprehensive and spatially explicit 
understanding of how risk varies across transportation networks. Using this information, 
they can the minimize damage and human injuries and fatalities that could result from 
intentional or accidental hazardous materials releases. Obviously no system, 
irrespective of its sophistication, can anticipate and therefore ward off terrorist attacks. 
However, implementing DHMRA will prepare public agencies and private stakeholders 
alike to respond in an effective manner to potential threats and ongoing events.  
Despite the advances DHMRA provides over existing risk management 
frameworks, much work remains to be done to ensure hazardous materials supply 
chains are well-defended against the threat of terrorist attacks and well-protected 
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against the risk of accidental releases. One of the limitations of this dissertation is its 
exclusive focus on a small subset of hazardous materials — Tier 1 Highway Security 
Sensitive Materials (HSSMs). A narrow focus was logical because Tier 1 HSSMs are by far 
the most dangerous materials in the domestic hazardous materials supply chains. If 
targeted by a deliberate attack, the release or detonation of these materials would 
produce catastrophic outcomes for the built environment, socioeconomic relationships, 
and human health. Tier 1 HSSMs thus warrant close scrutiny, and therefore make a 
natural starting point to design, build, and implement a tracking and monitoring system. 
Yet, large quantities of hazardous materials typically go unmonitored and are therefore 
still vulnerable. Future research should extend and apply the framework outlined in this 
dissertation to other classes of hazardous materials which are routinely transported on 
U.S. highway networks.  
Although the risk equations developed in Chapters 3 and 4 have been empirically 
validated through the input of expert knowledge and some testing, DHRMA remains a 
largely conceptual framework. The GIS environment and mapping applications have 
been tested under simulated real-world conditions, however, full implementation has 
yet to occur. Future research will need to determine what modifications are needed to 
scale up its operation to ensure it is equipped to simultaneously process the thousands 
of hazardous materials shipments which are concomitantly on U.S. highways. Certainly, 
full implementation was beyond the scope of this project, however, a sound foundation 
has been established upon which future work can proceed. As full-scale testing moves 
forward, adjustments can be made to the risk equations, mapping interface, and GIS 
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environment to ensure satisfactory performance under a variety of conditions.  
Future work also needs to look beyond the transportation of hazardous 
materials on highway networks. The domestic hazardous materials supply chain is 
thoroughly multimodal, with railways and waterways being critical for the movement of 
hazardous materials. DHMRA addresses one component of the multimodal hazardous 
materials supply chain, but it presents officials with a circumscribed picture of where 
individual shipments are by not reaching beyond roadway transportation. When a 
shipment is placed onto a tractor trailer, it gains visibility and the DHMRA is able to track 
it, however, once it transferred to another mode, government agencies lose sight of it. 
For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers does not currently require carriers to 
submit regular reports on the location of vessels carrying hazardous materials (although 
it did previously; the rule stipulating that carriers do so was suspended in January 2011 
and has not been reinstated). Developing mode-appropriate risk equations to quantify 
the risk of individual shipments would present an obstacle, but not an insurmountable 
one. The risk equations developed as part of this research are specific to highway 
transportation. Although TSA’s foundational equation of Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x 
Consequence provides a starting point to generate equations for shipments transported 
on inland and coastal waterways, eliciting the input of subject-matter experts would be 
necessary to generate an appropriate system of equations tailored to the unique 
challenges presented by waterborne transportation. As noted in Chapter 3, the Federal 
Railroad Administration has implemented the Rail Corridor Risk Management System to 
aid with route selection and calculate a score that represents the level of risk posed by 
113 
rail cars transporting hazardous materials. Information from this system could 
potentially be integrated with risk management data generated by DHMRA (and from a 
new waterways risk management system) to develop a more comprehensive and 
integrated picture of risk across U.S. surface transportation networks. Integrating 
disparate systems, each with its own unique methodology for calculating risk, would no 
doubt prove challenging, but this is a worthwhile task that, over the long-term, will be 
necessary to understand the spatial and cross-modal variability of hazardous materials 
risk.  
Although DHMRA was designed primarily with terrorism in mind, it is also, as 
noted throughout this document, useful for examining the impacts of accidental 
hazardous materials releases. Future iterations of DHMRA could expand on its 
capabilities in this area by incorporating modeling data on the release and dispersion of 
toxic gases, liquids, and other substances. Numerous research studies have modeled the 
dispersion and atmospheric residence time of toxic gases, and could provide a valuable 
source of data for anticipating the consequences of different release scenarios. While 
DHRMA facilities provide spatially explicit risk forecasting under a variety of release 
scenarios, these scenarios assume that an area of a fixed size will be impacted 
regardless of when or where they occur. Integrating sophisticated models geared 
toward understanding the behavior of particular substances under a range of 
atmospheric conditions would open the door for more accurate and fine-grained risk 
estimates. 
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Advances in knowledge typically come incrementally. The risk management 
framework laid out in this dissertation stands as a modest contribution to ongoing 
discussions about how public and private stakeholders can best protect the public 
against terrorist activities which single out commercial vehicles transporting hazardous 
materials. The potential ramifications of terrorists preying upon a hazardous materials 
shipment are immense. Imagine, for instance, a terrorist seizing tankers filled with 
chlorine gas in a crowded urban landscape and releasing it. Widespread casualties 
would certainly result, and the subsequent social and economic dislocations would 
prove daunting to cope with. Although DHMRA cannot entirely avert terrorist attacks, 
the knowledge it can generate about the location and status of hazardous materials 
shipments can help prevent nightmare scenarios from emerging. By instantly showing 
where particular shipments are traveling — and their risk profiles — carriers and 
government agencies can react swiftly when anomalous circumstances arise. A quick 
response may be the difference between forestalling an attack or watching as a 
calamitous series of events unfolds. DHMRA offers great promise, and once 
implemented will play an integral role in shaping a safer and more secure future for U.S. 
transportation networks. While the academic contributions of research are certainly 
important and worthwhile, perhaps the ultimate measure of its efficacy should be 
whether or not it materially transforms regulations, policies, and practices. Thus, if it 
succeeds at nothing else, DHMRA heralds a future in which hazardous materials are less 
vulnerable, and therefore less likely to be made into weapons that can victimize an 
unsuspecting public.   
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APPENDIX A Survey Results Tables 
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Introduction 
This appendix provides the detailed survey results.  The appendix presents 
questions asked in each of the topical areas covered by the survey. Breaks in topical 
areas are denoted by a change in chart color. 
Section 1 examines a series of attack scenarios involving Commercial Motor 
Vehicles (CMV’s) transporting Tier 1 HSSMs. These scenarios were presented to the 
survey participants.  Survey participants then ranked the likelihood of each scenario 
occurring on a scale from Virtually Certain to Extremely Unlikely. 
Section 2 presents an examination of threat rankings associated with trailer and 
container types. Survey participants were asked to assess the threat associated with 
each type of container or trailer that could be transportation a Tier 1 HSSM, and rank 
according to the threat they posed on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 being the highest threat 
and 6 being the lowest threat. 
Section 3 presents seven attack scenarios which are designed to examine 
particular vehicle types. Survey participants were asked to analyze and select the 
likelihood that the attackers would fail due to: a) technical difficulties; and b) security 
measures.  These responses were ranked from Certain to Not Possible. 
Section 4 presents the survey participants with the Transportation Security 
Administration’s Security Action Items (SAIs). Survey participants examined each of the 
23 SAIs and ranked them according to importance in securing the United States Tier 1 
HSSM supply chain.  Ranking ranged from Extremely Important to Not At All Important. 
Section 5 presents survey results of the questions pertaining to factors contributing to 
the aggregate impacts of a terrorist attack. Questions were designed to ask each of the 
survey participants to rank a variety of potentially affected categories and the overall 
contribution they make to the aggregated impacts of a terrorist attack. 
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Section 1: Commercial Motor Vehicle Attack Scenarios 
Scenario 1 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an explosive 
device being placed on a CMV with the intent to cause harm.  6% felt that this scenario 
was virtually certain, 6% extremely likely, 17% very likely, 26% likely, 14% more likely 
than not, 26% unlikely, and 6% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 2 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an explosive 
device being placed along a planned CMV route with the intent to cause harm. 3% felt 
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that this scenario was virtually certain, 6% extremely likely, 6% very likely, 31% likely, 
23% more likely than not, 29% unlikely, and 3% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 3 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of a weapon being 
launched at a CMV from a distance. Examples provided included a high powered rifle or 
a rocket propelled grenade.  3% felt that this scenario was virtually certain, 3% 
extremely likely, 6% very likely, 17% likely, 26% more likely than not, 37% unlikely, and 
9% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 4 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an explosive 
device being placed in a vehicle located proximate to a CMV (i.e. Vehicle Borne 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Virtually
Certain
Extremely
Likely
Very Likely Likely More
Likely
Than Not
Unlikely Extremely
Unlikely
Scenario 3: Weapon launched at a 
CMV from a distance 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Virtually
Certain
Extremely
Likely
Very Likely Likely More
Likely
Than Not
Unlikely Extremely
Unlikely
Scenario 4: Explosive device placed in 
a vehicle proximate to a CMV 
119 
Improvised Explosive Device-VBIED) with the intent to cause harm. Examples provided 
included a high powered rifle or a rocket propelled grenade. 0% felt that this scenario 
was virtually certain, 6% extremely likely, 14% very likely, 20% likely, 26% more likely 
than not, 26% unlikely, and 9% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 5 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of a hijacker 
commandeering a CMV with the intent of immediately releasing the hazardous 
materials or producing an explosion. 3% felt that this scenario was virtually certain, 12% 
extremely likely, 9% very likely, 12% likely, 26% more likely than not, 26% unlikely, and 
12% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 6 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of a hijacker 
commandeering a CMV and driving it to a nearby location with the intent of releasing 
the hazardous materials or producing an explosion. 6% felt that this scenario was 
virtually certain, 9% extremely likely, 11% very likely, 9% likely, 29% more likely than 
not, 31% unlikely, and 6% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 7 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an insider, such 
as a trucking firm employee, commandeering a CMV to immediately release hazardous 
materials or produce an explosion. 6% felt that this scenario was virtually certain, 9% 
extremely likely, 11% very likely, 9% likely, 29% more likely than not, 31% unlikely, and 
6% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 8 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an insider, such 
as a trucking firm employee, commandeering a CMV and driving it to a nearby location 
with the intent of releasing the hazardous materials or producing an explosion. 3% felt 
that this scenario was virtually certain, 12% extremely likely, 15% very likely, 0% likely, 
35% more likely than not, 26% unlikely, and 9% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 9 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of a sabotage of a 
toxic inhalation hazard cargo tank motor vehicle; for example, by opening or damaging a 
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valve. 0% felt that this scenario was virtually certain, 12% extremely likely, 6% very 
likely, 12% likely, 32% more likely than not, 29% unlikely, and 9% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 10 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved purposely initiating a crash through external means, for example placing 
something on the roadway or collision with another vehicle. 3% felt that this scenario 
was virtually certain, 9% extremely likely, 17% very likely, 11% likely, 23% more likely 
than not, 31% unlikely, and 6% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 11 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an aircraft 
being used to attack a hazardous material shipment. 0% felt that this scenario was 
virtually certain, 0% extremely likely, 0% very likely, 3% likely, 14% more likely than not, 
49% unlikely and 34% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 12 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of a drone being 
used to attack a hazardous material shipment. 0% felt that this scenario was virtually 
certain, 6% extremely likely, 3% very likely, 6% likely, 23% more likely than not, 49% 
unlikely, and 14% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 13 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. 0% felt that this scenario 
was virtually certain, 14% extremely likely, 3% very likely, 11% likely, 40% more likely 
than not, 23% unlikely and 9% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 14 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved a waterborne vessel carrying an IED exploding close to a CMV. 0% felt that this 
scenario was virtually certain, 0% extremely likely, 0% very likely, 6% likely, 20% more 
likely than not, 37% unlikely and 37% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 15 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved coordinate or sequential attacks. For example sabotage of a truck’s braking 
system and subsequent use of a rocket propelled grenade once the vehicle crashes. 0% 
felt that this scenario was virtually certain, 0% extremely likely, 0% very likely, 0% likely, 
20% more likely than not, 51% unlikely, and 26% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 16 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved burglary or theft of hazardous materials with the intent to cause harm. 6% felt 
that this scenario was virtually certain, 17% extremely likely, 9% very likely, 20% likely, 
29% more likely than not, 17% unlikely, and 3% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 17 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved damage to a hazardous material (through vandalism or some other means) 
that does not produce a release or explosion. 6% felt that this scenario was virtually 
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certain, 14% extremely likely, 11% very likely, 17% likely, 29% more likely than not, 20% 
unlikely and 3% extremely unlikely. 
Scenario 18 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of an attack that 
involved a cyber-attack causing theft or diversion, such as electronically changing a 
manifest so that hazardous materials are delivered to an improper destination. 0% felt 
that this scenario was virtually certain, 3% extremely likely, 15% very likely, 12% likely, 
29% more likely than not, 29% unlikely, and 12% extremely unlikely. 
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Scenario 19 asked the respondents to determine the likelihood of natural 
disasters such as a hurricane, tornado or earthquake resulting in a release or explosion. 
50% felt that this scenario was virtually certain, 11% extremely likely, 11% very likely, 8% 
likely, 16% more likely than not, 5% unlikely, and 0% extremely unlikely. 
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Section 2: Examination of threat rankings associated with trailer and container type 
Survey participants were asked to assess the threat associated with each type of 
container or trailer that could transport a Tier 1 HSSM, and rank according to the threat 
they posed on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 being the highest threat and 6 being the lowest 
threat. 
20% of respondents felt that van trailers presented the highest threat when 
transporting Tier 1 HSSM’s. 37% felt that the van trailer was the second highest threat, 
29% the third highest threat, 11% the fourth highest, 3% the fifth highest threat and 0% 
felt that a van trailer posed the lowest threat. 
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52% of respondents felt that cargo tanks presented the highest threat when 
transporting Tier 1 HSSM’s. 17% felt that the van trailer was the second highest threat, 
20% the third highest threat, 11% the fourth highest, 0% the fifth highest threat, and 0% 
felt that a cargo tank posed the lowest threat. 
14% of respondents felt that containers presented the highest threat when 
transporting Tier 1 HSSM’s. 23% felt that the van trailer was the second highest threat, 
43% the third highest threat, 9% the fourth highest, 11% the fifth highest threat, and 0% 
felt that a van trailer posed the lowest threat. 
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0% of respondents felt that hoppers presented the highest threat when 
transporting Tier 1 HSSM’s. 9% felt that the van trailer was the second highest threat, 
9% the third highest threat, 54% the fourth highest, 28% the fifth highest threat, and 0% 
felt that a hopper posed the lowest threat. 
14% of respondents felt that flatbeds presented the highest threat when 
transporting Tier 1 HSSM’s. 14% felt that the van trailer was the second highest threat, 
0% the third highest threat, 11% the fourth highest, 58% the fifth highest threat and 3% 
felt that a flatbed posed the lowest threat. 
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0% of respondents felt that the other category presented the highest threat 
when transporting Tier 1 HSSM’s. 0% felt that the van trailer was the second highest 
threat, 0% the third highest threat, 0% the fourth highest, 3% the fifth highest threat 
and 97% felt that other types not listed posed the lowest threat. 
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Section 3: Probability of attackers failing on specific scenarios due to technical 
difficulties or security measures 
Attack Scenario 1 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed on 
a CMV. The hazmat type was Class 1 explosives, which were placed on a van trailer. 4% 
of respondents felt that it was nearly certain that attackers would fail due to technical 
difficulties. 30% felt that failure due to technical difficulties was probable, 28% felt that 
chances were even, 16% felt that the attack would probably not fail due to technical 
difficulties, 16% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would fail due to technical 
difficulties, and 5% felt that it was practically impossible for the attack to fail due to 
technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 12% felt that it was 
nearly certain the attack would fail. 33% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 18% felt chances were even, 14% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 11% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, and 12% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to 
fail due to security measures. 
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Attack Scenario 2 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed on 
a CMV. The hazmat type was Class 1 explosives, which were placed in a container. 0% of 
respondents felt that it was nearly certain that attackers would fail due to technical 
difficulties. 39% felt that failure due to technical difficulties was probable, 26% felt that 
chances were even, 16% felt that the attack would probably not fail due to technical 
difficulties, 18% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would fail due to technical 
difficulties, and 2% felt that it was practically impossible for the attack to fail due to 
technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 14% felt that it was 
nearly certain the attack would fail. 37% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 21% felt chances were even, 12% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 12% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, and 4% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to 
fail due to security measures. 
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Attack Scenario 3 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed on 
a CMV. The hazmat type was Class 2 Gases that are non-flammable and toxic, which 
were placed in a van trailer. 5% of respondents felt that it was nearly certain that 
attackers would fail due to technical difficulties. 40% felt that failure due to technical 
difficulties was probable, 26% felt that chances were even, 19% felt that the attack 
would probably not fail due to technical difficulties, 9% felt that it was highly doubtful 
the attack would fail due to technical difficulties, and 0% felt that it was practically 
impossible for the attack to fail due to technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 11% felt that it was 
nearly certain the attack would fail. 33% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 25% felt chances were even, 12% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 11% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, 4% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to fail 
due to security measures, and 4% felt that it was not possible for the attack to fail due 
to security measures. 
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Attack Scenario 4 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed on 
a CMV. The hazmat type was Class 2 Gases that are non-flammable and toxic, which 
were placed in a cargo tank. 7% of respondents felt that it was nearly certain that 
attackers would fail due to technical difficulties. 26% felt that failure due to technical 
difficulties was probable, 39% felt that chances were even, 18% felt that the attack 
would probably not fail due to technical difficulties, 9% felt that it was highly doubtful 
the attack would fail due to technical difficulties, and 2% felt that it was practically 
impossible for the attack to fail due to technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 9% felt that it was nearly 
certain the attack would fail. 33% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 30% felt chances were even, 14% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 11% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, and 4% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to 
fail due to security measures. 
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Attack Scenario 5 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed on 
a CMV. The hazmat type was Class 2 Gases that are non-flammable and toxic, which 
were placed in a container. 5% of respondents felt that it was nearly certain that 
attackers would fail due to technical difficulties. 28% felt that failure due to technical 
difficulties was probable, 40% felt that chances were even, 18% felt that the attack 
would probably not fail due to technical difficulties, 7% felt that it was highly doubtful 
the attack would fail due to technical difficulties, and 2% felt that it was practically 
impossible for the attack to fail due to technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 12% felt that it was 
nearly certain the attack would fail. 35% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 25% felt chances were even, 14% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 11% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, and 4% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to 
fail due to security measures. 
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Attack Scenario 6 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed 
along the planned route of a CMV transporting hazardous materials. The hazmat type 
was Class 1 explosives, which were placed in a van trailer. 12% of respondents felt that it 
was nearly certain that attackers would fail due to technical difficulties. 35% felt that 
failure due to technical difficulties was probable, 25% felt that chances were even, 14% 
felt that the attack would probably not fail due to technical difficulties, 11% felt that it 
was highly doubtful the attack would fail due to technical difficulties, and 4% felt that it 
was practically impossible for the attack to fail due to technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 5% felt that it was nearly 
certain the attack would fail. 11% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 26% felt chances were even, 28% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 16% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, and 14% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to 
fail due to security measures. 
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Attack Scenario 7 outlined a scenario wherein an explosive device was placed 
along the planned route of a CMV transporting hazardous materials. The hazmat type 
was Class 1 explosives, which were placed in a container. 5% of respondents felt that it 
was nearly certain that attackers would fail due to technical difficulties. 25% felt that 
failure due to technical difficulties was probable, 44% felt that chances were even, 19% 
felt that the attack would probably not fail due to technical difficulties, 5% felt that it 
was highly doubtful the attack would fail due to technical difficulties, and 2% felt that it 
was practically impossible for the attack to fail due to technical difficulties.  
In relation to attackers failing due to security measures, 4% felt that it was nearly 
certain the attack would fail. 14% felt it was probable the attack would fail due to 
security measures, 30% felt chances were even, 33% felt that the attack would probably 
not fail due to security measures, 11% felt that it was highly doubtful the attack would 
fail due to security measures, and 9% felt it was practically impossible for the attack to 
fail due to security measures. 
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Section 4: The Transportation Security Administration’s Security Action Items 
Survey participants were presented with the Transportation Security 
Administrations Security Action Items (SAIs). Survey participants examined each of the 
23 SAIs and ranked them according to importance in securing the United States Tier 1 
HSSM supply chain.  Ranking ranged from Extremely Important to Not At All Important. 
Only 33% of the respondents were familiar with the SAIs.  However the description 
provided enabled them to answer the questions surrounding the relevance of each SAI. 
SAI 1 is titled Security Assessments and Security Plan Requirements.  It suggests 
that employers should review their security assessment and determine the security 
action items which are appropriate to correct their assessed risks. 48% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 42% as very important and 10% as 
somewhat important. 
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SAI 2 is titled Awareness of Industry Security Practices.  It suggests that 
employers should be familiar with security practices recommended by industry groups 
and trade associations to further enhance transportation security. 39% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 52% as very important and 9% as 
somewhat important. 
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SAI 3 is titled Inventory Control Process.  It suggests that employers should 
implement procedures to maintain accountability for their containers, cylinders and 
vehicles at all times while in transport throughout the supply chain. 64% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 33% as very important and 3% as 
somewhat important. 
SAI 4 is titled Business and Security Critical Information.  It suggests that 
employers should implement policies to protect security critical information. 42% of 
survey respondents ranked this as extremely important, 52% as very important and 6% 
as somewhat important. 
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SAI 5 is titled Possession of a Valid CMV Driver’s License and hazardous materials 
endorsement.  It indicates that all drivers should have a valid license and carry the 
hazmat endorsement. 45% of survey respondents ranked this as extremely important, 
36% as very important, 9% as somewhat important, 7% as neither important nor 
unimportant, and 3% as very unimportant. 
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SAI 6 is titled Conduct background checks on highway transportation sector 
employees other than motor vehicle drivers with a valid CDL with Hazmat endorsement.  
It suggests that during the hiring process employers should conduct background checks 
on employees and contractors with unescorted access to motor vehicles, the motor 
carrier facility, or information critical to hazmat transportation. 58% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 25% as very important and 16% as 
somewhat important. 
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SAI 7 is titled Security Awareness Training for Employees. It suggests that 
employers should have employees complete TSA-sponsored domain awareness training 
or equivalent security training programs. 30% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 48% as very important and 22% as somewhat important. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Extemely
Important
Very
Important
Somewhat
Important
Neither
Important
Nor
Unimportant
Somewhat
Unimportant
Very
Unimportant
Not At All
Important
SAI 7: Security Awareness Training for 
Employees 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Extemely
Important
Very
Important
Somewhat
Important
Neither
Important
Nor
Unimportant
Somewhat
Unimportant
Very
Unimportant
Not At All
Important
SAI 8: Access Control System for Drivers 
147 
SAI 8 is titled Access Control System for Drivers.  It suggests that employers 
should implement an access control system that includes company ID’s for 
shippers/consignee confirmation, as well as for access to restricted areas such as the 
key control room. 47% of survey respondents ranked this as extremely important, 44% 
as very important and 9% as somewhat important. 
SAI 9 is titled Access Control System for Facilities Incidental to Transport.  It 
suggests that employers should implement access control systems in restricted areas 
including plants, data centers and IT systems, loading and unloading facilities, storage 
facilities, and other critical areas as designated by company management. 50% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 38% as very important, 9% as 
somewhat important, and 3% felt it was neither important nor unimportant. 
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SAI 10 is titled Establish Communications Plan.  It suggests that a 
communications plan should exist between drivers, company personnel and emergency 
professionals in the event of an incident. 55% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 36% as very important and 9% as somewhat important. 
SAI 11 is titled Establish Appropriate Vehicle Security Program.  It suggests that 
employers should ensure that all company vehicles are secured when unattended 
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through use of a primary and secondary security system. 58% of survey respondents 
ranked this as extremely important, 36% as very important, 3% as somewhat important, 
and 3% as neither important nor unimportant. 
SAI 12 is titled Establish Appropriate Cargo Security Program to Prevent Theft or 
Sabotage of Cargo Containers.  It suggests that employers should ensure that all cargo 
containers are secured when in use and that a primary and secondary security system 
protects them when they are left unattended. 50% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 38% as very important, 9% as somewhat important, and 3% as 
neither important nor unimportant. 
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SAI 13 is titled Implement a Seal/Lock Control Program to Prevent Theft or 
Sabotage of Cargo.  It suggests that employers should implement a seal/lock program to 
prevent theft or sabotage of the contents of cargo containers and cylinders when in 
transport, when unattended by company personnel, or when at facilities incidental to 
transport. 56% of survey respondents ranked this as extremely important, 34% as very 
important and 9% as somewhat important. 
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SAI 14 is titled High Alert Level Protocols.  It suggests that employers should 
establish policies that govern operations during periods of elevated threat conditions 
under the Homeland Security Advisory System. For example, secure locations to seek 
refuge or local law enforcement escorts. 30% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 45% as very important, 18% as somewhat important, 3% as 
neither important nor unimportant, and 3% as somewhat important. 
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SAI 15 is titled Establish Security Inspection Policy and Procedure.  It suggests 
that employers should establish a security inspection policy as well as procedures 
drivers follow to conduct security inspections. 35% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 39% as very important and 26% as somewhat important. 
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SAI 16 is titled Establish Reporting Policy and Procedures.  It suggests that 
employers should implement reporting procedures that drivers and non-driver 
employees follow when reporting suspicious incidents, threats, or concerns regarding 
transportation facilities or company vehicles. 40% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 47% as very important and 13% as somewhat important. 
SAI 17 is titled Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival and Receipt 
Confirmation Procedures with Receiving Facility.  It suggests that the shipper, carrier, 
and consignee should conduct shipment pre-planning to ensure shipments are not 
released to the motor carrier until they can be transported to the destination in a 
manner that minimizes public exposure and transit delays. 16% of survey respondents 
ranked this as extremely important, 56% as very important, 25% as somewhat 
important, and 3% as somewhat unimportant. 
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SAI 18 is titled Pre-Planning Routes.  It suggests that employers should ensure 
pre-planning of primary and alternate routes takes place. 13% of survey respondents 
ranked this as extremely important, 61% as very important, 23% as somewhat 
important, and 3% as neither important nor unimportant. 
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SAI 19 is titled Security for Trips Exceeding Driving Time under the Hours of 
Service of Drivers Regulation.  It suggests that employers should examine security in 
light of hours of service available and take steps to mitigate the vulnerabilities 
associated with drivers’ extended rest stops.  26% of survey respondents ranked this as 
extremely important, 45% as very important, 26% as somewhat important, and 3% as 
neither important nor unimportant. 
SAI 20 is titled Dedicated Truck.  It suggests that employers should implement 
policies to ensure that, except under emergency circumstances, contracted shipments 
remain under the authority of the primary carrier and are not subcontracted, 
driver/team substitutions are not made, and transloading does not occur unless it has 
been verified that the subcontractor complies with applicable Federal safety and 
security guidance and regulations and company security policies. 25% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 44% as very important, 25% as 
somewhat important, 3% as neither important nor unimportant and 3% as very 
unimportant. 
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SAI 21 is titled Tractor Activation Capability.  It suggests that employers should 
implement security measures that authenticate driver identification via login and 
password, or biometric data to drive the vehicles and materials. 16% of survey 
respondents ranked this as extremely important, 34% as very important, 34% as 
somewhat important, 13% neither important nor unimportant, and 3% as not at all 
important. 
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SAI 22 is titled Panic Button Capability.  It suggests that employers should 
implement means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert notification to dispatch. 
18% of survey respondents ranked this as extremely important, 48% as very important, 
27% as somewhat important, 3% as neither important nor unimportant and 3% as not at 
all important. 
SAI 23 is titled Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems.  It suggests that employers 
should have the ability to implement methods of tracking the tractor and trailer 
throughout the intended route with satellite and/or land-based wireless GPS 
communications systems. 52% of survey respondents ranked this as extremely 
important, 33% as very important and 15% as somewhat important. 
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Section 5: Aggregate Impacts of a Terrorist Attack 
Section 5 presents survey results of the questions pertaining to factors contributing 
to the aggregate impacts of a terrorist attack. Questions were designed to ask each of 
the survey participants to rank a variety of potentially affected categories and the 
overall contribution they make to the aggregated impacts of a terrorist attack. Survey 
participants were also asked to indicate any variables beyond those provided that 
should be factored in when evaluating the level of risk associated with hazardous 
materials shipments. The following list provides additional factors highlighted: 
• The length of time the event will last. For example, placing anthrax on a roadway
could close the road or facility for months or years
• Impact of a successful attack on enemy cause, strength, and prominence bona
fides
In examining Factor 1, population’s contribution to the aggregate impacts of an attack, 
survey respondents ranked the following. 4 respondents found that population’s 
contribution was low, 5 medium, 25 high, and 23 found the aggregate impacts of 
population to be very high. 
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In examining Factor 2, critical infrastructure’s contribution to the aggregate 
impacts of an attack, survey respondents ranked the following. 4 respondents found 
that critical infrastructure’s contribution was low, 15 medium, 20 high, and 18 found the 
aggregate impacts of critical infrastructure to be very high. 
In examining Factor 3, key resources’ contribution to the aggregate impacts of an attack, 
survey respondents ranked the following. 2 respondents found that key resources’ 
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contribution was very low, 8 low, 21 medium, 21 high, and 5 found the aggregate 
impacts of key resources to be very high. 
In examining Factor 4, environmentally sensitive area’s contribution to the 
aggregate impacts of an attack, survey respondents ranked the following. 3 respondents 
found that environmentally sensitive area’s contribution was very low, 21 low, 24 
medium, 7 high, and 2 found the aggregate impacts of environmentally sensitive areas 
to be very high. 
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In examining Factor 5, economic impact’s contribution to the aggregate impacts 
of an attack, survey respondents ranked the following. 5 respondents found that 
environmentally sensitive area’s contribution was low, 13 medium, 24 high, and 15 
found the aggregate impacts of environmentally sensitive areas to be very high. 
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In examining Factor 6, public psychology and fear’s contribution to the aggregate 
impacts of an attack, survey respondents ranked the following. 2 respondents found 
that public psychology and fear’s contribution was low, 5 medium, 21 high, and 29 
found the aggregate impacts of public psychology and fear to be very high. 
In examining Factor 7, international politics’ contribution to the aggregate 
impacts of an attack, survey respondents ranked the following. 1 respondent found that 
international politics’ contribution was very low, 14 low, 15 medium, 17 high, and 6 
found the aggregate impacts of international politics to be very high. 
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In examining Factor 8, civil liberties’ contribution to the aggregate impacts of an 
attack, survey respondents ranked the following. 5 respondents found that civil liberties’ 
contribution was very low, 14 low, 15 medium, 17 high, and 6 found the aggregate 
impacts of population to be very high. 
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The table above makes a comparison of the combined high and very high 
rankings of each of the aggregate impact factors identified in the survey.  An 
examination of this table highlights that public psychology and fear, with a combined 
total of 50, ranks the highest.  This is followed closely by population, which has a 
combined total of 48. Economic impact has a ranking of 39, and critical infrastructure 
has a ranking of 38. Key resources received 26, international politics 24, and civil 
liberties 23.  Lastly, environmentally sensitive areas received only 9 high or very high 
aggregate impacts ratings. 
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Section 6: Additional Questions 
Survey participants were requested to answer a number of additional questions. 
Additional Question 1: Survey participants were asked to indicate how vulnerable to 
attacks they felt the United States highway motor carrier Tier 1 HSSM supply chain is. 
36% of respondents felt the supply chain was very vulnerable, 34 % felt that it 
was vulnerable, 23% felt that chances of attack are even, and 7% felt that it is not 
probable. 0% of respondents felt that an attack would be impossible. 
Additional Question 2: Survey participants were asked to rank security 
challenges faced by shippers, carriers, and consignees, when transporting and 
safeguarding Tier 1 HSSM.   
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52% of respondents felt that en route security posed the biggest challenge, 42% 
felt that personnel security posed the largest challenge, 6% felt the inventory control 
processes posed the biggest challenge, and 0% felt the business information security 
posed the largest challenge. 
Additional Question 3: Survey participants were asked to rank five factors 
contributing to the risk of a particular shipment, with rank level 1 being the greatest 
contributor to transportation risk, and rank 5 being the least contributor to 
transportation risk. 
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The table above combines rank 1 and 2, the top two contributors to shipment 
risk. 39% of respondents felt that critical infrastructure contributed the greatest risk to 
Tier 1 HSSM shipments.  31% felt that population density was the greatest risk 
contributor, 18% highlighted special events, 7% key natural resources, and 5% critical 
industries.  Special events were defined in the question as events such as Super Bowl or 
a Presidential Inauguration. Critical infrastructure was defined as ports, bridges, tunnels, 
and water and sewer systems.  Critical industries provided examples such as chemical 
facilities or nuclear power. 
A follow-on question asked survey respondents to identify any additional factors 
that they felt contributed to risk.  Numerous factors were mentioned and could be 
combined into the following list: 
• Geography – or the physical environment through which the shipment is
travelling
• National-level iconic structures – these should be kept separate to regular critical
infrastructure as they include targets such as Golden Gate Bridge, Brooklyn
Bridge, Hoover Dam and Sears Tower
• Symbolic Significance – Pentagon, White House, Congress
• Routing – or a lack of attendance for specific shipments
• Driver mental state
• Historical or psychological significance of a target
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WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience 
in everyday life. 
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study. 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You will not lose any 
benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer. You can stop at any time during the 
study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before volunteering. 
IF YOU DON'T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES? 
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in the study. 
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study. 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study. 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE? 
We will make every effort to keep confidential all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law. 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write 
about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. 
You will not be personally identified in these written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, 
we will keep your name and other identifying information private. 
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us 
information, or what that information is. The data generated during the course of the study will be stored on the 
Pl's desktop computer. This data will be password protected, and no one will have access to the desktop or the 
office except the Pl. The data will be destroyed 6 years after completion of the project. Pl generated notes 
pertaining to conversations will be kept in a locked tile cabinet, inside the Pl's locked office on the University of 
Kentucky campus. After the 6 years of holding the records has lapsed, the desktop hard drive will be wiped by 
the College of Engineering's computer technician. Additionally, no information or data generated during the 
course of the study will be sentto anyone via email. 
We may be required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done the 
research correctly; these would be people from such organizations as the University of Kentucky. 
CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
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If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to 
continue. You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the study. 
WHAT ELSE DO YOU NEED TO KNOW? 
There is a possibility that the data collected from you may be shared with other investigators in the future. If that 
is the case the data will not contain information that can identify you unless you give your consent or the UK 
Institutional Review Board (IRS) approves the research. The IRS is a committee that reviews ethical issues, 
according to federal, state and local regulations on research with human subjects, to make sure the study 
complies with these before approval of a research study is issued. 
WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR COMPLAINTS? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might 
come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study, you can 
contact the investigator, Doug Kreis at 859-257-6898. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer 
in this research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky between the 
business hours of 8am and 5pm EST, Mon-Fri. at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
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THIS FORM VALi D 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Tier 1 hazardous materials shipment security- Addressing critical research gaps to secure the United 
States supply chain 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the shipment of Tier 1 hazardous materials by 
highway motor carriers. The purpose of the study is to assess the need and technology available to design a 
truck tracking and risk management system. You are being invited to take part in this research study because of 
your subject matter expertise in relation to the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) conducted beginning October 
2005. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of about four people to provide information on the 
HTSP. 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? 
The person in c,harge of this study is Steven Douglas (Doug) Kreis (Principal Investigator, Pl) of University of 
Kentucky Department of Civil Engineering. Doug ls a doctoral candidate in the Department of Civil Engineering, 
and he is being guided in his research by Dr. Tim Taylor (Advisor). 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
By doing this study, we hope to evaluate the HTSP, and develop a list of lessons learned during the initial pilot 
study. These lessons learned will be used to inform our system architecture for a truck tracking and risk 
management system that would serve the shippers, carriers and consignees involved in the hazardous material 
supply chain. 
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? 
No. 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? 
The research procedures will be conducted at College of Engineering, in the University of Kentucky. The interview 
will be conducted over the phone, and it is estimated to take 45-60 minutes of your time. You will be contacted 
during regular business hours, at a time that is most convenient to you. 
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WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO? 
You will be asked questions about your involvement in the HTSP. You will be asked to give your opinion on both 
the successes and failures of the original project. You will also be asked your opinion on the original study 
methods. 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience 
in everyday life. 
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study. 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
If you decrde to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You will not lose any 
benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer. You can stop at any time during the 
study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before volunteering. 
IF YOU DON'T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES? 
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in the study. 
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study. 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study. 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE? 
We will make every effort to keep confidential all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law. 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write 
about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. 
You will not be personally identified in these written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, 
we will keep your name and other identifying information private. 
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us 
information, or what that information is. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research 
team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. The data generated during the 
course of the study will be stored on the Pl's desktop computer. This data will be password protected, and no one 
will have access to the desktop or the office except the Pl. The data will be destroyed 6 years after completion of 
the project. Pl generated notes pertaining to conversations will be kept in a locked file cabinet, inside the Pl's 
locked office on the University of Kentucky campus. After the 6 years of holding the records has lapsed, the 
desktop hard drive will be wiped by the College of Engineering's computer technician. Additionally, no information 
or data generated during the course of the study will be sent to anyone via email. 
We may be required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done the 
research correctly; these would be people from such organizations as the University of Kentucky. 
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CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to 
continue. You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the study. 
WHAT ELSE DO YOU NEED TO KNOW? 
There is a possibility that the data collected from you may be shared with other investigators in the future. If that 
is the case the data will not contain information that can identify you unless you give your consent or the UK 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approves the research. The !RB is a committee that reviews ethical issues, 
according to federal, state and local regulations on research with human subjects, to make sure the study 
complies with these before approval of a research study is issued. 
WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR COMPLAINTS? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might 
come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study, you can 
contact the investigator, Doug Kreis at 859-257-6898. lf you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer 
in this research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky between the 
business hours of 8am and 5pm EST, Mon-Fri. at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
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Kreis Survey Cover Letter 
To XXXXX: 
=====-==--·-· -· 
IRB Approval 
/5-C)� s) 
You are being invited to participate in an on line survey for a project titled "Tier 1 hazardous materials 
shipment security-Addressing critical research gaps to secure the United States supply chain". This 
survey is being completed as a part of a doctoral dissertation that seeks to develop a risk analysis and 
management protocol for Tier 1 highway security sensitive materials that will improve both the safety 
and security of highway based freight. This survey is being sent to subject matter experts in the field of 
highway security sensitive materials nationwide, including representatives from government agencies, 
private industry and academia. The purpose of the survey is to request your feedback and based upon 
your expertise rank a number of fields that will assist the Pl Steven Kreis in developing a semi­
quantitative risk equation. This equation will be used to analyze the risk of a particular shipment of 
hazardous material in both space and time. That is to assist in determining how the risk profile of a 
shipment will change as it moves across the country (rural as opposed to urban locations) and in time 
{daytime or rush hour as opposed to nighttime). 
Although you will not get personal benefit from taking part in this research study, your responses may 
help us understand more about these shipments and the biggest risks associated with them, as 
perceived by our Nation's leading experts and practitioners in this field. 
We hope to receive completed questionnaires from about 200 people, so your answers are important 
to us. Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the survey/questionnaire, but if 
you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or discontinue at any time. 
The survey/questionnaire will take about 30 minutes to complete. 
There are no known risks to participating in this study. 
Although we have tried to minimize this, some questions may be beyond your area of expertise or you 
may feel uncomfortable providing a response. If this is the case you have the option to quit the survey, 
or preferably skip the question and continue with the questions you do feel comfortable answering. 
Your response to the survey will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law. When we write 
about the study you will not be identified. 
Please be aware, while we make every effort to safeguard your data once received from the on line 
survey/data gathering company, given the nature of online surveys, as with anything involving the 
Internet, we can never guarantee the confidentiality of the data while still on the survey/data 
gathering company's servers, or while en route to either them or us. It is also possible the raw data 
collected for research purposes may be used for marketing or reporting purposes by the survey/data 
gathering company after the research is concluded, depending on the company's Terms of Service and 
Privacy policies. 
University of Kentucky 
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If you have questions about the study, please feel free to ask; my contact information is given 
am a PhD candidate at the University of Kentucky, and this research will be used as a part of my 
doctoral degree. Study questions can also be directed to my faculty advisory Dr. Timothy Taylor, who 
can be contacted at the University of Kentucky tim.taylor@uky.edu or 859 323 3680. If you have 
complaints, suggestions, or questions about your rights as a research volunteer, contact the staff in the 
University of Kentucky Office of Research Integrity at 859-257-9428 or toll-free at 1-866-400-9428. 
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project. I would appreciate if you could 
respond at any time in the coming two weeks. 
Sincerely, 
Steven Douglas Kreis 
College of Engineering, 
University of Kentucky 
PHONE: 859-257-6898 
E-MAIL: dougkreis@uky.edu
University of Kentucky Survey/Questionnaire Cover Letter Template [Fl.0355] 
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FORM A-1
EXPEDITED CERTIFICATION FORM
To Be Completed Only If Protocol is to Receive Expedited Review
Please Read Carefully Before Answering the Questions
08/03/15
Date
Name of Principal Investigator:  
Steven Douglas (Doug) Kreis
Title of Research Project:
Tier 1 hazardous materials shipment security – Addressing critical research gaps to secure the 
United States supply chain
Applicability
(A) Research activities that (1) present no more than minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve only
procedures listed in one or more of the following categories, may be reviewed by the IRB through the
expedited review procedure authorized by 45 CFR 46.110 and 21 CFR 56.110.  The activities listed
should not be deemed to be of minimal risk simply because they are included on this list. Inclusion on
this list merely means that the activity is eligible for review through the expedited review procedure
when the specific circumstances of the proposed research involve no more than minimal risk to
human subjects.
(B) The categories in this list apply regardless of the age of subjects, except as noted.
(C) The expedited review procedure may not be used where identification of the subjects and/or their
responses would reasonably place them at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the
subjects’ financial standing, employability, insurability, reputation, or be stigmatizing, unless
reasonable and appropriate protections will be implemented so that risks related to invasion of
privacy and breach of confidentiality are no greater than minimal.
(D) The expedited review procedure may not be used for classified research involving human subjects.
(E) IRBs are reminded that the standard requirements for informed consent (or its waiver, alteration, or
exception) apply regardless of the type of review—expedited or convened—utilized by the IRB.
(F) Categories one (1) through seven (7) pertain to both initial and continuing IRB review.
Does this study present more than minimal risk to the subjects?*: ____YES  __ __ NO
*“Minimal risk” means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research 
are not greater in and of themselves from those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the 
performance of routine physical or psychological examination or tests.  45 CFR 46.102(i)
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Research Categories
Please indicate which of the following categories are applicable to your research.
1) ____ Clinical studies of drugs and medical devices only when condition (a) or (b) is met.
(a) _____ Research on drugs for which an investigational new drug application (21 CFR Part 312)
is not required. (Note: Research on marketed drugs that significantly increases the 
risks or decreases the acceptability of the risks associated with the use of the product 
is not eligible for expedited review.)
(b) _____ Research on medical devices for which (i) an investigational device exemption
application (21 CFR Part 812) is not required; or (ii) the medical device is 
cleared/approved for marketing and the medical device is being used in accordance 
with its cleared/approved labeling.  
2) ____ Collection of blood samples by finger stick, heel stick, ear stick, or venipuncture as follows:
(a) _____ From healthy, nonpregnant adults who weigh at least 110 pounds. For these subjects,
the amounts drawn may not exceed 550 ml in an 8 week period and collection may not 
occur more frequently than 2 times per week; or 
(b) _____ From other adults and children1 considering the age, weight, and health of the subjects,
the collection procedure, the amount of blood to be collected, and the frequency with 
which it will be collected. For these subjects, the amount drawn may not exceed the 
lesser of 50 ml or 3 ml per kg in an 8 week period and collection may not occur more 
frequently than 2 times per week. 
NOTE: Intravenous (IV), Port, Central, or any other lines are NOT eligible under this category 
even if the research involves “minimal risk”.
3) ____ Prospective collection of biological specimens for research purposes by noninvasive means.
Examples: (a) Hair and nail clippings in a nondisfiguring manner; (b) deciduous teeth at time of 
exfoliation or if routine patient care indicates a need for extraction; (c) permanent teeth if routine 
patient care indicates a need for extraction; (d) excreta and external secretions (including sweat); 
(e) uncannulated saliva collected either in an unstimulated fashion or stimulated by chewing
gumbase or wax or by applying a dilute citric solution to the tongue; (f) placenta removed at
delivery; (g) amniotic fluid obtained at the time of rupture of the membrane prior to or during labor;
(h) supra- and subgingival dental plaque and calculus, provided the collection procedure is not
more invasive than routine prophylactic scaling of the teeth and the process is accomplished in
accordance with accepted prophylactic  techniques; (i) mucosal and skin cells collected by buccal
scraping or swab, skin swab, or mouth washings; (j) sputum collected after saline mist
nebulization.
4) ____ Collection of data through noninvasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or sedation)
routinely employed in clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or microwaves. 
Where medical devices are employed, they must be cleared/approved for marketing. (Studies 
intended to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the medical device are not generally eligible 
for expedited review, including studies of cleared medical devices for new indications.)  
Examples: (a) Physical sensors that are applied either to the surface of the body or at a distance 
and do not involve input of significant amounts of energy into the subject or an invasion of the 
subject’s privacy; (b) weighing or testing sensory acuity; (c) magnetic resonance imaging; (d) 
electrocardiography, electroencephalography, thermography, detection of naturally occurring 
radioactivity, electroretinography, ultrasound, diagnostic infrared imaging, doppler blood flow, and 
echocardiography; (e) moderate exercise, muscular strength testing, body composition 
assessment, and flexibility testing where appropriate given the age, weight, and health of the 
individual.
5) ____ Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been collected
or will be collected solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or 
diagnosis). “Form A-1” Expedited Cert Form.doc
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(Note: Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for the protection 
of human subjects. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(4). This listing refers only to research that is not exempt.)
6) ____ Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research purposes.
7) __ __ Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to,
research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs 
or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus 
group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. (Note: 
Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for the protection of 
human subjects 45 CFR 46.101 (b)(2) and (b)(3). This listing refers only to research that is not 
exempt.) 
8) ____ Continuing review of research previously approved by the convened IRB as follows:
(a) _____ Where (i) the research is permanently closed to the enrollment of new subjects; (ii) all
subjects have completed all research-related interventions; and (iii) the research 
remains active only for long-term follow-up of subjects; or 
(b) _____ Where no subjects have been enrolled and no additional risks have been identified; or
(c) _____ Where the remaining research activities are limited to data analysis.
9) ____ Continuing review of research, not conducted under an investigational new drug application or
investigational device exemption where categories two (2) through eight (8) do not apply but the 
IRB has determined and documented at a convened meeting that the research involves no 
greater than minimal risk and no additional risks have been identified. 
*THE CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH THAT MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARD (IRB) THROUGH AN EXPEDITED REVIEW PROCEDURE BECAME EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER
9, 1998.
____________________________________________
1 In Kentucky, “child/children” refers to all individuals less than 18 years of age unless the individual(s) 
is/are legally emancipated. (See Informed Consent SOP for discussion of “Emancipated Individuals” 
under Kentucky state law.)  Individuals less than 18 years of age who are not emancipated meet the 
federal definition for “child” (e.g., DHHS, FDA, and U.S. Department of Education). Children are defined 
in the HHS regulations as “persons who have not attained the legal age for consent to treatments or 
procedures involved in the research, under the applicable law of the jurisdiction in which the research 
will be conducted.” 45 CFR 46.402(a)    If conducting research outside the state of Kentucky, you are 
responsible for complying with applicable state law.
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THIS FORM MUST BE TYPED
Note:  For best results in opening links contained within this document, it is recommended that you first save this 
document to the location of your choice.  Open the document from that location, then right-mouse click on a link and 
select “open hyperlink”.
This application is described by (check one):  
A.  New IRB Research Protocol (Not previously reviewed)
B.  Previously Approved Study for which IRB Approval has Lapsed :  Previous IRB #
Please include with your submission either a written statement that verifies no research activities (recruitment or 
enrollment of new subjects; interaction, intervention, or data collection from currently enrolled subjects; or data 
analysis) have occurred since the lapse in approval, or a summary of events that occurred in the interim.  
C.  Modification to Currently Approved Protocol
1. Check type of review: Check IRB:
Expedited Full: Medical Nonmedical
2. Name and Address of Principal Investigator (PI) (where mail can most easily reach PI): If research is being submitted to or
supported by an extramural funding agency such as NIH, or a private foundation, the PI listed on the grant application must
be the same person listed below.  If the PI is completing this project to meet the requirements of a University of Kentucky
academic program, also list name and campus address of faculty advisor.
PI Name: Steven Douglas Kreis PI is R.N.
Department: Civil Engineering- KTC
*Room # & Bldg.:
176 Raymond Building
Speed Sort #: 0281
*Students should list preferred mailing address (i.e., an address where mail will most quickly reach them).
3. PI’s Link Blue: sdkrei00 Degree and Rank: PhD Candidate
(“username”  to log in to your UK network account, i.e., jdoe)
PI’s Telephone #: 859 257 6898 Dept. Code: 8h060
PI’s e-mail address: dougkreis@uky.edu PI’s FAX Number: 859 257 1815
4. Title of Project:  (If applicable, use the exact title listed in the grant/contract application. When applicable to your research,
it is important that you add to the beginning of your title the following:  “UK/P” if your research involves prisoners;
“UK/D” if your research is supported by the Department of Defense”.
Tier 1 hazardous materials shipment security – addressing critical research gaps to secure the United States supply 
chain
IRB # 
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5. Indicate which of the categories listed below accurately describes this protocol:
Not greater than minimal risk
Greater than minimal risk, but presenting the prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects
Greater than minimal risk, no prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects, but likely to yield generalizable 
knowledge about the subject’s disorder or condition
Research not otherwise approvable which presents an opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious 
problem affecting the health or welfare of subjects
6. Anticipated Beginning and Ending Date of Research Project: 09/01/15 / 12/01/16
Month/Day/Year Month/Day/Year
7. Number and age level of human subjects: 200 / 40-70
Number Age Range
Indicate the categories of subjects and controls to be included in the study.  You may be required to complete additional forms 
depending on the subject category applicable to your research. Check ALL that apply:  
Children (17 yrs or less) [attach Form W] Prisoners [attach Form V]
Wards of the State  [attach Form W] Non-English Speaking [see Form H info (HTML)]
Emancipated Minors International Citizens [DoD SOP may apply]
Impaired Consent Capacity [attach Form T] Students
Impaired Consent Capacity (Institutionalized) [attach Form T] Normal Volunteers
Neonates [attach Form U] Patients
Pregnant Women [attach Form U] Appalachian Population
Military Personnel or DoD Civilian Employees [DoD SOP may 
apply]
8. Does this study focus on subjects with any of the clinical conditions listed below that present a high likelihood of impaired
consent capacity or fluctuations in consent capacity?
No  
Yes
If yes, does the research involve interaction or intervention with subjects?
No, direct intervention/interaction is not involved (e.g., record-review research, secondary data analysis) 
Yes - direct intervention/interaction is involved - complete and attach Form T to your IRB application.
Examples of such conditions include:
Traumatic brain injury or acquired brain injury
Severe depressive disorders or Bipolar disorders
Schizophrenia or other mental disorders that involve 
serious cognitive disturbances
Stroke
Developmental disabilities
Degenerative dementias
CNS cancers and other cancers with possible CNS 
involvement
Late stage Parkinson’s Disease
Late stage persistent substance dependence
Ischemic heart disease
HIV/AIDS
COPD
Renal insufficiency
Diabetes
Autoimmune or inflammatory disorders
Chronic non-malignant pain disorders
Drug effects
Other acute medical crises
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9. Indicate the targeted/planned enrollment of the following members of minority groups and their subpopulations [Please note:
the IRB will expect this information to be reported at Continuation Review time]:
Ethnic Origin # Male  # Female Ethnic Origin # Male   # Female
American Indian/
Alaskan Native Hispanic/Latino
Asian Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
Black/African American White/Caucasian
Other or unknown
10. Indicate the items below that apply to your research.  Depending on the items applicable to your research, you may be
required to complete additional forms or meet additional requirements.  Contact the ORI (859-257-9428) if you have questions
about additional requirements.  Check ALL that apply.
Academic Degree / Required Research Deception [attach Form E]
Aging Research Drug/Substance Abuse Research 
Alcohol Abuse Research Educational/Student Records (e.g., GPA, test scores)
Cancer Research Genetic Research
Certificate of Confidentiality NIH GWAS (Genome-Wide Association Study)
CCTS (Center for Clinical & Translational 
Science)
UK HIPAA Authorization
UK HIPAA Waiver of Authorization
Clinical Research UK HIPAA  De-Identification
Clinical Trial HIV/AIDS Research
Multicenter Clinical Trial (excluding NIH 
Cooperative Groups)
Screening for Reportable Diseases
International Research [see Form H info (HTML)]
NIH cooperative groups (i.e., SWOG, RTOG) Internet Research
Placebo Controlled Trial Psychology Dept. Subject Use & Research Ethics (SURE) Committee
UK only Survey Research
Community-Based Participatory Research Waiver of Informed Consent [attach Form E]
Data & Safety Monitoring Board Waiver of Requirement for Documentation of Informed Consent 
[attach Form F]Data & Safety Monitoring Plan
11. If the research is being submitted to, supported by, or conducted in cooperation with an external or internal agency or funding
program, indicate below all the categories that apply:
Not applicable  National Science Foundation
Grant application pending Other Institutions of Higher Education
(HHS) Dept. of Health & Human Services Pharmaceutical Company
(NIH) National Institutes of Health Private Foundation/Association
(CDC) Centers for Disease Control & Prevention State
(HRSA) Health Resources and Services Administration
(DoEd) U.S. Department of Education (See DoEd 
Guidance for details)
(SAMHSA) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration
(DoJ) Department of Justice (e.g., National Institute 
of Justice; Bureau of Prisons) (See DoJ Guidance
for details)
Federal Agencies Other Than Those Listed Here
(DoE) Department of Energy (See DoE Guidance
for details)
Industry (Other than Pharmaceutical Companies)  IRB Fee Info
(EPA) Environtmental Protection Agency (See EPA
Guidance for details)
Internal Grant Program w/ proposal Other: _________________________________
Internal Grant Program w/o proposal
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12. Specify the funding source and/or cooperating organization(s):  (e.g., National Cancer Institute, Ford Foundation, Eli Lilly &
Company, South Western Oncology Group, Bureau of Prisons, etc.) If your project is funded, please see Form AA – DD
in Section 6 of the IRB application for applicability of attachments.
Not Funded
13. Yes    No    The research is supported by the Department of Defense (DoD).
If yes, attach to your IRB application materials addressing the specific processes described in the Department of 
Defense IRB/ORI Coordination SOP [http://www.research.uky.edu/ori/human/SOPs_&_Policies.htm#6].
14. a)  Check all the applicable sites listed below at which the research will be conducted.
Not applicable Other Hospitals and Med. Centers
Bluegrass Regional Mental Health Retardation Board Other State/Regional School Systems
Cardinal Hill Hospital Shriner’s Children’s Hospital
Correctional Facilities UK Classroom(s)/Lab(s)
Eastern State Hospital UK Clinics in Lexington
Fayette Co. School Systems UK Clinics outside of Lexington
Home Health Agencies UK Healthcare Good Samaritan Hospital
Institutions of Higher Education (other than UK) UK Hospital
International Sites Norton Healthcare
Nursing Homes Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Other:
List all other non-UK owned/operated locations where the research will be conducted*:
Attach additional sheets if necessary.  
*A letter of support and local context is required from non-UK sites.  Click here for more information.
b) Is this a multi-site study for which you are the lead investigator or UK is the lead site? Yes No
If yes, you must describe the plan for the management of reporting unanticipated problems, noncompliance, and submission 
of protocol modifications and interim results from the non-UK sites in question #8 of the Research Description (Form B).
If the non-UK sites or non-UK personnel are engaged in the research, there are additional federal and university requirements 
which need to be completed for their participation, such as the establishment of a cooperative IRB review agreement with the non-
UK site.  Questions about the participation of non-UK sites/personnel should be discussed with the ORI staff at (859) 257-9428.
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15. Disclosure of Financial Interest (DFI):
Do you, any of your investigators, or key personnel have a significant financial interest requiring disclosure (per the 
UK administrative regulation: http://www.uky.edu/regs/files/ar/ar7-2.pdf)
YES NO
          AND
the interest(s) relate(s) to this project? 
YES NO
(to make this determination, see OSPA [http://www.research.uky.edu/ospa/coi.html] and/or download a sample form 
to view the questions required to make this determination [PDF])
If YES to both questions above, do you, any of your investigators, or key personnel need to update (or 
submit) an online financial disclosure?
[instructions: 
http://www.research.uky.edu/ospa/info/docs/INSTRUCTIONS%20FOR%20COMPLETING%20THE%20FINANCIAL%20DISCLOSURE%20
FORM.pdf]
YES       
NO UPDATE REQUIRED (e.g., disclosure is already up-to-date)
If YES, please identify who has submitted an updated (or new) online financial disclosure:
Name: Name:
Name: Name:
Name: Name:
Note: The IRB cannot issue final IRB approval without reviewing the final approved management plan, if one has been deemed 
necessary. 
16. Additional Certification: (If your project is federally funded, your funding agency may request an
Assurance/Certification/Declaration of Exemption form.) Check the following if needed:
Protection of Human Subjects Assurance/Certification/Declaration of Exemption (Formerly Optional Form – 310)
17. Identify other STUDY personnel assisting in research project (attach additional sheets if necessary).  (In the space
provided, specify which personnel are authorized by the principal investigator to obtain informed consent.)
NOTE:  Study personnel are required to receive human research protection training before implementing any
research procedures (e.g., CITI).  For information about mandatory training requirements for study personnel, visit UK’s web
page FAQ's on Mandatory Training [http://www.research.uky.edu/ori/human/Human_Research_Mandatory_Education.htm]
or contact ORI at 859-257-9428.
If you are using this sheet to request changes in study personnel (SP) that have not been previously reported to the IRB,
please include with your Modification Request Form two copies of a current list of all study personnel, denoting the changes.
*If the research is being completed to meet academic requirements, the faculty advisor is also considered study personnel.
Study personnel assisting in research project:
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the 
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
Name, Rank/Degree: Timothy Taylor PhD First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project : Faculty Advisor
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address: tim.taylor@uky.edu
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4): tbtayl0
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
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UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the 
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
Name, Rank/Degree: First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project :
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address:
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4):
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the 
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
Name, Rank/Degree: First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project :
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address:
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4):
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the 
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
Name, Rank/Degree: First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project :
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address:
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4):
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the 
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
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Name, Rank/Degree: First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project :
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address:
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4):
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
Name, Rank/Degree: First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project :
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address:
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4):
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
access to that data will be limited to staff working under the auspices of the 
Office of the Vice President for Research.)
Name, Rank/Degree: First Name:
Middle 
Name:
Last 
Name:
Responsibility in Project :
Rank/ 
Degree:
Primary 
Phone:
E-mail address:
Responsibility in 
Project:
Link Blue (e.g., jdoe4):
E-mail
address(s):
Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No Authorized to Obtain Consent: Yes No
UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as 
study personnel:
NON-UK Affiliated individuals assisting in research project as study 
personnel [see question #8 of the Research Description (Form B) to provide a 
description of the role of these personnel].  (Note that phone # and e-mail 
address(s) are being requested for data matching/identification purposes and 
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1. Background:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought renewed attention to the problem of domestic terrorism. These 
attacks provided a vivid example of passenger airplanes – an integral component of the United States’ transportation 
network – being transformed into weapons, which resulted in significant loss of human life and economic damage. 
Maybe the most enduring legacy of the 9/11 attacks was the subsequent transformation of how the US government and 
policymakers deal with questions of transportation security. Almost immediately, security was heightened at airports as 
attention understandably turned to the mode of transportation most directly implicated in the attacks. By November 
2001, with the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) had been created. The TSA’s mandate includes overseeing the security of airports, highways, railroads, mass 
transit systems, and ports. 
The creation of the TSA highlights the changing security landscape in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. While security-
related policies had tended to gloss over infrastructure and transportation before 9/11, those attacks raised awareness 
that transportation assets could be used as weapons, serve as targets, or act as delivery mechanism for terrorist attacks 
(Edwards and Goodrich 2012). In 2002, President Bush’s signing of the Homeland Security Act brought about the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After its formation, the DHS absorbed 22 separate 
government offices and agencies, each of which shared the common goal of securing the United States against future 
terrorist attacks. Included among these was the TSA. However, activities designed to increase transportation security 
were not confined to the policy and governance. Acknowledging that research gaps could potentially hamper efforts to 
improve security practices, the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), in 2002, began a dedicated 
program to address security-related transportation research. This program remains operational today, attesting to the 
need for timely and focused research products that inform new policies and practices that will help prevent, prepare, 
mitigate, or recover from security-related incidents.
Following on the heels of DHS absorbing TSA and other offices, a number of legislative and presidential directives 
transformed the nature of the hazardous materials landscape. Beginning in March 2003, TSA introduced new 
regulations that apply to drivers and other personnel involved in hazardous materials shipments. It required that hazmat 
employees receive security awareness training. Then in December 2003 President Bush issued a presidential directive 
that required Federal departments and agencies to identify and protect critical infrastructure assets deemed vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks. One portion of this directive stipulated that the U.S. Department of Transportation and DHS would 
coordinate the regulation of hazardous materials transported by any mode (including pipelines). 
Clearly, in the initial scramble after 9/11 policy changes focused on airports and air transportation more broadly; in the 
ensuing years attention gradually turned to a wider range of transportation networks. Specifically, surface transportation 
security garnered more scrutiny as legislators and policymakers sought to protect highways and motor vehicles from 
potential terrorist attacks. Certainly it is possible for any vehicle to be weaponized, but it is undeniable that some 
vehicles present a more attractive target than others. For instance, vehicles carrying hazardous materials can pose a 
significant threat if a terrorist commandeers them for malicious purposes. Any vehicle moving hazardous materials is a 
viable target, but those transporting the most dangerous and toxic goods, if weaponized, would cause severe damage to 
human health, the environment, and local. One category of hazardous materials, however, is particularly vulnerable. If 
released, they would instigate a chain of events leading to catastrophic damage – Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive 
Materials (HSSM). 
Although hazardous materials shipments have received much attention since the 1980s, researchers and policymakers 
refocused their attention toward them following 9/11 (e.g. Huang et al. 2005; Lee and Whang 2005). Tier I HSSMs are 
used in a number of manufacturing and construction processes and constitute a key part of multiple supply chains. 
Formally, Tier 1 HSSMs are defined as highway sensitive-security materials transported by motor vehicles which, if 
released through a terrorist act or another accident would have highly significant level of adverse effects on human life, 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption. Included among Tier 1 HSSMs are 
explosives, radioactive materials, chemical weapons, and flammable and non-flammable gases. Although toxic 
chemicals and many gasses often play little if any role in construction projects, many highway security-sensitive 
materials are integral to supply chains. For example, explosives can play a critical role in road construction projects 
(e.g., clearing rock debris to clear a path for the road) and demolition activities that are a precursor to new construction 
projects. Included among Tier 1 HSSMs are – explosives, radioactive materials, chemical weapons, and various liquids 
and gasses that are extremely toxic if humans are exposed to them, either through inhalation or other means. A 
commonly used Tier 1 HSSM is anhydrous ammonia, which is used as a fertilizer to supply nitrogen to plants. An April 
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2013 fertilizer plant explosion near Waco, Texas exemplified the danger it poses when not handled properly – or if it 
were used with malicious intent.  While Tier 1 HSSMs represent a small fraction of all hazardous materials shipped 
daily in the United States, they merit a heightened level of oversight and protection due to the grave consequences that 
would result from their release. 
Despite the recognition that hazardous materials could be used in terrorist attacks and produce social, security, and 
economic disruptions if released, not until 2007, when the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 (hereafter the 9/11 Act) was signed into law, did a concerted effort get underway to investigate the potential 
of developing a centralized system to monitor and track hazardous materials shipments. Section 1554 of the 9/11 Act 
instructs the TSA to develop a program that would facilitate the tracking of security-sensitive materials shipped by 
motor carriers. In 2006 and 2008, the TSA introduced new regulations designed to enhance the security of freight and 
passenger rail systems. In 2008, it announced security guidelines for motor carriers that were to be adopted by 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis. These security action items (SAIs) focused on improving the security of trucks or 
other vehicles transporting hazardous materials. The SAIs made recommendations about enhancing overall motor 
carrier security, eliminating unauthorized access to hazardous materials, conducting security threat assessments, and 
developing robust security plans. Before the 9/11 Act became law, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) conducted a brief field operations test in 2004 to assess the effectiveness of truck telematics systems to 
determine if they could be implemented to bolster security of the hazardous materials supply chain. 
As part of Section 1554 requirements, the TSA was asked to work on a truck tracking system that would account for the 
FMCSA’s previous field study as well as the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot Program it was responsible for administering. 
As commentators noted at the time, despite the stated urgency of improving transportation security, limited progress 
had been made on this front, especially in area of surface transportation (Johnstone 2007). Land transportation security 
programs suffered anemic funding, which hampered the DHS and TSA in their mission to protect surface transportation 
modes. Arguably, the 9/11 Act served as a partial corrective, and in particular motivated the TSA to direct more 
attention toward the issue of hazardous materials shipments. Solving this problem would be difficult due to the 
immense heterogeneity and complexity of the hazardous materials transport system. Multiple stakeholders are involved 
in this system – manufacturers of hazardous materials, shippers, and consignees, and so any effort to institute a robust 
system to monitor it would require a highly coordinated approach (ICF 2000).     
Eight years after the 9/11 Act was passed, no formal system has been installed to monitor and track security-sensitive 
materials transported across the nation’s highways – this has produced lingering gaps in the United States’ hazardous 
materials supply chain that demand an immediate closure. This has had negative consequences for risk management. 
Lacking a dynamic, real-time geospatial risk analysis system, government agencies remain in the dark regarding 
vulnerabilities Tier 1 HSSMs experience as they move across the landscape. As Prentice (2008) argues, robust 
transportation security measures carry tangible and intangible benefits. Perhaps the most critical tangible benefit is the 
reduction in terrorism threats. 
2. Objectives:
The objective of this dissertation is to develop a risk analysis and management protocol for Tier 1 HSSMs that improve 
the safety of highway-based freight. Reducing the threat level posed by these materials will protect critical 
infrastructure, key environmental assets, and human life. As such, while the project will make a scholarly contribution 
through the development of new techniques to map and analyze risk, it will also achieve the practical goal of improving 
infrastructure safety and enhancing hazard mitigation techniques. Scholarly objectives will be accomplished through the 
development of three papers suitable for publication. Each paper will make the following contributions:
1) Paper 1 will combine a literature synthesis on hazardous materials and hazardous transportation security with a
detailed case study reviewing a previous – unsuccessful – attempt to create a comprehensive risk analysis and
mapping system for Tier 1 HSSMs. The purpose of this case study will be to identify lessons learned from past
failures. Identifying previous missteps serves a valuable function in that it improves our ability to adapt
theoretical knowledge in an applied setting.
2) Paper 2 will leverage a survey of experts in the hazardous materials transportation field to create a semi-
quantitative risk equation. This equation can be used to dynamically assess the level of risk associated with the
movement of hazardous materials throughout the U.S. highway network. By using the feedback from subject
matter experts, this paper will develop spatially and temporally dynamic approach to risk analysis that
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evaluates the risk of individual shipments instead of individual road segments, which has been a common 
practice in the past. 
3) Paper 3 will identify cost effective, appropriate telematics technologies to equip trucks carrying Tier 1 HSSMs
with and determine optimal methods to report and represent this information. It will describe the practical
barriers and limitations of installing telematics systems across fleets as well as the strengths and weaknesses of
different technologies.
3. Study Design:
The study involves utilizing a number of different techniques to collect the necessary information. Techniques include 
semi-structured phone interviews, and an online survey of subject matter experts. The semi-structured interviews will be 
employed to ascertain information about the General Dynamics previous attempt to create a tracking and monitoring 
system, and to collect information regarding the range of telematics available to the trucking industry.  The online survey 
will be used to gather information from subject matter experts in the field of hazardous materials.  These experts will be 
selected to represent different facets of government stakeholders (such as State Police, Emergency Response, 
Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration), private industry (such as the Institute for the 
Makers of Explosives) and various academics focused on hazardous material transportation and/or terrorism.  Phone 
interviews with telematics providers will also be conducted to ascertain the range of tracking technology currently 
available to the trucking industry.  Participants will not be randomly selected, nor will there be deception involved in the 
study.
Immediately after 9/11, General Dynamics received a contract to create a tracking and monitoring system for hazardous 
materials shipments. After a period of sustained development, General Dynamics terminated the project because the 
products delivered to the US Government did not provide a robust means for dynamically evaluating risk. Even though 
General Dynamics’ risk monitoring and tracking program was inadequate, it can still offer valuable lessons to inform 
the design and implementation of future risk assessment protocols. 
The benefits of using a semi-structured interview format are numerous. First, it allows for a mixture of structured (or 
targeted) questions and less rigid inquiries that give the interviewee the opportunity to expound upon his or her answer. 
Second, it lets the interviewer decide how to conduct an interview to preserve flow and keep the discussion as 
conversational as possible. Third, unlike structured interviews, which requires a strict list of questions that are directed 
toward each participant, semi-structured methods let the researcher identify unexpected or emergent themes that could 
prove critical in understanding a particular situation (Merriam, 2006). The goal of analysis will be to derive key insights 
about why the General Dynamics project failed; all information will be distilled into a comprehensive discussion 
outlining the lessons learned and how the current project can avoid the pitfalls that afflicted General Dynamics. The 
main purpose of the survey will be to understand how stakeholders conceptualize risk.  However, it will also elicit 
information about the critical issues facing the hazardous materials supply chain, and hazmat transportation more 
broadly. Based on interview and survey results, findings will be used to outline strategies to develop a tracking and 
monitoring system for Tier I Hazmat shipments.
4. Study Population:
Semi-structured phone interviews will be utilized to catalogue the lessons learned from the General Dynamics failed 
system. I will collaborate with project designers, systems engineers, and other individuals from General Dynamics’ 
organization to highlight the successes and failures of their pilot program. A comprehensive list of lessons learned will 
be invaluable for developing the Tier I Hazmat Monitoring and Tracking System proposed here. To collect this 
information, I will conduct semi-structured interviews with organizational stakeholders with an eye toward producing a 
detailed case study. Appendix A contains a list of questions that will be used during interviews. The interviewees will 
be selected based upon their participation in the original study, and will not be selected based upon sex/gender or 
race/ethnicity.  The proposed dates for conducting the interviews will be between November 2015 and February 2016.
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Semi-structured phone interviews will also be utilized to contact representatives from the telematics industry.  Each of 
the companies will be contacted to ascertain the abilities/capabilities of the equipment they currently provide to the 
trucking industry.  This information will inform the study in so far as it will determine the baseline of technology 
currently available for use in a tracking system. The selection criteria for participants will be based upon an internet 
search of available telematics providers.  The interviewees will be selected based upon the contact information provided 
on each telematics provider’s website.  Interviewee selection will not be based upon sex/gender or race/ethnicity.  The 
proposed dates for conducting these interviews will be January 2016 to March 2016.
An online survey will be utilized to ascertain opinions of subject matter experts in the field of homeland security, 
highway motor carrier transportation and terrorism.  This is a select group of individuals who will be contacted based 
upon the information available online.  For example, a representative from State Police and/or Commercial Vehicle 
Enforcement from each state will be invited to participate.  The same process will be conducted for a number of state 
and federal agencies such as the Federal Motor Carriers Administration; Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Administration; State Transportation Agencies; State Emergency Management; Transportation Security Administration 
and the Department of Homeland Security. Survey participants will also be invited from select industry groups that 
deal specifically with the transportation of Tier 1 hazardous materials.  An example of such a group includes the 
Institute of Makers of Explosives.  Additionally, survey participants will be invited to participate from academia.  These 
academics will be selected based upon their affiliations and publications in the field of hazardous materials 
transportation.  The subject matter experts will be selected purely for their expertise and will not be selected based upon 
sex/gender or race/ethnicity.  The proposed dates for conducting the survey are January 2016 to April 2016.  I anticipate 
that in excess of 250 participants will be invited to participate in total.  Ideally I will receive a 20% response rate to 
make my findings statistically significant.
5. Subject Recruitment Methods and Privacy:
Subjects will be recruited in a number of ways.  Firstly the General Dynamics staff that participated in the original 
research will be contacted and recruited to participate in the semi-structured interviews.  The contacted members will be 
based upon the published report.  Initial contact will be made via phone.
Phone interviews will also be conducted with the telematics provider’s representative.  In this instance, sales personnel 
from each of the companies should be able to provide all the necessary information.  The contact information for these 
representatives will be taken from the contact information available on each of the companies websites.
The online survey requires a broader range of participants.  Each of these participants will be contacted via email to 
participate in the study.  Each of these emails will be obtained from online sources, such as the contact page for each of 
the agencies.  In the case of academics, contact information of individuals is typically listed on published material.
Each recruitment method involves publically available information.
6. Informed Consent Process:
Informed consent will be different for the interview subjects and the survey participants.  The interview subjects will be 
provided written informed consent. A copy of the consent form will be emailed to the survey participant ahead of time 
so they can read it.  The consent will be confirmed over the phone by the PI Doug Kreis.  At that point in time Doug 
will answer any questions the interview participants may have. Informed consent will be obtained only by the PI. No 
one except the participant may give consent, and no one but the PI is authorized in this study to receive it. The informed 
consent will be confirmed at the beginning of the interview.  
For the online survey, informed consent will be provided via the initial email contact that is made with the survey 
participant in the form of a survey cover letter.       
7. Research Procedures:
The research procedures to be followed for the semi-structured interviews will be to have detailed questions prepared 
for the interview, and then to allow the interviewee to direct the conversation, adhering to the questions only if the
conversation loses focus.
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For the online survey, the participants will be invited via email.  The email addresses will have been gathered through 
publically available information on each of the organizations websites.  In some cases, the email will be sent to an 
individual identified as being responsible, or to a general information request.  Follow-up contact will be made to each 
email address 2 weeks after initial contact, and again 2 weeks later to request participation.  At this point no further 
contact will be made.      
8. Resources:
The online survey will be designed using the Qualtrics survey tool available to all University of Kentucky researchers.  
The survey will be distributed and administered by the PI Doug Kreis.  The PI will be the only person with access to the 
survey and the survey responses.
Phone interviews will be conducted by the PI Doug Kreis. In the case of the General Dynamics staff, the original study 
participants are known to the PI, and conducting the interviews over the phone will elicit the necessary information.  
The interview contents will not be disclosed and the individual participant responses will remain confidential.
9. Potential Risks:
There are no risks associated with this research project.  Information will remain confidential, and responses are 
gathered to inform the research equation and truck tracking framework.  Individuals will not be identifiable through the 
end result.
10. Safety Precautions:
All data collected through the course of this research project will be kept in electronic files on the researcher’s
university issued desktop computer, used only for the purpose of this project.  Data collected containing any identifiers 
will not be shared amongst participants or any other individual.   Identifiers will not be used in any public presentation 
of the research material. Identifiers will only be collected if the survey and or interview participants give their consent.
11. Benefit vs. Risk:
The conceptual system outlined for use here could be used by governmental agencies, such as the TSA, to monitor and 
track the changing risk profiles of Tier 1 HSSMs as they crisscross the vast network of U.S. surface infrastructure. 
Improving our situational awareness of the location of Tier 1 HSSMs will provide local, state, and federal agencies 
tasked with securing them and responding in the case of a release – whether intentional or accidental – with critical 
knowledge to execute their designated functions. The benefits of such a system to enhancing safety and security of the 
US highway system would be enjoyed by both the general public and government agencies.  There are no risks to the 
research participants.
12. Available Alternative Treatment(s):
Not Applicable
13. Research Materials, Records, and Privacy:
The research material obtained will be sourced through the online survey and the phone interviews.  The information 
recorded in the survey will be the responses to the survey questions (attached in Appendix B).  The information 
obtained in the phone interviews will be documented by the PI.  
The information from the online survey is necessary to gather subject matter expert opinion in relation to the riskiness 
of particular shipments and potential attack modes.  This information will be utilized to inform the equation that will 
measure the risk of a particular shipment as it moves across the highway. The qualtrics web-based survey is an 
independent proprietary survey program that is subscribed to by the University of Kentucky.  
The information gathered in the phone interviews with general dynamics staff will be used to ascertain what will and 
will not work in designing the system architecture for a truck tracking and risk management system.
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The information gathered in the phone interviews with the telematics provider’s will be used to determine the current 
technology available to the trucking industry, and identify any technology gaps that may exist for the implementation of 
a truck tracking and risk management system.
14. Confidentiality:
The data generated during the course of the study will be stored on the PI’s desktop computer.  This data will be 
password protected, and no one will have access to the desktop or the office except the PI.  The data will be destroyed 6 
years after completion of the project.  PI generated notes pertaining to conversations will be kept in a locked file 
cabinet, inside the PI’s locked office on the University of Kentucky campus.  After the 6 years of holding the records 
has lapsed, the desktop hard drive will be wiped by the College of Engineering’s computer technician.
Additionally, no information or data generated during the course of the study will be sent to anyone via email.
15. Payment:
Not Applicable
16. Costs to Subjects:
Not Applicable
17. Data and Safety Monitoring:
Not Applicable
18. Subject Complaints:
Interviewees and survey participants will be given contact information for the Department of Civil Engineering, the PI’s 
advisor, and the Office of Research Integrity at UK so that the participants can discuss problems, concerns and question, 
and obtain information about the project from someone other than the PI.
19. Research Involving Non-English Speaking Subjects or Subjects from a Foreign Culture:
Not Applicable
20. HIV/AIDS Research:
Not Applicable
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Appendix A
In October 2005, General Dynamics began work on a Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP). The purpose of 
this program was to demonstrate whether “smart truck” technology could be incorporated into an effective 
and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. While this study verified a tracking system could be 
implemented, there were many shortcomings with the system design that would have prevented the General 
Dynamics system from being implemented on a nationwide scale. Some of these issues were related to 
system architecture, while others stemmed from the system malfunctioning during testing. This set of 
interview questions will be administered during conversations with General Dynamics personnel, the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration’s independent verification and validation contractor – which 
evaluated the prototype for the federal government, – U.S. Department of Homeland Security staff, and 
private sector stakeholders to identify a set of lessons learned from the HTSP. While these questions are 
concerned with understanding how engineering principles are used in an applied context, this knowledge is 
of academic value in that it can inform literature focused on the design and implementation of complex 
systems. Interviews will use a semi-structured format. That is, all participants, regardless of background, will 
be asked the questions listed below; however, when a participant brings up a point that requires further 
exploration because it promises to deepen our conceptual knowledge, I will pursue those lines of inquiry in a 
more unstructured manner. Follow-up questions that depart from the list below will be recorded in interview 
notes.
Questions
1. Describe your involvement in the HTSP (e.g. designer, engineer, evaluator).
2. From your perspective, did this program adequately demonstrate that “smart truck” technology could
be used to track and monitor hazardous materials shipments?
3. A key component of HTSP development was the Transportation Event Analysis and Management
System (TEAMS), an event-based system that stored and displayed information relating to potential
transportation security incidents. What were the major shortcomings TEAMS and HTSP technology
prototypes more generally?
a. How did these defects impact overall system performance?
b. Were any components of the system particularly vulnerable to failure?
c. During prototype testing, what were the most significant problems?
i. Would any of these problems inhibit the implementation of a truck-tracking system?
If so, which ones?
4. Did the HTSP technology prototype meet the needs of a wide range of users (e.g. security
specialists, private sector entities, state and federal governments)? If not, what design changes would
be necessary to make the system more accommodating?
5. TEAMS used several geo-fencing algorithms to identify when and where a potential transportation
security incident was underway. Were the assumptions underpinning geo-fencing conceptually and
empirically sound? If not, what changes would be necessary to implement a more robust tracking
and monitoring system?
a. Should geographic information systems (GIS) be used more extensively when refining geo-
fencing solutions?
6. The HTSP technology prototype used an already-existing commercial product, FdFolio™, to
perform risk analysis on hazmat shipments. Were the risk calculation methods implemented by this
software appropriate for a monitoring and tracking system?
a. If not, what changes would you suggest to improve risk calculations and therefore enhance
the visibility of potentially vulnerable shipments?
b. Is a more dynamic form of risk calculation appropriate?
c. What variables are most important for accurately estimating the level of risk associated with
a hazmat shipment?
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7. The independent verification and validation contractor put forward 11 recommendations to build
upon and improve the HTSP technology prototype. Which of these suggestions do you feel it would
be most critical to implement during future phases of system development, and which would yield
the most significant security benefits?
8. The HTSP technology prototype design did not explicitly cater to the Tier 1 HSSMs. Bearing in
mind that future system development will exclusively target this class of hazardous materials, what
changes should be made to the technology prototype to comply with current governmental
regulations pertaining to their security.
9. Should e-manifests and electronic route preparation be more integral for the tracking and monitoring
system?
10. What attributes would a successful truck tracking center possess (this applies to the performance of
security specialists, software design, communication between stakeholders, or any other factor that
you believe warrants particular scrutiny)?
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Appendix B 
Hazardous Materials Transport Survey
Name (optional):
Title:
Organization:
Attack Modes:
Please examine the following attack scenarios involving commercial motor vehicles hazardous 
materials and rank each one from 1-5 according to likelihood (this is a modified Likert Scale). 
Here, a 1 indicates the scenario is extremely unlikely to occur, and a 5 indicates occurrence is 
very probable.
Attack Mode Description Ranking
Explosive device placed on a commercial 
motor vehicle (CMV)
Explosive device placed on highway 
infrastructure of a planned CMV route
Weapon launched at a CMV from a distance 
(e.g. high powered rifle, rocket propelled 
grenade)
Explosive device placed in a vehicle near a 
CMV (i.e. Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Device – VBIED)
A hijacker commandeers a CMV to 
immediately release hazardous materials or 
catalyze an explosion
A hijacker commandeers a CMV and drives 
it to a nearby location with the intent of 
releasing hazardous materials or catalyzing 
an explosion  
An insider (e.g. trucking firm employee) 
commandeers a CMV to immediately release
hazardous materials or catalyze and 
explosion
An insider (e.g. trucking firm employee) 
commandeers a CMB and drives it to a 
nearby location with the intent of releasing 
hazardous materials or catalyzing an 
explosion
Sabotage of TIH cargo tank motor vehicle 
(e.g. opening or damaging a valve)
External crash initiate (e.g. placing 
something on the roadway, collision with 
another vehicle)
An aircraft is used to attack a hazardous 
material shipment
Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
200
F2.0100
Form B:  Nonmedical IRB Research Description
Tier 1 hazardous materials shipment security – Addressing critical research gaps to 
secure the United States supply chain
University of Kentucky
Revised 7/30/14
attack (CBRN)
A waterborne vessel carrying an IED 
explodes close to a CMV 
Coordinated or sequential attacks (e.g. 
sabotage of a truck’s braking system and 
subsequent use of a rocket-propelled 
grenade once the vehicle crashes)
Burglary or theft of hazmat materials (i.e. 
removing the materials from the vehicle)
Damage to hazardous materials (through 
vandalism or some other means) that does 
not produce a release or explosion
Cyber-attack causing theft/diversion (e.g. 
electronically changing a manifest so that 
hazmat are delivered to an improper 
destination)
Natural disasters (e.g. hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake)
Based on your professional experience, which of the preceding scenarios are in your opinion the 
most likely?
Why do these particular scenarios merit extra scrutiny?
Threat Analysis Questions
- The following questions relate to threat analysis for highway motor carriers transporting
hazardous materials.
Which of the following hazardous materials classes should be considered in dynamic threat
calculations? (Dynamic meaning a threat value that would change as the location of the material
changed both temporally and spatially).
Hazardous Materials Class Inclusion? (Yes/No)
Class 1: Explosives
Class 2: Gasses
Class 3: Flammable Liquid and Combustible 
Liquid
Class 4: Flammable Solid, Spontaneously 
Combustible, and Dangerous When Wet
Class 5: Oxidizer and Organic Peroxide
Class 6: Poison (Toxic) and Poison Inhalation 
Hazard
Class 7: Radioactive
Class 8: Corrosive
Class 9: Miscellaneous Materials – Chemical 
Weapons
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Trailer and Container Type
- Threat varies depending on the trailer and type of container holding hazardous materials. The list
below is of trailer and container types. Please order them from 1-6 with respect to their vulnerability
to potential terrorists attacks. “1” equals the highest threat, while “6” is the lowest vulnerability.
Trailer/Container Type Vulnerability Ranking (1-6)
Van Trailer
Cargo Tank
Container
Hopper
Flatbed
Other
- The attractiveness of a CMV carrying hazardous materials is contingent on numerous factors, such
as proximity of critical infrastructure, key resources, and population density.  Which factors, based
on your professional experience, do you believe contribute the most to elevating the dynamic
threats a Tier 1 HSSM shipment encounters?
Vulnerability Analysis
- The CIA and other intelligence agencies use the Kent Scale to convert linguistic statements into
quantitative probabilities in order to determine the likelihood that a scenario will play out. For
example, in the table below, there are a series of descriptions about the challenges involved in
executing an attack against a hazardous materials shipment. The first statement, “Attack is not
challenging and simple to execute,” denotes a linguistic possibility of “Certain,” and a quantitative
probability that the attack will not fail because of technical obstacles of 1.0 Please examine the
following Kent Scale and answer the associated question:
- V is Vulnerability
- V no failure (tech) = probability attackers do not fail due to the technical challenges of carrying out the
attack
Kent Scale for V no failure (tech)
Description Linguistic 
Probability
V no failure (tech) 
(0-1)
Attack is not challenging and simple to execute Certain 1.0
Attack is somewhat challenging and relatively simple to execute Nearly Certain 0.93
Attack is challenging and somewhat complex, requiring good 
logistics and coordination
Probable 0.75
Attack is challenging and complex, requiring substantial logistics
and coordination
Chances even 0.5
Attack is very challenging and complex, requiring substantial 
logistics and coordination
Probably not 0.3
Attack is very challenging and very complex, requiring substantial 
logistics, coordination and resources
Highly
Doubtful
0.07
Attack is very challenging and extremely complex requiring 
substantial logistics, sophisticated coordination and significant 
resources
Practically 
impossible
0.01
Attack is not possible Not Possible 0.0
Given your experience do the assigned probabilities seem reasonable?
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If not, how should the probabilities be adjusted?
- Please examine the following Kent Scale and answer the associated question:
- Here, V = Vulnerability, and
- V no failure (secure) = probability attackers do not fail because of security measures
Kent Scale for V no failure (secure)
Description Linguistic 
Probability
V no failure 
(secure) (0-1)
No security processes/procedures in place Certain 1.0
Personnel security and access control in place with minimal 
effectiveness
Nearly Certain 0.93
Personnel security and access control in place with limited 
effectiveness
Probable 0.75
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with moderate effectiveness
Chances even 0.5
Personnel security, access control and en route security in place with 
significant effectiveness
Probably not 0.3
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with high effectiveness
Highly 
Doubtful
0.07
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with maximum effectiveness
Practically 
impossible
0.01
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with complete effectiveness
Not Possible 0.0
Given your experience do the assigned probabilities seem reasonable?
If not, what alternatives do you suggest, or which probabilities would you change?
- Based upon your professional knowledge, judgment, and experience please assign V no failure (tech) 
(0-1) and V no failure (secure) (0-1) values to the following hypothetical scenarios table:
Scenario Attack Mode Hazmat Truck/Container 
Combination
V no failure 
(tech) (0-1)
V no failure 
(secure) (0-1)
1 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 1 Explosives Van Trailer
2 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 1 Explosives Container
3 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 2 Gases (non-
flammable and 
toxic)
Van Trailer
4 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 2 Gases (non-
flammable and 
toxic)
Cargo Tank
5 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 2 Gases (non-
flammable and 
toxic)
Container
6 Explosive device on the 
highway infrastructure
Class 1 Explosives Van Trailer
7 Explosive device on the Class 1 Explosives Container
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highway infrastructure
- Are there other evaluation methods (i.e. other than the Kent Scale) that would be appropriate for
estimating the vulnerability of a given shipment? If so, describe the method you have in mind,
provide a 2-3-sentence description of how it works, and a brief statement of why it offers a superior
manner of risk assessment.
Consequence Analysis
- Consequences are the effects that result from a terrorist attack and hazardous materials release.
Four dimensions of consequences—human, economic, mission, and psychological—are often
considered when assessing the potential outcomes of an attack. In some cases, factors such as
environmental conditions may be important as well, and therefore figured into consequence
assessments. Look at the following entities and categories, each of which may be impacted from a
hazardous materials release. Using the scale provided, rank the impact each one would have on the
aggregate consequences of an attack. Here 1 is no impact, and 5 is a very high impact.
Consequence Ranking
Population
Critical Infrastructure
Key Resources
Environmentally Sensitive Areas
Economic Impact
Public Psychology/Fear
International Politics
Civil Liberties
Concluding Questions
1. What considerations do you think are frequently omitted from assessments that
evaluate the level of risk associated with hazardous materials shipments?
2. Do you think that a real-time monitoring and tracking system for hazard materials shipments
would lead to the improved security of hazardous materials while expediting response times in the
case of an attack?
3. If yes, what kinds of hazardous materials should this system prioritize?
4. How vulnerable to attacks do you think the United States’ highway motor carrier hazardous
materials supply chain is?
5. What are the most pressing security challenges that shippers, carriers and consignees face with
respect to the hazardous materials transportation security landscape?
6. In your view, what steps can public (i.e. federal and state governments) and private stakeholders
take to enhance the security of hazardous materials shipments?
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Script for Telematics Providers Phone Interviews
Hello, we are researching the features of different tractor-based telematics systems. The information we collect will be 
used to compare the attributes of different systems. We will be evaluating their capacity to perform various functions. 
Our focus is on the appropriateness of systems for security-based applications. Specifically, our interest is in hazardous 
materials. We are designing a system that can be used to dynamically track the location of hazardous materials 
shipments as they move across road networks. With that in mind, we have several questions we would like to ask you 
about the telematics systems and services your company provides. Most of these are of a technical nature and are 
concerned with the features of your products and can be answered with either a “yes” or “no.” We are using a survey-
style questionnaire to keep the research as objective as possible. At the end of the interview, if you have anything you 
would like to add — for example, wanting to draw attention to a particular component of the system that we did not ask 
about but think is salient to this project — you are welcome to do so. However, we cannot make any guarantees as to 
whether this information will be included in our final report. Thank you for your time.
Questions: 
- Does your system have the capability of offering panic buttons?
- Does your system provide push to talk buttons that will automatically connect with a service center?
- Does your system provide gate-in and gate-out buttons?
- Does your system have text display?
- Does your system have a keypad that allows a driver to enter information?
- Does the onboard computer have a Bluetooth connection?
- Does the onboard computer link to both mobile devices and the in cab terminal?
- Does your system have a GPS Satellite Receiver?
- Does your system have GSM jamming detection capability?
- Does your system offer a hybrid satellite/cellular modem?
- Does the system have an impact/accident alert feature?
- Does the system have any equipment tampering detection available?
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WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH?
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the shipment of Tier 1 hazardous materials by 
highway motor carriers.  The purpose of the study is to assess the need and technology available to design a 
truck tracking and risk management system. You are being invited to take part in this research study because of 
your subject matter expertise in relation to truck telematics. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be 
one of about five people to provide information on truck telematics systems available in North America. 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY?
The person in charge of this study is Steven Douglas (Doug) Kreis (Principal Investigator, PI) of University of 
Kentucky Department of Civil Engineering. Doug is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Civil Engineering, 
and he is being guided in his research by Dr. Tim Taylor (Advisor).
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
By doing this study, we hope to learn about the range of telematics providers available to the trucking industry, 
and the range of services that those providers offer.  The hope is to ascertain the current technology available, 
and the cost of this technology to the individual truck driver.
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
No.
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
The research procedures will be conducted at College of Engineering, in the University of Kentucky. The interview 
will be conducted over the phone, and it is estimated to take 45-60 minutes of your time.  You will be contacted 
during regular business hours, at a time that is most convenient to you.
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?
You will be asked questions about the telematics system that your company offers to the trucking industry.  These 
questions will cover aspects such as cost of initial installation, monthly costs, system operations requirements 
and/or platforms, tracking capabilities and technology employed (e.g. GPS, or satellite) and any additional 
features or services offered as a part of your device.
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WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience 
in everyday life.
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study.
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY?
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer.  You will not lose any 
benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer.  You can stop at any time during the 
study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before volunteering. 
IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES?
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in the study.
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE?
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study.
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study.
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE?
We will make every effort to keep confidential all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law.
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write 
about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. 
You will not be personally identified in these written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, 
we will keep your name and other identifying information private. 
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us 
information, or what that information is.  The data generated during the course of the study will be stored on the 
PI’s desktop computer.  This data will be password protected, and no one will have access to the desktop or the 
office except the PI.  The data will be destroyed 6 years after completion of the project.  PI generated notes 
pertaining to conversations will be kept in a locked file cabinet, inside the PI’s locked office on the University of 
Kentucky campus.  After the 6 years of holding the records has lapsed, the desktop hard drive will be wiped by 
the College of Engineering’s computer technician. Additionally, no information or data generated during the 
course of the study will be sent to anyone via email.
We may be required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done the 
research correctly; these would be people from such organizations as the University of Kentucky.
CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY?
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If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to 
continue.  You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the study.  
WHAT ELSE DO YOU NEED TO KNOW?
There is a possibility that the data collected from you may be shared with other investigators in the future.  If that 
is the case the data will not contain information that can identify you unless you give your consent or the UK 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approves the research. The IRB is a committee that reviews ethical issues, 
according to federal, state and local regulations on research with human subjects, to make sure the study 
complies with these before approval of a research study is issued.
WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR COMPLAINTS?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might 
come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study, you can 
contact the investigator, Doug Kreis at 859-257-6898.  If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer 
in this research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky between the 
business hours of 8am and 5pm EST, Mon-Fri. at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428.  
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  Consent to Participate in a Research Study
Tier 1 hazardous materials shipment security – Addressing critical research gaps to secure the United 
States supply chain
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH?
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the shipment of Tier 1 hazardous materials by 
highway motor carriers.  The purpose of the study is to assess the need and technology available to design a 
truck tracking and risk management system. You are being invited to take part in this research study because of
your subject matter expertise in relation to the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) conducted beginning October 
2005. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of about four people to provide information on the 
HTSP. 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY?
The person in charge of this study is Steven Douglas (Doug) Kreis (Principal Investigator, PI) of University of 
Kentucky Department of Civil Engineering. Doug is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Civil Engineering, 
and he is being guided in his research by Dr. Tim Taylor (Advisor).
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
By doing this study, we hope to evaluate the HTSP, and develop a list of lessons learned during the initial pilot 
study.  These lessons learned will be used to inform our system architecture for a truck tracking and risk 
management system that would serve the shippers, carriers and consignees involved in the hazardous material 
supply chain.  
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
No.
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
The research procedures will be conducted at College of Engineering, in the University of Kentucky. The interview 
will be conducted over the phone, and it is estimated to take 45-60 minutes of your time.  You will be contacted 
during regular business hours, at a time that is most convenient to you.
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WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?
You will be asked questions about your involvement in the HTSP.  You will be asked to give your opinion on both 
the successes and failures of the original project.  You will also be asked your opinion on the original study 
methods.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience
in everyday life.
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study.
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY?
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer.  You will not lose any 
benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer.  You can stop at any time during the 
study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before volunteering. 
IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES?
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in the study.
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE?
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study.
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study.
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE?
We will make every effort to keep confidential all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law.
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write 
about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. 
You will not be personally identified in these written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, 
we will keep your name and other identifying information private. 
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us 
information, or what that information is. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research 
team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is.  The data generated during the 
course of the study will be stored on the PI’s desktop computer.  This data will be password protected, and no one 
will have access to the desktop or the office except the PI.  The data will be destroyed 6 years after completion of 
the project.  PI generated notes pertaining to conversations will be kept in a locked file cabinet, inside the PI’s 
locked office on the University of Kentucky campus.  After the 6 years of holding the records has lapsed, the 
desktop hard drive will be wiped by the College of Engineering’s computer technician. Additionally, no information 
or data generated during the course of the study will be sent to anyone via email.
We may be required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done the 
research correctly; these would be people from such organizations as the University of Kentucky.
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CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY?
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to 
continue. You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the study.  
WHAT ELSE DO YOU NEED TO KNOW?
There is a possibility that the data collected from you may be shared with other investigators in the future.  If that 
is the case the data will not contain information that can identify you unless you give your consent or the UK 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approves the research. The IRB is a committee that reviews ethical issues, 
according to federal, state and local regulations on research with human subjects, to make sure the study 
complies with these before approval of a research study is issued.
WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR COMPLAINTS?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might 
come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study, you can 
contact the investigator, Doug Kreis at 859-257-6898.  If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer 
in this research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky between the 
business hours of 8am and 5pm EST, Mon-Fri. at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428.  
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Kreis Survey Cover Letter 
To XXXXX: 
You are being invited to participate in an online survey for a project titled “Tier 1 hazardous materials 
shipment security – Addressing critical research gaps to secure the United States supply chain”.  This 
survey is being completed as a part of a doctoral dissertation that seeks to develop a risk analysis and 
management protocol for Tier 1 highway security sensitive materials that will improve both the safety 
and security of highway based freight.  This survey is being sent to subject matter experts in the field of 
highway security sensitive materials nationwide, including representatives from government agencies, 
private industry and academia.  The purpose of the survey is to request your feedback and based upon 
your expertise rank a number of fields that will assist the PI Steven Kreis in developing a semi-
quantitative risk equation.  This equation will be used to analyze the risk of a particular shipment of 
hazardous material in both space and time.  That is to assist in determining how the risk profile of a 
shipment will change as it moves across the country (rural as opposed to urban locations) and in time 
(daytime or rush hour as opposed to nighttime).    
Although you will not get personal benefit from taking part in this research study, your responses may 
help us understand more about these shipments and the biggest risks associated with them, as 
perceived by our Nation’s leading experts and practitioners in this field.   
We hope to receive completed questionnaires from about 200 people, so your answers are important 
to us.  Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the survey/questionnaire, but if 
you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or discontinue at any time.   
The survey/questionnaire will take about 30 minutes to complete.   
There are no known risks to participating in this study. 
Although we have tried to minimize this, some questions may be beyond your area of expertise or you 
may feel uncomfortable providing a response.  If this is the case you have the option to quit the survey, 
or preferably skip the question and continue with the questions you do feel comfortable answering. 
Your response to the survey will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law.  When we write 
about the study you will not be identified. 
Please be aware, while we make every effort to safeguard your data once received from the online 
survey/data gathering company, given the nature of online surveys, as with anything involving the 
Internet, we can never guarantee the confidentiality of the data while still on the survey/data 
gathering company’s servers, or while en route to either them or us. It is also possible the raw data 
collected for research purposes may be used for marketing or reporting purposes by the survey/data 
gathering company after the research is concluded, depending on the company’s Terms of Service and 
Privacy policies. 
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If you have questions about the study, please feel free to ask; my contact information is given below. I 
am a PhD candidate at the University of Kentucky, and this research will be used as a part of my 
doctoral degree.  Study questions can also be directed to my faculty advisory Dr. Timothy Taylor, who 
can be contacted at the University of Kentucky tim.taylor@uky.edu or 859 323 3680.  If you have 
complaints, suggestions, or questions about your rights as a research volunteer, contact the staff in the 
University of Kentucky Office of Research Integrity at 859-257-9428 or toll-free at 1-866-400-9428. 
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.  I would appreciate if you could 
respond at any time in the coming two weeks.  
Sincerely, 
Steven Douglas Kreis 
College of Engineering, 
University of Kentucky 
PHONE:  859-257-6898 
E-MAIL:  dougkreis@uky.edu
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Study Title: Tier 1 hazardous materials shipment security – Addressing critical research gaps to secure 
the United States supply chain
Form F – IRB Application for Waiver of Documentation of Informed Consent 2/15/12
S2F University of Kentucky
Form F
Include in IRB Application to
Waive Requirement for Documentation of Informed Consent
Check the box next to the option below that best fits your study, and explain in the space provided how 
your study meets the criteria for the selected regulatory option. 
Note:  The IRB cannot waive the requirement for documentation or alter the consent form for FDA-regulated 
research unless it meets Option #2 below.  FDA does not accept Option #1.
Note:  Even if a waiver of the requirement for documentation is approved by the IRB, participants must still be 
provided oral or written (e.g., cover letter) information including all required and appropriate elements of consent.
Option 1
a) The only record linking the participant and the research would be the consent document.
b) The principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality (i.e., a study that
involves participants who use illegal drugs).
Under these conditions, each participant must be asked whether (s)he wants to sign a consent form; if the 
participant agrees to sign a consent form, only an IRB approved version should be used.
Option 2
a) The research presents no more than minimal risk to the participant.
b) The research involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the
research context (i.e. a cover letter on a survey, or a phone script).
The interviews will be conducted over the phone, and will have an accompanying email provided to the 
interviewees beforehand that covers all the necessary information involved in informed consent.  This 
email will be tailored to each of the interviewees, and should reduce the burden on the individuals taking 
part in the phone interviews.  The informed consent email will be tailored for a) the Telematics Providers 
and b) General Dynamics employees.  The online survey will include a cover letter that explains the 
purpose of the study, and follows the template provided by IRB.
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Interview Questions for General Dynamics
In October 2005, General Dynamics began work on a Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP). The purpose of 
this program was to demonstrate whether “smart truck” technology could be incorporated into an effective 
and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. While this study verified a tracking system could be 
implemented, there were many shortcomings with the system design that would have prevented the General 
Dynamics system from being implemented on a nationwide scale. Some of these issues were related to
system architecture, while others stemmed from the system malfunctioning during testing. This set of 
interview questions will be administered during conversations with General Dynamics personnel, the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration’s independent verification and validation contractor – which 
evaluated the prototype for the federal government, – U.S. Department of Homeland Security staff, and 
private sector stakeholders to identify a set of lessons learned from the HTSP. In cataloguing lessons 
learned, future iterations of Fedtrak can be refined, and the appropriate systems engineering principles 
used, to improve system performance and meet the needs of multiple stakeholders. While these questions 
are concerned with understanding how engineering principles are used in an applied context, this 
knowledge is of academic value in that it can inform literature focused on the design and implementation of 
complex systems. Interviews will use a semi-structured format. That is, all participants, regardless of 
background, will be asked the questions listed below; however, when a participant brings up a point that 
requires further exploration because it promises to deepen our conceptual knowledge, I will pursue those 
lines of inquiry in a more unstructured manner. Follow-up questions that depart from the list below will be 
recorded in interview notes.
Questions
1. Describe your involvement in the HTSP (e.g. designer, engineer, evaluator).
2. From your perspective, did this program adequately demonstrate that “smart truck” technology
could be used to track and monitor hazardous materials shipments?
3. A key component of HTSP development was the Transportation Event Analysis and Management
System (TEAMS), an even-based system that stored and displayed information relating to
potential transportation security incidents. What were the major shortcomings TEAMS and HTSP
technology prototypes more generally?
a. How did these defects impact overall system performance?
b. Were any components of the system particularly vulnerable to failure?
c. During prototype testing, what were the most significant problems?
i. Would any of these problems inhibit the implementation of a truck-tracking
system? If so, which ones?
4. Did the HTSP technology prototype meet the needs of a wide range of users (e.g. security
specialists, private sector entities, state and federal governments)? If not, what design changes
would be necessary to make the system more accommodating?
5. TEAMS used several geo-fencing algorithms to identify when and where a potential transportation
security incident was underway. Were the assumptions underpinning geo-fencing conceptually
and empirically sound? If not, what changes would be necessary to implement a more robust
tracking and monitoring system?
a. Should geographic information systems (GIS) be used more extensively when refining
geo-fencing solutions?
6. The HTSP technology prototype used an already-existing commercial product, FdFolio™, to
perform risk analysis on hazmat shipments. Were the risk calculation methods implemented by
this software appropriate for a monitoring and tracking system?
a. If not, what changes would you suggest to improve risk calculations and therefore
enhance the visibility of potentially vulnerable shipments?
b. Is a more dynamic form of risk calculation appropriate?
c. What variables are most important for accurately estimating the level of risk associated
with a hazmat shipment?
7. The independent verification and validation contractor put forward 11 recommendations to build
upon and improve the HTSP technology prototype. Which of these suggestions do you feel it
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would be most critical to implement during future phases of system development, and which 
would yield the most significant security benefits?
8. The HTSP technology prototype design did not explicitly cater to the Tier 1 HSSMs. Bearing in
mind that future system development will exclusively target this class of hazardous materials,
what changes should be made to the technology prototype to comply with current governmental
regulations pertaining to their security.
9. Should e-manifests and electronic route preparation be more integral for the tracking and
monitoring system?
10. What attributes would a successful truck tracking center possess (this applies to the performance
of security specialists, software design, communication between stakeholders, or any other factor
that you believe warrants particular scrutiny)?
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Hazardous Materials Transport Survey for Subject Matter Experts
Organization:
Attack Modes:
Please examine the following attack scenarios involving commercial motor vehicles hazardous 
materials and rank each one from 1-5 according to likelihood (this is a modified Likert Scale). Here, 
a 1 indicates the scenario is extremely unlikely to occur, and a 5 indicates occurrence is very 
probable.
Attack Mode Description Ranking
Explosive device placed on a commercial 
motor vehicle (CMV)
Explosive device placed on highway 
infrastructure of a planned CMV route
Weapon launched at a CMV from a distance 
(e.g. high powered rifle, rocket propelled 
grenade)
Explosive device placed in a vehicle near a 
CMV (i.e. Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Device – VBIED)
A hijacker commandeers a CMV to 
immediately release hazardous materials or 
catalyze an explosion
A hijacker commandeers a CMV and drives 
it to a nearby location with the intent of 
releasing hazardous materials or catalyzing 
an explosion  
An insider (e.g. trucking firm employee) 
commandeers a CMV to immediately release 
hazardous materials or catalyze and 
explosion
An insider (e.g. trucking firm employee) 
commandeers a CMB and drives it to a 
nearby location with the intent of releasing 
hazardous materials or catalyzing an 
explosion
Sabotage of TIH cargo tank motor vehicle 
(e.g. opening or damaging a valve)
External crash initiate (e.g. placing
something on the roadway, collision with 
another vehicle)
An aircraft is used to attack a hazardous 
material shipment
Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
attack (CBRN)
A waterborne vessel carrying an IED 
explodes close to a CMV 
Coordinated or sequential attacks (e.g. 
sabotage of a truck’s braking system and 
subsequent use of a rocket-propelled grenade 
once the vehicle crashes)
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Burglary or theft of hazmat materials (i.e. 
removing the materials from the vehicle)
Damage to hazardous materials (through 
vandalism or some other means) that does 
not produce a release or explosion
Cyber-attack causing theft/diversion (e.g. 
electronically changing a manifest so that 
hazmat are delivered to an improper 
destination)
Natural disasters (e.g. hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake)
Based on your professional experience, which of the preceding scenarios are in your opinion the most 
likely?
Why do these particular scenarios merit extra scrutiny?
Threat Analysis Questions
- The following questions relate to threat analysis for highway motor carriers transporting hazardous
materials.
Which of the following hazardous materials classes should be considered in dynamic threat calculations?
(Dynamic meaning a threat value that would change as the location of the material changed both
temporally and spatially)
Hazardous Materials Class Inclusion? (Yes/No)
Class 1: Explosives
Class 2: Gasses
Class 3: Flammable Liquid and Combustible 
Liquid
Class 4: Flammable Solid, Spontaneously 
Combustible, and Dangerous When Wet
Class 5: Oxidizer and Organic Peroxide
Class 6: Poison (Toxic) and Poison Inhalation 
Hazard
Class 7: Radioactive
Class 8: Corrosive
Class 9: Miscellaneous Materials – Chemical 
Weapons
Trailer and Container Type
- Threat varies depending on the trailer and type of container holding hazardous materials. The list below is
of trailer and container types. Please order them from 1-6 with respect to their vulnerability to potential
terrorists attacks. “1” equals the highest threat, while “6” is the lowest vulnerability.
Trailer/Container Type Vulnerability Ranking (1-6)
Van Trailer
Cargo Tank
Container
Hopper
Flatbed
Other
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- The attractiveness of a CMV carrying hazardous materials is contingent on numerous factors, such as
proximity of critical infrastructure, key resources, and population density.  Which factors, based on your
professional experience, do you believe contribute the most to elevating the dynamic threats a Tier 1 HSSM
shipment encounters?
Vulnerability Analysis
- The CIA and other intelligence agencies use the Kent Scale to convert linguistic statements into
quantitative probabilities in order to determine the likelihood that a scenario will play out. For example, in
the table below, there are a series of descriptions about the challenges involved in executing an attack
against a hazardous materials shipment. The first statement, “Attack is not challenging and simple to
execute,” denotes a linguistic possibility of “Certain,” and a quantitative probability that the attack will not
fail because of technical obstacles of 1.0 Please examine the following Kent Scale and answer the
associated question:
- V is Vulnerability
- V no failure (tech) = probability attackers do not fail due to the technical challenges of carrying out the attack
Kent Scale for V no failure (tech)
Description Linguistic 
Probability
V no failure 
(tech) (0-1)
Attack is not challenging and simple to execute Certain 1.0
Attack is somewhat challenging and relatively simple to execute Nearly Certain 0.93
Attack is challenging and somewhat complex, requiring good 
logistics and coordination
Probable 0.75
Attack is challenging and complex, requiring substantial logistics 
and coordination
Chances even 0.5
Attack is very challenging and complex, requiring substantial 
logistics and coordination
Probably not 0.3
Attack is very challenging and very complex, requiring substantial 
logistics, coordination and resources
Highly 
Doubtful
0.07
Attack is very challenging and extremely complex requiring 
substantial logistics, sophisticated coordination and significant 
resources
Practically 
impossible
0.01
Attack is not possible Not Possible 0.0
Given your experience do the assigned probabilities seem reasonable?
If not, how should the probabilities be adjusted?
- Please examine the following Kent Scale and answer the associated question:
- Here, V = Vulnerability, and
- V no failure (secure) = probability attackers do not fail because of security measures
Kent Scale for V no failure (secure)
Description Linguistic 
Probability
V no failure 
(secure) (0-1)
No security processes/procedures in place Certain 1.0
Personnel security and access control in place with minimal 
effectiveness
Nearly Certain 0.93
Personnel security and access control in place with limited 
effectiveness
Probable 0.75
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with moderate effectiveness
Chances even 0.5
Personnel security, access control and en route security in place with 
significant effectiveness
Probably not 0.3
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place Highly 0.07
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with high effectiveness Doubtful
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with maximum effectiveness
Practically 
impossible
0.01
Personnel security, access control, and en-route security in place 
with complete effectiveness
Not Possible 0.0
Given your experience do the assigned probabilities seem reasonable?
If not, what alternatives do you suggest, or which probabilities would you change?
- Based upon your professional knowledge, judgment, and experience please assign V no failure (tech) (0-1) and
V no failure (secure) (0-1) values to the following hypothetical scenarios table:
Scenario Attack Mode Hazmat Truck/Container 
Combination
V no failure 
(tech) (0-1)
V no failure 
(secure) (0-
1)
1 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 1 Explosives Van Trailer
2 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 1 Explosives Container
3 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 2 Gases (non-
flammable and 
toxic)
Van Trailer
4 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 2 Gases (non-
flammable and 
toxic)
Cargo Tank
5 Explosive device on 
CMV
Class 2 Gases (non-
flammable and 
toxic)
Container
6 Explosive device on the 
highway infrastructure
Class 1 Explosives Van Trailer
7 Explosive device on the 
highway infrastructure
Class 1 Explosives Container
- Are there other evaluation methods (i.e. other than the Kent Scale) that would be appropriate for
estimating the vulnerability of a given shipment? If so, describe the method you have in mind, provide a 2-
3-sentence description of how it works, and a brief statement of why it offers a superior manner of risk
assessment.
Consequence Analysis
- Consequences are the effects that result from a terrorist attack and hazardous materials release. Four
dimensions of consequences—human, economic, mission, and psychological—are often considered when
assessing the potential outcomes of an attack. In some cases, factors such as environmental conditions may
be important as well, and therefore figured into consequence assessments. Look at the following entities
and categories, each of which may be impacted from a hazardous materials release. Using the scale
provided, rank the impact each one would have on the aggregate consequences of an attack. Here 1 is no
impact, and 5 is a very high impact.
Consequence Ranking
Population
Critical Infrastructure
Key Resources
Environmentally Sensitive Areas
Economic Impact
Public Psychology/Fear
International Politics
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Civil Liberties
Concluding Questions
1. What considerations do you think are frequently omitted from assessments that evaluate the level of risk
associated with hazardous materials shipments?
2. Do you think that a real-time monitoring and tracking system for hazard materials shipments would lead
to the improved security of hazardous materials while expediting response times in the case of an attack?
3. If yes, what kinds of hazardous materials should this system prioritize?
4. How vulnerable to attacks do you think the United States’ highway motor carrier hazardous materials
supply chain is?
5. What are the most pressing security challenges that shippers, carriers and consignees face with respect to
the hazardous materials transportation security landscape?
6. In your view, what steps can public (i.e. federal and state governments) and private stakeholders take to
enhance the security of hazardous materials shipments?
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Script for Telematics Providers Phone Interviews 
Hello, we are researching the features of different tractor-based telematics systems. The information we 
collect will be used to compare the attributes of different systems. We will be evaluating their capacity to 
perform various functions. Our focus is on the appropriateness of systems for security-based applications. 
Specifically, our interest is in hazardous materials. We are designing a system that can be used to 
dynamically track the location of hazardous materials shipments as they move across road networks. With 
that in mind, we have several questions we would like to ask you about the telematics systems and services 
your company provides. Most of these are of a technical nature and are concerned with the features of your 
products and can be answered with either a “yes” or “no.” We are using a survey-style questionnaire to 
keep the research as objective as possible. At the end of the interview, if you have anything you would like 
to add — for example, wanting to draw attention to a particular component of the system that we did not 
ask about but think is salient to this project — you are welcome to do so. However, we cannot make any 
guarantees as to whether this information will be included in our final report. Thank you for your time. 
Questions:
Does your system have the capability of offering panic buttons? 
Does your system provide push to talk buttons that will automatically connect with a service 
center? 
Does your system provide gate-in and gate-out buttons? 
Does your system have text display? 
Does your system have a keypad that allows a driver to enter information? 
Does the onboard computer have a Bluetooth connection? 
Does the onboard computer link to both mobile devices and the in cab terminal? 
Does your system have a GPS Satellite Receiver? 
Does your system have GSM jamming detection capability? 
Does your system offer a hybrid satellite/cellular modem? 
Does the system have an impact/accident alert feature? 
Does the system have any equipment tampering detection available? 
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